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 The thesis is an exploratory study of the Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF), an 
independent autonomous public organisation (APO) and its NGO partners in Thailand. It aims to 
make an explanatory account on why NGOisation of civil society has unfolded in Thailand. Since 
it was established in 2001, the THPF has operated by subsidising its partners to promote public 
health policies and civil society. It has become one of the biggest sources of funding for the NGO 
sector and has a considerable impact on the trajectory of the sector. The funded NGOs are 
facilitated in adapting themselves to become reliable partners in order to match the aims of THPF’s 
overall programme. However, the relationship between them does not involve an absolute 
patronage relationship. In fact, different NGOs have different kinds of relations with the THPF. 
The different relations also affect the overall character of the THPF. Hence, the relationship is 
dynamic. To be precise, this thesis argues that the THPF-NGO relations are interdependent, 
asymmetrical, and consequential. 
 Two major theoretical frameworks are developed and employed to investigate the 
phenomenon: NGOisation and metagovernance. NGOisation helps examine the influences of the 
funding on the NGOs. It encourages us to look at the signs and the development of the funded 
NGOs. Metagovernance helps conceptualise the way the THPF has steered and governed the 
funded NGO partnership in a way that allows the NGOs to develop their autonomy.  
The research is navigated by critical realism (CR) which typically encourages the search 
for mechanisms of metagovernance and NGOisation instead of people’s understanding or 
associations with them. As qualitative research, information is drawn from in-depth interviews 
with 50 participants from the THPF and the funded NGOs and documents such as minutes of 
meetings and publications of the relevant organisations. 
 The thesis found that while NGOs have relied on the funding to operate, and perhaps to 
survive, the THPF has depended totally on the NGOs to implement the projects/programmes. The 
THPF has been strategically functioning in an ‘innovative’ way combining different kinds of 
governance mechanisms to steer the NGOs in the ways they perceive as appropriate. The THPF is 
also seen to exercise its power through its societal partners signifying a relational aspect of state-
society cooperation. 
 v 
 As an independent APO, the THPF is equipped with resources and the capacity to steer. 
As an enabler to promote health and improvements in society, it aims to bring about changes in 
health and social developments. This thesis argues that the THPF performs metagovernance. The 
THPF strategically uses interactive governance mechanisms, namely quasi-markets (proactive 
granting) and quasi-network (partnership). They are the key mechanisms employed by the THPF 
to metagovern its NGO partners. 
Consequently, NGOisation of civil society has unfolded. This phenomenon signifies a 
version of civil society which is focused on institutional advocacy, elite civil society, and upward 
accountability. NGOised organisations are driven to become more professionalised, 
institutionalised, bureaucratised, and depoliticised. Organisational reproduction is becoming the 
essence of the organisation of NGOs rather than the social constituencies they are supposed to 
represent.  
The THPF-NGO cooperation thus represents a version of state-society relations in 
Thailand, where the state has changed from a traditional form of government to a metagovernor 
exercising its power throughout civil society and a combination of governance mechanisms 
beyond mere hierarchies. It also reflects how civil society has become more professionalised, 
institutionalised, bureaucratised, and depoliticised. This paves the way to looking at a relational 


















Contents           vi 
Figures           xi 
Tables            xii 
Abbreviations           xiii 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction         1 
1.1 Research Aims         1 
1.2 Setting the scene: an introduction to NGOs and the THPF   3  
  1.2.1 NGO in Thailand       3 
1.2.2 The THPF and the changing landscape of NGO funding   7 
 1.3 State of the research         11 
  1.3.1 NGOs and the state funding      12 
  1.3.2 NGO studies in Thailand      14 
  1.3.3 Why does NGOisation matter?      15 
1.3.4 Why does metagovernance of the THPF matter?   18 
 1.4 Structure of the thesis        20 
 
Chapter 2 Theoretical frameworks: NGOisation and Metagovernance  22 
 2.1 NGOisation         22 
2.1.1 NGOisation process       23 
  2.1.2 NGOisation of civil society and its implications   26 
2.2 Metagovernance         31 
2.2.1 Metagovernance and governance     32 
 2.2.2 Steering through hierarchies, markets, and networks   33 
  2.2.3 Conceptualising metagovernance     34 
 2.2.4 The analytic of metagovernance     36 






Chapter 3 Methodology         46 
 3.1 Critical realism and social research      46 
  3.1.1 The layered ontology and the ‘emergence’    47 
  3.1.2 Epistemology        48 
3.1.3 Causation and mechanisms      49 
 3.2 Retroductive research strategy       50 
 3.3 Data collection and analysis       52 
 3.3.1 In-depth interviews       53 
3.3.2 Supplementary methods      56 
3.3.3 Data analysis        58 
3.4 Reflexivity and research challenges      62 
  3.4.1 Research reflexivity       62 
 3.4.2 Difficulties in finding mechanisms     64 
 3.4.3 Problems encountered during the fieldwork    65 
3.5 Conclusion         66 
 
Chapter 4 State-society relations, NGO funding, and the THPF   67 
 4.1 State-society relations in Thailand      67 
4.2 NGO funding         69 
  4.2.1 Foreign funding: rise and decline     70 
4.2.2 Public funding and the rise of quangos     72 
4.3 The rise of the THPF        77 
4.3.1 Agencification movement and the creation of independent APOs 77 
4.3.2 Health promotion movement and the creation of HPFs  78 
4.4 Health promotion in the era of the THPF     83 
4.4.1 THPF’s approach to health      83 
4.4.2 The governance of the THPF      87 





4.5 Conclusion         95 
 
Chapter 5 THPF-NGO relations: relational aspects     96 
 5.1 The THPF, NGOs, and their interdependent relations    96 
5.1.1 Resource dependent NGOs?      96 
5.1.2 The interdependent relation      100 
 5.2 Multifaceted character of the THPF      109 
  5.2.1 Grantor         110 
  5.2.2 Alliance/infrastructure of civil society     112 
  5.2.3 Health and societal promotion enabler     113 
 5.3 Conclusion         116 
 
Chapter 6 Metagovernance of the THPF (I): interactive governance and 
the ‘shadow of hierarchy’       118 
 6.1 The THPF as a metagovernor       119 
6.1.1 The metagoverning THPF and NGO sponsorship   120 
6.1.2 The metagoverning THPF and the use of interactive governance 121 
   6.1.2.1 Quasi-markets: strategic granting    122 
6.1.2.2 Quasi-networks: networks and partnerships   124 
6.2 The ‘shadow of hierarchy’: the higher-order steering    133 
6.2.1 Audit as a practice of verification     134 
6.2.2 The board of governance as a legitimate hierarchical supervision 135 
6.3 Conclusion         141 
 
Chapter 7 Metagovernance of the THPF (II): partnership strategy  
and proactive granting       143 
 7.1 Governing NGO partners: the ‘tri-power strategy’    144 





  7.1.2 The ‘tri-power strategy’ as strategic supervision   151 
7.2 Governing civil society through NGOs: proactive granting   153 
7.3 Conclusion         163 
 
Chapter 8 NGOisation of Civil Society       165 
 8.1 Professionalisation and institutionalisation of civil society   165 
 8.2 Grant-making and ‘contracting regime’      168 
 8.3 ‘Success myth’ and indicators-led development     171 
 8.4 Project review mind-set and ‘project-based’ mentality    173 
 8.5 Colonisation of ‘health’ and isomorphic pressure    177 
 8.6 Bureaucratisation         178 
8.7 Becoming stronger, becoming organised      182 
 8.8 Partnering with the state and the institutional advocacy     185 
 8.9 Depoliticised NGOs        190 
 8.10 Conclusion         193 
 
Chapter 9 Conclusion         194 
 9.1 THPF-NGO relations, metagovernance and NGOisation   194 
9.1.1 The interdependent relation: state-society relations  
in relational perspective       195 
9.1.2 The asymmetrical relation: the metagoverning THPF  
and the funded NGOs        196 
  9.1.3 The consequential relation: NGOisation of civil society  199 
 9.2 CR and the research on metagovernance and NGOisation   201 
 9.3 Contributions         203 
 9.4 Limitations of the research       204 
 9.5 Directions for further research       205 





References           207 
 
Appendices           248  
Appendix A Interview Guideline       249 
 Appendix B Lists of interview participants     255 



























Figure 1.1 The proliferation of organised civil society in Thailand    5 
Figure 2.1 NGOisation framework          26 
Figure 2.2 Public advocacy and institutional advocacy     31 
Figure 2.3. The analytic of metagovernance       37 
Figure 4.1 Brief timeline of the development of civil society funding   75 
Figure 4.2 THPF’s structure of governance and administration of plans and projects 86 
Figure 4.3 Relationship between the THPF, its boards and national authorities  88 
Figure 5.1 Types of NGOs and their relations with the THPF    104 
Figure 5.2 Iceberg model of THPF key functions       116 
Figure 7.1 ‘Tri-power strategy’ model       144 
Figure 7.2 The differently balanced triangle in alcohol control, tobacco control,    
 and accident prevention        149 




















Table 3.1 Codes and their links to empirical data      60 
Table 4.1 Eras of civil society funding in Thailand      76 
Table 4.2 The differences between agency-type APOs and independent APOs  78 
Table 4.3 Strategic plans of the THPF and their administration    85 
Table 5.1 Proportions of the annual THPF funding separated by types of agencies (%) 97 
Table 5.2 Perceived roles, positions, and steering capacity of the THPF   110 


























APO  = Autonomous public organisation 
CODI  = Community Organisation Development Institution 
CR  =  Critical realism 
GONGO = Government-organised nongovernmental organisation 
HiAP  = Health in all policies 
HPF  = Health Promotion Foundation 
HPP  = Healthy public policy 
MoPH  = Ministry of Public Health 
NESDP = National Economic and Social Development Plan 
NGO  = Nongovernmental organisation 
NPM  = New Public Management 
PAC  = Plan Administrative Committee 
PSC  = Project Steering Committee 
Quango = Quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organisation 
RDM  = Rural Doctor Movement 
SDH  = Social determinants of health 
THPF  = Thai Health Promotion Foundation 
UHC  = Universal Health Coverage 
VicHealth = Victorian Health Promotion Foundation 








1.1 Research Aims 
Thai nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) are arguably naïve towards state funding. 
The research found that many NGO workers do not see the political aspect attached to asymmetric 
power relations in their interactions with the funder, reflecting a narrow world view of state power 
held by the NGOs (Rakyutidharm 2014a, 2014b). Likewise, in a recent survey of organised civil 
society across the country (n=1,000) conducted by the Civil Society Empowerment Institute 
(Chaiyapan 2019), funding, either from the state or business agencies, is only seen by organised 
civil society as an opportunity for work and a technique which can be managed, notably through 
lobbying and negotiating; it has never been mentioned as a threat to the development of the sector. 
Instead, what is seen as threats are more direct such as government policies that violate community 
rights and jeopardise the environment, government barriers on information access and public 
hearing, capitalism and passive citizenship. Worst, some NGO workers, as stated in the survey, 
tend to view ‘receiving government funding’ as ‘a kind of utilisation of public resources’: an action 
which is legitimate for the NGOs to do. NGOs think that grants derived from people’s tax are spent 
by them in the public interest as they claim to represent a specific constituency. This can imply 
that the NGO community is not concerned much with the indirect effect of state actions, 
particularly funding, let alone other subtle instruments of governing, which can have a 
considerable impact on the sector. The problem is, argued Barnett and Walker (2015), that funders 
control the resources and the agenda although they claim to build a partnership and empower the 
partners; they tend to include only initiatives and actors which reinforce their position and interests. 
Sombatpoonsiri (2018a, p. 9) depicts several weaknesses from which Thai civil society has 
suffered:  
 
Some groups pursued single-issue-based campaigns that were blind to the intersections of different 
social problems. Many competed for resources and prestige rather than cooperating with each other 
and a number of organisations lost their political independence by relying on state funding. Others 
adopted a patronising stance toward grassroots communities and became increasingly detached 
from the changing needs of rural populations… Efforts to address these shortcomings remained 
limited. Together with Thai society’s authoritarian political culture, which views NGOs’ 
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contentious politics as a driver of political instability, this failure to self-reflect reduced the 
legitimacy of NGOs in the public eye. 
 
 The statement above obviously reflects a symptom of NGOisation mostly due to the state 
and its funding. NGOisation of civil society refers to a shift from rather loosely organised, 
horizontally dispersed and broadly mobilising social movements to more professionalised, 
technocratic, member-less, vertically structured organisations (Lang 2013; Choudry and Kapoor 
2013a). Besides, from what Sombatpoonsiri (2018a) said, there is a limited source of knowledge 
concerning the issue of civil society funding and the state-civil society relations in Thailand. The 
relationship that NGOs have with the state and public agencies has not been sufficiently 
empirically investigated. The way the NGOs have been influenced by the state is also overlooked 
in empirical research. This thesis would like to address the state influence and the modus operandi 
of NGO funding, which is often overlooked, by investigating the relationship between the THPF 
and the NGOs. 
This thesis mainly aims to study why the NGOisation of civil society happens and become 
the way it does through the examination of the relationship between the Thai Health Promotion 
Foundation (THPF), one of the largest public funding initiatives for civil society in the country, 
and NGOs in Thailand. The research of the thesis is assisted and guided by critical realism (CR). 
For CR, dealing with ‘why’ is to deal with explaining the cause or reason which requires a 
‘retroductive’ research strategy: the creation of hypotheses regarding the structures and the 
mechanisms responsible for the phenomena of the study and theories to guide the data collection 
and analysis (Blaikie 2010). In other words, retroduction involves an examination into the potential 
mechanisms which lead to the emergence of the phenomena. This will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
Using the analytic of metagovernance and the concept of NGOisation, the thesis 
investigates the ways in which the NGOs are governed and steered by the THPF. It is expected 
that the mechanisms of metagovernance conducted by the THPF are the ones generating the 
NGOisation of civil society in Thailand. As a result, this thesis also aims to build or develop an 
explanation of the phenomenon of NGOisation which has happened through the THPF-NGO 
relations. 
The level of analysis of the research is at the organisational and inter-organisational level. 
This work is interested in the relationship between the THPF and its NGO partners. It suggests 
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that the expansion of THPF funding has been central to the very nature of contemporary civil 
society in Thailand. It describes the new funding landscape which arose after the 2000s focusing 
on the emergence of the THPF that fundamentally altered the terrain of NGOs, and specifically 
shows how the THPF has used its governing mechanisms to transform what may be described as 
the NGO ecosystem in Thailand.  
The main argument of the thesis is that the THPF metagoverns, or strategically steers its 
NGO partnership in a way which typically allows the NGOs as recipients to perform their ‘own’ 
missions and enjoy their autonomy. The metagovernance of the THPF, notably through strategic 
funding and partnership, is mostly responsible for driving NGOisation. The NGOs under the 
funding of THPF have become more NGOised, that is, become preoccupied with organisational 
reproduction and institutional advocacy at the expense of gradually distancing themselves from 
their social base and social movement strategies. With the metagoverning position of the THPF, 
the NGOisation has emerged and continues ‘by default’. The THPF is successful in integrating the 
NGOs into its system and creating partnerships; it is responsible for coordinating non-state 
initiatives. Also, the NGOs share certain agendas with the THPF. They principally and practically 
act in concert with the THPF and the NGOisation.    
Consequently, three main research questions are formulated to reach an explanatory 
account of NGOisation of civil society: 
1) What is the nature and characteristic of the relationship between the THPF and the 
funded NGOs?; 
2) How are the funded NGOs steered and metagoverned by the THPF?; 
3) What does the relationship produce? (or in what way are the funded NGOs driven to 
be NGOised?) 
 
1.2 Setting the scene: an introduction to NGOs and the THPF 
 
 1.2.1 NGO in Thailand 
Among Southeast Asian countries, civil society in Thailand is generally considered to be 
relatively vibrant and able to enjoy a certain degree of legitimacy and political space (Weiss 2015; 
Shigetomi 2004b, 2004b). Thai NGOs have been recognised as influential and crucial actors in 
politics and society at both national and local levels.  According to the National Economic and 
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Social Development Board (NESDB) (2010), there are 70,792 non-profit organisations (NPOs) in 
Thailand which operate in many social fields.  Thai law, namely the Civil and Commercial Code 
(see Cheecharoen and Udornpim 1999), requires NGOs to register either as a foundation 
(mulanithi) or as an association (samakom). Together with numerous unregistered NGOs, they are 
believed to significantly constitute civil society. 
According to the Social Research Institute (SRI) (2003), the non-profit sector contribution 
to gross domestic product (GDP) accounted for 0.062-0.15 percent in 1999. The number is quite 
similar to the studies run by the Centre for Civil Society Studies, John Hopkins University and the 
NESDB which suggested that the contribution of the sector to total GDP is equivalent to an annual 
average of 0.8 percent (Salamon et al. 2012; NESDB 2010). It is important to note that the small 
contribution of the sector to GDP does not necessarily mean that the sector is not societally 
significant. It is believed in Thailand that the role of the sector is not to support the economic 
system of the country but the social sector. The latter is extremely difficult to measure 
quantitatively (SRI 2003). 
Historically, organisations which are nongovernmental and work for philanthropic 
purposes have existed for a century in the form of religious organisations (see Greene 1971; 
Nitayarumphong and Mulada 2001). The first generation of Thai NGOs were founded as a reaction 
against state- led, top- down, inequitable social and economic development (see Leangchareon 
2000; Suksawat 1995; Suwana-adth 1991). They emerged to support underprivileged people, reach 
the ‘ unreached’  and proposed an alternative way for national development (Shigetomi 2004a). 
They operated where the state failed to do. Yet the use of NGOs as leading agents in modern civil 
society did not appear until the 1980s (Baker and Phongpaichit 2014; McCargo 2004; Connors 
2002). 
Since the 1980s, there has been a dramatic growth in the number of NGOs (see SRI 2003), 
as shown in the figure 1.1. The blossoming of the sector made NGOs become more visible to 
government agencies and a mechanism for political transformation as well as a legitimate and 
indispensable actor in public affairs. The proliferation of NGOs allowed the beginning of a 
political structure where NGOs can comment on government policy and launched public protest 
and campaigning as a means of influencing the state. The National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB), for example, made it clear that the government would seek help 
from NGOs for its development (Laothamatas 1991). 
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The positive atmosphere of NGO-government relations continued through the 1990s when 
the country was becoming more liberalised. The government had a clear vision to promote NGOs 
(Farrington et al. 1993). NGO participation in public development is highly recognised and 
organised civil society has been empowered to deliver public services, both locally and nationally 
(see Balassiano 2011; Thammasat University Research and Consultancy Institute ( TU- RAC) 
2012).  
 The 1990s also witnessed the promulgation of the 1997 constitution which significantly 
encouraged public participation and decentralisation.  The constitution transformed the structure 
and governance of the state which then allowed and supported the emergence of non-departmental 
and non-state initiatives, giving a large space for civil society to enjoy. In addition, with the 
application of the notion of ‘ Thammarat’  ( literally means ‘ the righteous state’ )  or ‘ good 
governance’  (see Tejapira 2009; Banpasirichote 2004; Orlandini 2003), integrated into the 1997 
constitution, NGOs and their methodologies were increasingly incorporated into state institutions 
in the name of ‘ good governance’  (Elinoff 2014).  As mentioned by Roy (2008), civil society 
involvement has become a prerequisite as well as an indicator of good governance. This marks the 
beginning of the state-civil society partnership era and the emergence of ‘institutional civil society’ 
in which NGOs could participate more in policy processes and government settings rather than 
keeping protest on the street (see Brenner et al.  1999; Johnson and Forsyth 2002). NGOs have 
since become a leading agent in civil society creating an age of ‘NGO- based civil society’ 
(McKinnon 2011). 
 
Figure 1.1 The proliferation of organised civil society in Thailand 
 













The development trajectory of the NGO sector is dynamic and closely linked with the state. 
In developing countries including Thailand, civil society and its component organisations are 
different from the idealised version of community that is independent of both the state and the 
market.  Indeed, civil society exists in degrees (Boychuk 2007).  The state and government are 
crucial to the development and operation of NGOs. As Lang (2013, p.7) contends, ‘transparent, 
interactive, and very public government- civil society relations’, not a stricter separation of them, 
are pivotal to a stronger civil society. 
There have been several times when the sector was suppressed by the state and censured 
by the public. When the government adopted a more liberal approach, the sector could exercise its 
operation well. When the government took a rather authoritative, antagonistic approach, the sector 
was subjugated. Throughout history, many barriers have been erected by different governments, 
either civilian or military, to constrain civil society.  For example, at the end of the 1990s, NGOs 
were subject to trivial bureaucratic intimidation. Acting from suspicion, the government checked 
the accounts of NGO activists by auditing their activities and finances on a monthly basis.  Those 
who refused to comply were defamed and suppressed.  NGOs were discredited, accused of being 
related to organised crime and heavily investigated by the Anti Money Laundering Office (AMLO) 
(Phongpaichit and Baker 2009).  There was also an attempt to label NGOs as ‘ undesired’  or 
‘ useless’ ,  creating only conflict (see The Secretariat of the Senate 2003).  NGOs were finally 
portrayed by the government as evil anarchists, ‘enemies of the state’ (Janchitfah  2003).  
During the 2000s, the role of NGOs as intermediaries has also been given less importance 
as the government launched a series of policies which resulted in the emergence of a direct 
relationship between the government and the people (Phongpaichit and Baker 2008). NGOs, 
especially ones located in the centre, lost their power over rural areas. Individuals in the rural areas 
were forced to contact the government without the help of NGOs (Prasertkul 2009).  Splitting 
NGOs from their bases considerably reduced the importance of NGOs while increasing the 
positive influence of the government. The government has managed to totally occupy the space 
that used to belong to NGOs.  Complaints were made by activists that people movements and 
NGOs were facing a dilemma of needing to choose between remaining self- reliant without 
contacting the state or rising up against the state (Prasertkul 2009).  Civil society became 
‘superfluous’ for the state (Phongpaichit and Baker 2009). 
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Criticism  and discouragement of NGOs by the government eventually undermined public 
support for NGOs (Simpson 2005), leading the public to begin to be sceptical of NGOs. Anti-NGO 
ideas were disseminated. NGOs were increasingly envisioned as having a top-down, bureaucratic 
relationship, drifting away from their supposed roles, and operating against the national interest 
(Shigetomi 2004a).  As a consequence, they have started to lose public trust and their place in 
public activities (Bureekul et al. 2010, 18).  Nevertheless, as Cohen (2008) pointed out, the 
oppositional discourses of NGOs mainstreamed and became incorporated into government 
ideology, policies and institutions. This in fact indicated the growing influence of the NGO 
movement in the country. 
 
1.2.2 The THPF and the changing landscape of NGO funding 
Before the 2000s, NGOs in Thailand had managed to survive by strengthening their 
independent managerial strategies (Dechalert 2002). Despite that, after the 2000s, as will be shown 
in Chapter 4, Thailand has witnessed the rise of public funds for social purposes managed by quasi-
nongovernmental organisations (quangos). These funds have immediately become a major source 
of funding for the Thai NGOs and influenced the development of the NGO sector driving 
NGOisation of civil society. The NGOs have slowly become dependent on this public funding. 
These quangos have operated to provide funding and support for a certain cause, mostly a policy 
change. Among them, the THPF can be regarded as prominent.  
Since its establishment, the THPF has seen numerous achievements (see Galbally et al. 
2012; Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong 2015). The most famous campaigns the THPF has 
run are focused on reducing alcohol consumption and the smoking rate, and increasing road safety 
and accident prevention. Many of the THPF’s campaigns have been highly acknowledged at 
international level (see WHO 2016; Glassman and Temin 2016; Moodie et al. 2000). The THPF 
likes to claim that its achievements cannot be attributed only to the organisation, but are to be 
acknowledged as collective contributions by its partners and collaborating organisations 
throughout the country (Adulyanon 2012). Notably, THPF’s investments in health promotion seem 
to provide a high return to the public (Hanvoravongchai et al. 2014). 
The THPF is not resource-dependent on the government as it has a secure independent 
income from ‘earmarked tax’. It is not like a common quango which has limited autonomy over 
its budgeting. Focusing on structural and behavioural changes, the THPF often intervenes in 
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society and other governmental areas. It works through cross-sectoral operations and network 
governance. The THPF is thus a hybrid organisation functioning with multiple mechanisms, 
principally non-hierarchical ones such as market and network. 
Currently, the THPF has annual revenue of about US$120 million. The amount may seem 
large on an individual level compared with other quangos ( see National Reform Council 2015) . 
Yet, it is relatively small ( about 7. 3 percent)  compared with the financial expenses of other state 
agencies in the health sector (Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong 2015; Watabe et al. 2017). 
The THPF annually provides a large amount of funding to various organisations, both public and 
private, through its innovative, proactive scheme. However, the majority of THPF’s grantees are 
local NGOs, universities, and research institutions. Through the funding, the THPF strongly 
advocates the establishment of many innovative social and health policies.  Interestingly, when 
necessary, the THPF even establishes new societal organisations to mobilise and run campaigns 
(Galbally et al. 2012). Expanding networks of partners have become the tools for advocacy of the 
THPF. 
Given these, the THPF is arguably influential in contemporary civil society. The THPF is 
recognised as one of the most significant players in Thai civil society (Pitidol 2016a, 2016b; 
Rakyutidharm 2011, 2014b; Shigetomi 2006, 2009) and believed to be one of the largest sources 
of funding for organised civil society in Thailand (Phatharathananunth 2014; Rakyutidharm 2014a; 
Ungpakorn 2009; Chutima 2004). This influential status of the THPF is also acknowledged by 
every participant in the research. The THPF has a significant impact on NGOs’ decision making 
and activities. Receiving funding from the THPF has led many NGOs to adapt themselves, for 
instance, to become more professionalised1 and institutionalised, in order to suit the THPF’s 
working approach and agenda. This corresponds to an observation mentioned by Phaholyothin 
(2017, p. 193): 
 
                                                        
1 Professionalisation is a contested concept. In NGO studies, Evetts (2007, p. 752) suggests that NGOs 
professionalise ‘in order to promote and protect their own interests’. Professionalisation indicates the ‘authority of 
institutionalised expertise’ which makes NGOs being better recognised and gaining an insider position at negotiation 
tables and institutional decision-making settings, which in turn promises a higher rate of policy advocacy success 
(Lang 2013; Clemens 2006; Zwingel 2005). With the authority of institutionalised expertise, NGO members become 
conversant in the same language as knowledge producers, governments and funders, and reorganise to meet their 
needs (Elbers and Arts 2011; Jad 2007; Henderson 2003). In the context of this thesis, professionalisation is closely 
links the way the NGOs adopted modern management knowledge and skills to enhance their organisational 
performance. Professionality is also associated with the way the NGOs form their organisational identity or signature 
and engage with their donors. This topic will be significantly explored in chapter 5 and chapter 8. 
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With its large annual budget funding over 1,000 projects per year, [the] THPF has been criticised 
for distorting the NGO sector by creating a monopoly on funding and influencing the priorities and 
programs of the sector. 
 
Arguably, the THPF refashions the funding system for civil society in Thailand. As will be 
discussed later, the THPF has become the biggest available domestic funder for civil society in the 
country; the majority of its funding goes through non-state institutions. It is therefore possible to 
see the THPF as a new form of philanthropy in Thailand. The THPF can be regarded as a prominent 
emergent philanthropic actor and a key funding organisation; it is one of the largest grant-making 
entities in philanthropic engagement. However, in Thailand, large foundations such as the THPF 
are the exceptions rather than the norm (Phaholyothin 2017). The creation and operation of the 
THPF is unique. This point will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
Interestingly, the THPF is institutionally odd in its dual nature: a granting foundation and 
a public organisation. As a foundation, the THPF echoes the ‘outcome-oriented’ type of foundation 
(Tompkins-Stange 2016) mainly aiming to attain desired policy change and produce an impact. 
Phaholyothin (2017, p. 193) points out that there are four major institutional characteristics which 
make the THPF considered to be a new form of local philanthropy and a typical foundation. First, 
the THPF has a secure endowment source, guaranteed by law from the state, through excise tax on 
tobacco and alcohol. Second, the THPF does not obtain donations or money from the public or 
any other source. Third, the THPF has governance and staffing structures comparable to other 
professionally-run foundations. It is overseen by boards, managed by a CEO and run by staff who 
are recruited based on their qualifications. It is also obliged to report annually to the cabinet as 
well as to both houses of the Thai parliament. Lastly, the THPF implements active and strategic 
programmes. Its  ‘partnership model of granting’ (Galbally et al. 2012) places emphasis on seeking 
out grantees rather than issuing open calls for proposals, and thus makes the THPF align with the 
notion of ‘strategic giving/philanthropy’ (see Frumkin 2006, 2010; Reckhow 2013; Brest 2012) 
and ‘venture philanthropy’ (see Scott 2009; Letts, Ryan and Grossman 1997; Frumkin 2003). The 
THPF is working in the ‘new frontiers’ of philanthropy and social investment (see Salamon 2014). 
 As a public organisation, the THPF represents the logic of new governance in which the 
state is hollowed out through networks and contracts (Milward and Provan 2000; Rhodes 2012; 
Goldsmith and Eggers 2004), having some missions devolved to other agencies—thereby, 
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becoming an enabler rather than a doer. In the language of Osborne and Gaebler (1992), the THPF 
mostly performs ‘steering’ while its partners do the ‘rowing’. Its tasks centre on organising 
resources, of both itself and others, to produce outcomes within the web of multisectoral 
relationships. In this sense, the THPF strategically manipulates its partners to run the business, 
performing ‘metagovernance’. As an orchestrator of metagovernance, the THPF draws NGOs to 
play in the field under the state-applied rule in which the NGOs became the state’s partners and 
assistants in reaching the THPF’s and the state goals. The emergence of the THPF can be 
conceptualised as a new form of statecraft that aims to (re)gain control over a networked 
administration/civil society, although it does not function like a straightforward instrument of the 
state. 
 However, the state is not coherent and homogeneous (Miliband 1973). Although the THPF 
can comfortably be seen a part of the state system, it has barely been perceived as a ‘state’ agency 
in practice. It would be misguided to address the THPF as a department of the state for the reason 
of its proximity to the state and its law of establishment. However, the THPF can be analytically 
seen as an ‘incarnated’ form of state agency which reflects the state’s success in creating a 
‘bureaucratic field’ (Bourdieu 1994). In this regard, the THPF is also an object of metagovernance 
of the Thai state. It is a delegated state mechanism in the form of a quango: an arm of the state.  
Besides, it is misleading to see the THPF as merely working in the health sector with health 
actors. In fact, the THPF has been working with a variety of actors across areas of interest mostly 
outside the health sector such as education, sexuality, women, family, children, labour, 
environment, food and nutrition, agriculture, social development, human rights, volunteering, 
media literacy, and so on. Applying the Ottawa Charter on Health Promotion (WHO, 1986), the 
THPF is using the ‘non-health to address health’ approach signifying an emphasis on non-health 
sectors. Hence, it is can be suggested that the THPF is an actor in civil society, or specifically, as 
part of the infrastructure or ‘enabler’ of civil society. 
Unfortunately, the THPF is one of the most significant and the most controversial, yet 
understudied, institutions in Thailand. The logic which guides the THPF and its partners is not 
well understood and acknowledged. Arguably, the THPF is a key element in Thailand’s unwritten 
and rarely described state and civil society. Studying and examining the THPF is thus important, 
not just to debate its merits but unavoidably invoking particular risks to principles which the THPF 
is seen to embody, most of all those fundamentals of the relationship between state and society. 
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A major strand of literature concerning the THPF is written by its own staff and its 
associates to promote the development and the operation of the THPF as a health promotion fund 
(e.g. Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong 2015; Vathesatogkit, Lian and Ritthiphakdee 2013; 
Buasai, Kanchanachitra and Siwaraksa 2007). There is also an amount of literature focusing on 
financial investment in health promotion by the THPF (e.g. Tangcharoensathien et al. 2017; 
Srithamrongsawat et al. 2010; Chandoevwit, Thampanishvong and Rojjananukulpong 2014). 
Unfortunately, little social research on the role of the THPF has been conducted.  
Among the available social studies of the THPF, the research conducted by Atchara 
Rakyutidharm (see Rakyutidharm 2014a, 2014b) is worthy of mention. Rakyutidharm’s work 
mainly aimed to study the general transformation of NGO-state-people relations in the context of 
resource and environmental policy. Parts of her project looked at the relationship between the 
THPF as a state funder, NGOs, and people in the funding context. The THPF was considered in 
the work as an arm of the state inviting NGOs to operate in a bureaucratic field under the state’s 
rule and financial support. The NGOs were found to be working in a collaborative manner sharing 
certain common development ideologies with the THPF. Her research concluded that the 
emerging, dynamic relationship between the THPF and the NGOs has significantly affected the 
positioning of the NGOs in society where they are cooperating more with, rather than challenging 
the state in order to gain positive responses from the state. By ‘cooperation’, the NGOs are not 
only obtaining money from the THPF. They also share opinions, work together and support each 
other in reaching a common goal. The relationship ‘blurs the boundary between the state and civil 
society’ in Thailand (Rakyutidharm, 2014a, p. 530). However, her research merely addressed the 
THPF as an actor in the bigger picture of the politics of NGO funding. The work did not 
particularly highlight the THPF per se, the ways it relates or steers the NGOs, its impact on the 
NGO community, and why it has become the way it is. Hence, it is possible to say that the THPF 
and its relation to NGO recipients has been overlooked in the social science literature, not only in 
Thailand but also in general as the case can contribute to other societies as well. 
 
1.3 State of the research 
There are three important aspects to the thesis. The first aspect involves an enquiry into the 
characterisation of the relationship between the THPF and its NGO partners highlighting 
collaborations and tensions. As noted by Fernando (2011), most NGO scholarship has downplayed 
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or failed to address the ways in which NGOs can be co-opted, disciplined, transformed, and 
reproduced within the ideological parameters of the state. The role of the state and its institutions 
in this process has not yet been widely studied even though it is a very important determinant of 
NGOs. The role and posture of the Thai state, its agency and relationship with civil society is 
reflected on. This work aims to refocus the debate on NGOs and examine how they have been 
affected and transformed by the THPF, and perhaps the state, which leads to the second and the 
third enquiry.  
The second aspect is concerned with the cause of the transformations of the funded NGOs 
through the funding of the THPF. As the NGOs are financially dependent on the THPF, they are 
driven to develop certain attributes to become a ‘suitable’ partner of the THPF. NGOisation of 
civil society thus happens. The third aspect is focused on metagovernance, the rationale and 
techniques of governance strategically employed by THPF in relation to its NGO network. There 
is a significant overlap between these enquiries. 
 
1.3.1 NGOs and the state funding 
Nowadays, NGOs in reality are part of the neoliberal state-devolved service delivery 
sector, the ‘community face of neoliberalism’ (Petras 1997). There are growing critical accounts 
of NGO actions which evidence that NGOs appear to be themselves ‘the problem’ rather than 
solving problems (see Henderson 2003; Blaser, Feit and McRae 2004; Barry-Shaw and Jay 2012; 
Choudry and Kapoor 2013b). All too often, NGOs place themselves and work as outriders of 
neoliberal ideology (see Fowler 2000), albeit not necessarily bound to it, and ignore democratic 
and public practices. NGOs are seen as part of an extended or shadow state functioning through 
contracts made with government. Wolch (1990) proposed the ‘shadow state’ thesis which refers 
to an increase of the non-state actors in performing welfare state functions. These functions were 
subsidised, enabled, and regulated by the state which made the NGOs subject to state-imposed - 
directly or not - constraints on their autonomy. In this sense, NGOs have progressively become 
channels for and direct beneficiaries of development aid provided by national and foreign 
governments (Biel 2000; Wallace 2003). This situation makes government-NGO relationships 
grow and continue; governments, in particular, turn increasingly to NGOs for support in carrying 
out publicly funded functions, the process which has been called ‘nonprofitisation’ (see Nathan 
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1996; Salamon 2015). Expansion of the funding base for NGOs through government contracting 
and corporate sponsorship is counted as a mega-trend for civil society (Casey 2016).  
In the study of NGO-funder relations in Russia, Henderson (2002) argues that the often-
proclaimed goal of funders to ensure the development of civil society was in fact stalled by their 
preoccupation with projects focusing on short-term objectives and reports instead of long-term 
civic development. As a result, NGO projects have become homogeneous and the NGOs 
themselves are developing into a vertical, institutionalised, and isolated, albeit well-funded, civic 
community. Moreover, the changing environment of NGOs in relation to the state donor suggests 
that NGOs are now operating in the age of contract and new governance, where the cooperation 
between governments and NGOs is increasingly becoming a common practice. NGOs are made to 
financially rely on government and public funding. In such an environment, NGOs are facing the 
‘fundamental revenue problem’ (da Silva Themudo 2004) which causes resource scarcity and 
uncertainty. The funding is conditioned by donors’ motives and presents challenges for NGOs to 
survive while keeping to their original missions effectively.  
An increase in government-NGO cooperation signifies a less confrontational position of 
organised civil society towards governments and the state. Smith and Lipsky (1993) argue that 
government-funded NGOs are conditioned to remain on good terms with government because the 
relationship they have with government is unbalanced reciprocity, albeit interdependent. 
Government is the dominant force in the relationship. Besides, public funding and programmes 
under the umbrella of ‘new governance’, in particular, are believed to depoliticise NGOs, making 
them detach from political activity and attempting to influence the government decisions (see 
Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire 2017). However, the relationship can also be productive 
depending on contingencies such as the ability of NGOs to steer the relationship in their favour 
(see Commins 1997) or the characteristic of the funder and the state (see Smillie et al. 1999). As 
shown by da Silva Themudo (2004), resource dependence on the funder does not necessarily lead 
to the loss of organisational independence. NGOs can pursue various independence strategies to 
negotiate with the structure of funding and the funder. Moreover, the relationship between the 
funder and the funded should not be addressed only from a financial dimension but also on other 
non-financial, symbolic dimensions in which NGOs can have more power over the relationship 
(Ebrahim 2005). 
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To become reliable partners of government, NGOs find themselves experiencing an intense 
pull to professionalism and ‘being colonised by governmental ways of doing business’ (Harwood 
and Creighton 2009, p. 19). In this respect, NGOs are influenced by inner-organisational processes 
and a rationalisation of modern bureaucracy to maintain their organisational reproduction. The 
issue of the position of NGOs in relation to government and their changing behaviours thus prompt 
a critical account to look at NGOs in some detail.  
 
1.3.2 NGO studies in Thailand 
Like many Asian countries, the Thai third sector or organised civil society was not given 
much attention before the 1990s (Lyons and Hasan 2002). This has resulted in a serious lack of 
information regarding the infrastructure, scope and size of the sector (Salamon and Anheier 1997).  
Most literature about Thai civil society and NGOs did not start to show a significant 
presence until the late 1990s (Shigetomi 2004a). Reliable quantitative data on the size of the sector 
in Thailand began to be gathered only at the beginning of 2000 (see SRI 2003). Dechalert (2002) 
points out that the analysis of NGOs in Thailand is confusing and varied because there is little 
academic research dedicated to distinguish NGOs from the bigger picture of civil society.  
Most literature about civil society and NGOs in Thailand has heavily revolved around the 
roles, activities and organisational attributes of NGOs (e.g. Prompitak 2009; Sangiampongsa 
2003), the development of the philanthropic, nongovernmental sector and civil society (e.g. 
Nitayarumphong and Mulada 2001; Chiengthong 2000; TDRI 2000; Pongsapich 1997), grassroots 
organisations and community actions (e.g. Natsupa 1991; Tabchumpon, 1998), and social and 
political movements (e.g. Missingham 2003; Phatharathananunth 2006; Pintobtang 1998).  
Also, too many studies have explored civil society and its political role in democratisation 
(e.g. Pitidol 2016b; Kuhonta and Sinpeng 2014; Kongkirati 2015). According to Elinoff (2014), 
political studies of civil society in Thailand are focused on two different, but related, aspects of 
civil society: its role as a regulator of the state, and its role as an organisational sphere that serves 
as the agent of democratisation. Such attention has made most literature on civil society in Thailand 
both analytical and normative, portraying civil society as a singular protagonist driving a uniform 
democracy. The language of civil society in Thailand expects civil society to be ‘the repository of 
hope’ (Phongpaichit 1999), a space for those who have been left out of formal politics. Civil 
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society has thus become ‘a dream that sought to produce a particular version of democratic 
governance’ (Elinoff 2014, p. 363).  
 This kind of vision of civil society has certain ‘eschatological’ features, signifying an end 
of and an end to history. Such features reflect a linear, teleological understanding of history in 
which history changes and progresses toward the final destination. In this sense, civil society is 
dreamed of as a sphere or a state of virtue and instructive solutions to problems signifying the 
victory of good over evil and an end to suffering, conflict and corruption (see Dean and Villadsen 
2016). Problems arise as, in reality, civil society and NGOs are definitely not an always happy 
solution to the problems of society, and civil society always raises questions about legitimacy, 
accountability, and democracy and is sometimes itself the centre of conflict.   
Arguably, one important point that these various studies commonly imply, explicitly and 
implicitly, is that the dynamics of the NGO sector and civil society is significantly related to that 
of the state.  This thesis supports the position that organised civil society, specifically NGOs, has 
consistently been defined vis-a-vis the state. In other words, the development, role, and positioning 
of NGOs can best be understood in terms of their dynamic relationship with the state (see Purdue 
2007). A state-society dialectic is in play: ‘through its administrative, legal, and coercive systems, 
the state structures its relationships with civil society, as well as relations within civil society’ 
(Smith 2013, p. 94). 
As the sector is growing in influence, it has interacted with other sectors, especially the 
state. Unfortunately, study concerning the influence of the state and government policies on the 
NGO sector has received much less attention than that of the state on the business sector (e.g. see 
Laothamatas 1992; Siroros 1995; Doner 2009). To a certain degree, this thesis would also like to 
fill the gap that few people have researched, by exploring the relationship between the state through 
its institutional mechanism and its influence on the NGO sector. This helps contribute to the 
understanding of the development of the sector in the country.  
 
 1.3.3 Why does NGOisation matter? 
Since the 1980s, more movement-oriented organisations have turned to or/and been 
replaced by more professionalised and effectiveness-oriented groups, developing a powerful 
NGOised footprint (Lang 2013). This phenomenon has led to the centralisation of funding to 
NGOs, particularly those located in the capital city, and the change in the NGOs’ ecosystem, which 
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creates preconceived notions of how civil society should operate and the divisions of NGOs 
(Edwards 2014). In this thesis, to become NGOised is to become overwhelmed with organisational 
reproduction and institutional advocacy at the expense of public movement. The inward-looking 
approach, which impels the NGOs to prioritise organisational reproduction, has replaced the 
forward-looking one, which drives NGOs to make social changes. NGOisation thus represents a 
change of NGOs both in terms of organisational structure, mission, management, and activity and 
their interaction with other agencies and the public. 
NGOisation does not just happen naturally. It is caused. Research has found that incentives 
from ‘outside patrons’ are inclined to promote routinisation and professionalisation (Stone 1996; 
Guo 2007; Walker and McCarthy 2010). More specifically, funding from government, often 
expressed as  a sub-contracting relationship or foundation, is the key source of the pull to 
NGOisation (Choudry and Kapoor 2013a; Lang 2013; Carroll 2016). The critical factors for 
NGOisation are donors’ capacities to control through funding and expectations. Repeatedly, ‘the 
donors expected to encounter an upwardly mobile, fully service-oriented, professional 
environment exhibiting all the regalia of a trustworthy business enterprise’ (Lang 2013, p. 84). 
Aksartova (2009) points out that NGOs are constrained by ‘quantifiable indicators’ of success, 
such as numbers of projects conducted and reports issued, created by public donors as a part of 
result measurement and for public presentation of the donors themselves. Project-by-project 
funding compels NGOs to transform their organisation by adopting certain forms of professional 
practices, functions and priorities (Choudry and Kapoor 2013a). 
Funding is the important parameter in the development of relationship between donors and 
their NGO partners (Malhotra 2000). An extensive amount of literature places attention on the 
impact of funding or pressures from donors and government toward the recipient organisations, or 
how the funding has shaped or influenced the recipient organisations (e.g. Edwards and Hulme 
1996; Hudock 1999; Deakin 2001; Ebrahim 2005). Government funding, in particular, has been 
seen to decrease NGOs’ autonomy and flexibility, displacement of goals, bureaucratisation and 
accountability conflicts (see Smith and Lipsky 1993; Salamon 1995; Froelich 1999). 
NGOs tend to rely on financial assistance from sources outside their control (Fowler 1997; 
Lewis 2014). This can be seen as dependency which puts NGOs in a vulnerable position by being 
subjected to external constraints such as international agencies, governments, and donors (Hudock 
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1997). NGOs, then, are at risk of losing their identity and legitimacy, drifting away from their 
original course (Hudock 1995). 
Donors are seen to have a significant influence over recipient NGOs as they can force 
NGOs to accept their agenda (Edwards and Hulme 1996; Lewis 2001). It is imperative to note that 
donors are not naïve; they hold certain ideologies and agendas which are normally translated and 
channelled through funding. Funding has never been merely a matter of giving money but has 
often embraced the donors’ agendas (see Ottaway and Carothers 2000). The funding relationship, 
particularly when funding is project-based, is suspected of putting NGOs in a position where they 
are treated as mere instruments of donor agencies and thus damaging the endeavour to establish a 
genuine partnership. NGOs may ultimately become more responsive to, or compliant with, donors’ 
demands, agendas, and ideologies rather than those of their constituencies or beneficiaries (Fowler 
1994, 1998). In other words, NGOs are becoming more distant from their bases. This concern is 
known as the ‘piper hypothesis’ (da Silva Themudo 2004) referring to the saying ‘the one who 
pays the piper calls the tune’. It suggests the potential danger which NGOs can have of losing 
independence and playing the funder’s tune rather than their own when they receive increased 
funding or become resource dependent on the funder. The higher the resource dependence NGOs 
have on the funder, the less they can keep their organisational independence. This reflects the 
increase in external control and constraint over NGOs. Being resource dependent allows the 
activation of a range of interventions which have been adopted to influence NGOs including the 
use of ‘sticks’ (closure, deregistration, investigation and co-ordination) and ‘carrots’ (tax exempt 
status, access to policy makers and public funding) (Edwards and Hulme 1997).  
It is also important to mention that the literature of NGOisation heavily revolves around 
the investigation of ‘neo-colonial’ and externally induced mechanisms operated by foreign donors, 
Western governments, and global philanthropic foundations, which in turn advocates for the 
scrutiny on movements to transcend ‘beyond NGOisation’ (see Alvarez, 2009; Jacobsson and 
Saxonberg, 2013a). This literature corresponds with the popularity in the study of the relationship 
between NGOs and foreign, international donors/funders (e.g. Henderson 2002; Ebrahim 2005; 
Mercea and Stoica 2007). 
However, this thesis aims to apply the concept of NGOisation to explain domestic 
government-induced pulls for NGOs to transform themselves, mostly in terms of 
professionalisation and institutionalisation. It looks at the relationship between NGOs and a certain 
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‘local’ public funder in a context where international/foreign donors have become less significant 
for, or perhaps absent from, the contemporary development of civil society. In such settings, local 
funders have become more influential and essential for the survival of the NGO sector. 
Unfortunately, little systematic research on the relationship between the Thai NGOs and 
their local funder exists, let alone NGOisation. The Thai NGO community is seen to be lacking 
self-reflection and being occupied by ‘familial hierarchy’ (Simpkins 2003; Rakyutidharm 2014b; 
Pitidol 2016b). The uncritical context of the sector potentially limits the healthy development of 
the sector and also knowledge generation in the field. A critical examination of the sector is needed. 
Looking at the role and position of the NGOs in politics and society can explain the livelihood of 
civil society but cannot say much about the situation within the sector. This study instead aims to 
critically investigate what is going on between the NGOs and their funder. 
Studying NGOs through the lens of NGOisation can bring us back to the reality of their 
operation. The concept allows us to see NGO transformation in terms of professionalisation, 
bureaucratisation, institutionalisation and depoliticisation in the context of ‘neoliberalisation of 
civil society’ (Goldman 2005). NGOs are not inherently democratic but political. They have a 
complex relationship with their funder and the state. It is important to note that changes in 
NGOisation are neither linear nor haphazard but transformational (see Archer 1995). NGOisation 
refocuses the study of NGOs by looking at the sector and its relations, not its role as a force 
for/against democratisation or the state. It focuses on what is going on within the NGO community, 
especially in the funding context. NGOisation will, to some extent, lead us to see the contradiction 
of NGOs in terms of their legitimacy, accountability and democratic values. This thesis is not 
interested in what an NGO is but how the ‘NGOisation’ is done through the metagovernance of 
the THPF. 
 
1.3.4 Why does metagovernance of the THPF matter? 
The concept of metagovernance is highly and variously conceptualised but poorly applied 
in empirical research. The way this thesis applies metagovernance is rather different from many in 
the field. The concept is popularly used to investigate the macro-level phenomenon, namely the 
relations between the state and society, and to analyse the state departmental governance because 
the state is obviously the one holding the absolute authority over its territory. It is less likely to be 
used for meso-/micro-level analysis concerning the inter- and intra-organisational relations 
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(Meuleman 2008). Besides, Baker and Stoker (2015) explain that the interest in metagovernance, 
indeed, comes from (a) the rise of the disaggregation of the state resulting in a relatively stable 
pattern of devolved institutions that are semi-autonomous yet ultimately subjected to government 
authority or operate in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ and (b) the continuing significance of hierarchies 
due to the enduring capacity of the state in steering, coordinating and shaping norms and values in 
some circumstances. This thesis would like to take the challenge in applying the concept to study 
the meso-/micro-level by looking at the functioning of a devolved institution of the state – that is 
the THPF, and its relations with its NGO partners. 
Unfortunately, only a handful of scholars are interested in using the concept to explain 
semi-autonomous, non-departmental public bodies or quangos (e.g. Hammond et al. 2019; 
Dowling and Washington 2018; Flinders and Tonkiss 2016; Dommett and Flinders 2015), let alone 
non-government actors. Their analyses, however, revolve around the relationship between the 
quangos and the state, typically envisioning the quangos as an object of metagovernance. Unlike 
them, this thesis distinctively examines the relationship that such non-departmental bodies have 
with non-governmental actors, which mainly points to the metagoverning quangos as the potential 
subject of metagovernance, not only the object of it. 
Metagovernance is simultaneously taking place within, and shaped by, the broader power 
relations which exist in society (Jessop 2010). This makes metagovernance an interesting issue 
and worthy of study. Metagovernance is closely related to the state-society relations. As McMahon 
(2017) argues, the state is ‘credited or criticised for the growth of NGOs [and other societal 
institutions] and their expanding budgets, but rarely is the relationship explored in much depth’ 
(p.68). In contemporary governance, the state has not lost its power to the growing number of 
societal actors, but is increasingly sharing the power with them and sometimes exercising power 
through them (Bell and Hindmoor 2009). Collaborative relationship with societal actors is the key 
for the state to develop its capacity to govern. This has resulted in an increase of the state-society 
partnership and is why the research needs to adopt a relational approach to comprehend how 
interactions shape perceptions and practices of the NGO as well as the state (see Anderson 2015). 
It is the relationship that matters. 
The way the state and its institutions employ power does not merely rely on traditional 
government but a variety of new modes of governance that are non-hierarchical and hybrid. The 
state, together with its apparatuses, performs a form of governance which is more subtle, giving a 
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distance to those being governed. The THPF can be seen to perform metagovernance, which is an 
attempt to influence and coordinate, notably through funding and strategic supervision, its societal 
partners by offering ways for them to see one another as mutual partners.  
It is appealing and interesting to study the THPF and its NGOs through the lens of 
metagovernance because this can uncover the operation of the THPF and the relationship it has 
with the NGOs. The THPF arguably performs metagovernance in two senses. Firstly, it 
strategically utilises and combines different, but related, modes of governance-hierarchies, 
markets, and networks-in order to achieve its goals. This emphasises the significance of interactive 
governance. Indeed, it is not surprising that the THPF involves a range of governance mechanisms 
because health is an area where ‘hybrid’ forms of governance are widely witnessed (Kickbusch 
and Gleicher 2012; Ramesh, Wu and Howlett 2015; Hort, Jayasuriya and Dayal 2017). Secondly, 
the THPF governs or steers its partners, in this case, the funded NGOs as a self-organised, inter-
organisational governance network. The THPF as the metagovernor applies the designed 
interactive governance to metagovern its NGO network. To be effective, these two kinds of 
metagovernance have been conducted in the shadow of hierarchy. 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis contains 9 chapters in total. This chapter provides the overview of the thesis 
encompassing the rationale of the research, purpose of the study, and structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 critically provides the theoretical frameworks applied in the thesis. Metagovernance and 
NGOisation will be elaborated. Chapter 3 discusses the methodology developed and used to 
navigate the research. The qualitative approach guided by critical realism will be fleshed out. 
Chapter 4 critically discusses the background of the study focusing on the state-society relations 
in Thailand, the NGO funding narrative, and the creation and the governance of the THPF. Chapter 
5 analytically explores the different relations the NGOs have with their funder, the THPF, within 
a context of the THFP-NGO partnership. It also looks at the different characters of the THPF as 
perceived and expected by stakeholders. These facilitate and constraint the capacity to steer of the 
THPF which in turn influences metagovernance in practice. Chapter 6 investigates the THPF as a 
metagovernor which favours civil society and NGOs and interactive governance. It also looks at 
the manifestation of the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, the necessary condition where metagovernance 
takes place. Chapter 7 further examines the key mechanisms of metagovernance of the THPF: 
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partnership strategy (the ‘tri-power strategy’) and proactive granting. Chapter 8 explores the 
NGOisation as a consequence of metagovernance by the THPF. The funded NGOs are driven to 
develop certain attributes to suit THPF’s frameworks. This significantly affects the trajectory of 
the sector in general. The thesis concludes in Chapter 9 by summarising the significant points made 





























Theoretical frameworks: NGOisation and Metagovernance 
  
This chapter discusses the core theoretical frameworks employed in the thesis: NGOisation 
and metagovernance. They are, implicitly and explicitly, related to one another and used in a 
complementary way explaining the same phenomenon from different perspectives (see Cairney 
2013). The value of the multiple explanations using a complementary approach to theorising lies 
with their potential to give different answers to the same phenomenon and encourage researchers 
to search for evidence which they would not otherwise uncover (See Allison 1969). 
The concept of NGOisation provides a theoretical basis to investigate the way the NGOs 
have been influenced by their funder in the modern world to become more inward-oriented 
corporate organisations. It is used in this thesis to help explore what kind of the influence the THPF 
has on the funded NGOs and civil society as the NGOs have been driven, intended or not, to 
develop certain characteristics so that they can become ‘suitable’ partners for the THPF. To further 
examine the way the THPF relates to the NGOs resulting in the NGOisation of civil society, the 
concept of metagovernance is employed as a framework to study the THPF-NGO relations. It 
systematically and distinctively provides an analytical lens on how state agencies like the THPF 
steer decentralised (governance) networks. It also emphasises the coordination of structures and 
processes of interactive governance mechanisms within a particular system or institution. Through 
metagovernance, the rationales and techniques of the funder towards the relationship are 
highlighted. In this thesis, the concept helps explore how and why the THPF steers or governs the 
funded NGOs.  
 
2.1 NGOisation 
The concept of NGOisation has been variously used to comprehend the condition of civil 
society (see Lang 2000; Kamat 2004; Aksartova 2009; Choudry and Kapoor 2013b). 
Unfortunately, its analytical power is underdeveloped. Most literature addresses the term in a 
descriptive, rhetorical way. Few have developed it as an analytical framework to investigate 
empirical events. This thesis takes an approach which relates NGOisation to the financial 
dependence of NGOs suggested by Choudry and Kapoor (2013a, p. 5). In other words, to analyse 
NGOisation is to: 
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examine ways in which funding and other material support can orient organisations to prioritise 
institutional survival and maintenance at the expense of mobilisation, and account for how 
NGO/movement actions may be shaped by material incentives.  
 
 There is ambivalence in the concept of NGOisation. The term can create obfuscation in its 
conflation of process and end-state of that process and their invocation of inevitability (see Taylor 
2000).  It can refer to a process (of becoming NGOised) and an outcome of that process which 
consists in a particular organisational form, a constituted entity with a formal or informal 
regulation and emergent effect. Recognising the double meaning of the term NGOisation is 
important for the analysis. This thesis develops and employs concept of NGOisation-as-a-process, 
as a theoretical framework while the NGOisation-as-a-product is the state of NGOs expected to be 
seen as a consequence of the process. The former is better referred to as the ‘NGOisation process’ 
while the latter is addressed as the ‘NGOisation of civil society’.  
It is noted that the concept developed here aims to move beyond conceptualising 
NGOisation as inherently ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Instead, it seeks to highlight NGOisation as an analytical 
concept to understand NGOs and their relations with funders, or the state in general. NGOisation 
thus describes ‘a culturally and politically mutable tendency rather than a narrowly confined path’ 
which possesses ‘different iterations and [can] be fuelled by different processes in different global 
or local constellations’ (Lang 2013, p. 65). 
 
2.1.1 NGOisation process 
According to Kamat (2013), two important factors are relevant for NGOisation around the 
world: the weight of geopolitical imperatives2 and the nature of the state. As this thesis is interested 
in the domestic force of the Thai state toward the NGOisation, the focus here is rather on the latter. 
The way the state governs society and the history of the country suggest the extent to which NGOs 
can act. The society that has strong centralised, bureaucratic government without political stability 
                                                        
2 Geopolitics is quite clear, for example, in some cases where western influences and national elites play 
pivotal roles in a surge of NGOs. NGOs strive to adapt themselves to the requirements of foreign donors and fail to 
meet the need of the people or their constituencies. In other cases, there are resistances against the NGOisation process 
or even rejection of NGOs as a politically viable organisational form given the historical trajectory of the activists and 
organised movements. 
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is likely to have a limited and uneven NGOisation process. NGOisation thus unfolds and manifests 
differently in different contexts and struggles (Choudry and Kapoor 2013a, p. 10). Historical 
context and the idea and practice of NGOs in a specific society are important in comprehending 
NGOisation of a particular country (Mojab 2009). There is no ‘Iron Law’ of NGOisation (Alvarez 
2009). Yet, it is possible to see common characteristics of the phenomenon. 
NGOisation, for Choudhry and Kapoor (2013a), refers to the institutionalisation, 
professionalisation, depoliticisation and demobilisation of movements for social and 
environmental change. In this sense, it involves the capacity of NGOs to depoliticise practices and 
discourses of social changes, becoming a more conformist/reformist, rather than a radicalist. A 
more systematic account of NGOisation is provided by Lang (2013, pp. 63-64) who frames it as,  
 
the process by which social movements3  professionalise, institutionalise, and bureaucratise in 
vertically structured, policy-outcome-oriented organisations that focus on generating issue-specific 
and, to some degree, marketable expert knowledge or services. 
 
The latter definition highlights organisational reproductions and the cultivation of funding 
resources. It seems that there is no difference between large and small organisations when they are 
needed to be treated as legitimate actors by government donors; they experience a similar pull to 
behave as professional organisations albeit with different capabilities to respond. For Lang (2013), 
NGOisation therefore signifies a move to more institutional and professional organised civil 
society featuring an inward orientation and represents a ‘bureaucratic’ organisational type, which 
is different from social movements representing a collectivist-democratic type of organisation (see 
Rothschild and Whitt 1986).  
 Likewise, in a cross-national and cross-organisational study of the third sector by Kallman 
and Clark (2016), five basic institutional logics of the nongovernmental sector, which operate 
simultaneously within the sector, can be identified. Their combined presences, to a different 
degree, generate tensions, synergies and unevenness in the sector. The five institutional logics are: 
clientelism (emerged in terms of financial support); paternalism (appeared in practice of 
                                                        
3 Social movements in this definition refer to any collective endeavour to change the social structure which 
occasionally utilise extraconstitutional methods (Minkoff 1997). They are not confined to mean just an organised 
movement which protests on streets. 
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philanthropy); bureaucracy (emerged in negotiating power sharing and responsibilities in 
conjunction with arms of government); activism (appeared as the language and tactics of social 
movements or organisation of volunteers to make sense of participation); and 
professionalism/professionalisation (emerged as the process which transforms a job into a skilled 
profession). These institutional logics stress an organisational-sociological dimension as to how 
certain constructed belief systems shape NGOs’ cognition and behaviour in a given environment. 
In other words, they are the ‘institutional properties’ of NGOs. 
 Consequently, NGOisation can be conceptualised and defined as an organisational shift from 
social movement properties towards NGO properties or institutional logics.4 Specifically, 
NGOisation in respect of NGOs – which is the main focus of this thesis – denotes the intensifying 
of their specific properties, quantitatively and qualitatively. In other words, NGOisation drives 
NGOs to have stronger commitments to the properties. As the thesis aims to study the cause of the 
NGOisation, it develops the concept in line with the aforementioned conceptualisations and 
suggests four major developments which should be looked at as signals for the beginning of 
NGOisation: professionalisation, institutionalisation, bureaucratisation and depoliticisation. 
Inducements from funders significantly generate these developments, which in turn fuel the 
NGOisation process. It is also possible that the NGOisation drives the developments.  
 Under such a framework, the degree of agency played by NGOs is recognised as NGOisation 
which is essentially about responses to environmental pressures and the ‘processes of material 
complicity with capital’ (Choudhry and Kapoor 2013a, p. 14). When material or organisational 
forms of civil society meet capital or money, NGOisation is a consequence, though commonly 
unintended. In order to capture NGOisation, it is important to look at funding, reporting and 
monitoring requirements, and other subtle signs of funders as principle inducements for 
NGOisation. 
 In this respect, NGOisation as a theoretical framework does not merely refer to an increasing 
number of NGOs but a conjunction of certain mechanisms with emergent properties: the 
professionalisation; the institutionalisation and organisation; the bureaucratisation; and the 
depoliticisation (see Figure 2.1). These mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. For instance, 
                                                        
4 These properties or logics are not strict in reality. It is hard for an organisation to appear in the pure type. 
In particular, NGOisation-as-process means that an organisation can possess properties of both organisational types. 
Civil society thus has multifaceted organisations which are not limited to NGOs. 
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professionalisation drives more institutionalisation, while institutionalisation serves as a 
supportive base for professionalisation. Ultimately, NGOisation intensifies these developments 
too. It is imperative to note that, in reality, the mechanisms can be counter-acted. Contingencies, 
such as institutional stickiness of NGOs, the context and nature of the organisations, and the nature 
of the funder, are likely to play a part in the process as well. The NGOisation process is thus 
dialectical, interactive, and iterative. It has emergent properties which are irreducible to its 
components. NGOisation, in a broader context, changes the landscape of the civil society 
ecosystem, and at an organisational and institutional level, changes the properties of a particular 
NGO in a way that either professionalisation or institutionalisation alone cannot make. 
 












 2.1.2 NGOisation of civil society and its implications 
 As mentioned, NGOisation generates a certain outcome, which is a more inward-oriented 
organised civil society focusing on organisational reproduction and institutional advocacy. Such 
an organised civil society has been professionalised, institutionalised, bureaucratised and 
depoliticised. Lang (2013) asserts that NGOisation brings material and symbolic returns to NGOs. 
Through material returns, NGOs will achieve a better legal status which in turn makes it easier for 
them to access funding and to influence policy. By symbolic returns, it makes it easier for NGOs 
to get closer to the donors or governments, thereby normalising the relationship they have with 
governing agencies and donors. These, however, have drawbacks. When a relationship is strongly 
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formed, there is always the exclusion of some parties and perspectives which show less organised 
interests. This results in a form of client or insider relationship between selected NGOs and 
government (see Alvarez 1999; Lang 2000). In summary, NGOisation serves as a conduit for 
internal/organisational reproduction and external legitimacy for gaining funding (Lang 2013). 
 Moreover, NGOisation has considerable implications for the transformation of civil society.  
 
 Modern civil society in Neoliberalism 
 First, it is a specific condition that NGOs operate in the 21st century or the late modern civil 
society influenced by neoliberal ideologies and policies. For some, it is a product of neoliberal 
globalisation and the rise of issue-specific NGO-led civil society (Stubbs 2007; Yacobi 2007; 
Sheppard et al.  2009). It also refers to a development in the organisational formation of civil 
society vis-a-vis the government. NGOs become more stable which enables them to ‘support moral 
claim-making with fact-driven claims’ (Lang 2013, p. 86). 
 According to SustainAbility (2003), the 21st century NGOs are more insiders and a part of 
the system which would be changed. They are focused more on solutions delivered through market 
mechanisms which are contradictory to the previous generation of NGOs that spotlighted problems 
considered as symptoms of market failure. They also invest heavily in networks and see 
government and corporate funding as investment. They then actively persuade supporters that they 
are good investors and professionals. In addition, they do not solely follow charity sector rules but 
adapt strategy and business management to their work. New modes of governance that are non-
hierarchical seem to be the NGOs’ preferred way. 
 Phenomena like professionalism and bureaucracy feature modernity. Bureaucratisation in 
particular is considered as one of the main features of Neoliberalism (Hibou 2015). Promoting 
NGOs is seen as the policy and practice of strengthening civil society and good governance which 
are counted as intrinsic pillars of neoliberal policy (Petras and Veltmeyer 2005; Kamat 2004). For 
donors, funding NGOs is then a strategy to democratise a society through ‘civil society’ 
(Veltmeyer 2007). Therefore, professionalisation and the other developments function well for 
neoliberal regimes. Many point out that NGO operations are inclined to welcome capitalism rather 
than seeking to transform it (Greenfield 2001; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001; McNally 2002). 
Funding, in fact, is a market mechanism that is the act of providing financial resources. NGOised 
organisations have become part of the ‘non-profit industry complex’ (INCITE 2007) modelled on 
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capitalist structures. NGOisation, ultimately, to put it in Petras and Veltmeyer's words (2005), 
serves to keep the existing power structure intact while promoting a degree of change and 
development. In short, the process of NGOisation, especially professionalisation, is driven by the 
neoliberal policy context in which NGOs work (Kamat 2004). 
 
 Collaborative partnership between the state and NGOs 
 The second feature of NGOisation is that the state-NGO relationship is developing into a 
greater ‘collaborative’ kind. The changing relationship heavily relies on the capacity of the state 
donor in drawing NGOs to function with government. Under such a relationship, NGOs better 
meet the need of the state and donors that seek reliable and competent partners. NGOs realise that 
public advocacy strategies typically involving protests and direct opposition are not welcome by 
government donors. A collaborative environment then transforms the working approach of NGOs 
to be a more professional but tamed civil society. In this sense, NGOisation happens in an arena 
of new governance. NGOisation represents a precondition for NGOs to engage in modern 
governance arrangements, especially state partnerships.  
 Conceptually, a considerable change in the new governance is the selection of the 
instruments to reach a governance purpose by the state. Instead of depending on traditional 
‘command and control’, the state utilises ‘softer’ or more indirect instruments such as co-operative 
arrangements with non-state actors, and ‘co-production’ in particular (see Ostrom 1996; Pestoff 
2012; Pestoff, Brandsen and Verschuere 2012). In this sense, the state has shifted from being a 
direct ‘doer’ to become a ‘regulator’ of private provision, thereby, becoming a ‘regulatory state’ 
(see Majone 1997; King 2007; Levi-Faur 2013). This kind of state increasingly expands the use of 
rule-making, monitoring and administrative techniques over the societal actors. For Power (1994, 
1997), such desire to enhance the capability of the state to oversee non-state actors is well 
manifested in an ‘audit explosion’: the increase in state strategies for creating and managing 
networks and partnerships through setting up all kinds of arrangements for auditing and regulating 
other organisations. 
 A greater collaboration between the state and NGOs facilitates ‘civic society’, rather than 
civil society (see Huang and Young 2016; Lee 2002; Koh and Ling 2000). ‘Civic society’ is not 
inherently political and exists in concert with most authoritarian polities (Hewison and Rodan 
1996). The state is happy to support ‘civic’ activities which are confined to effective and efficient 
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management and governance of communal matters (Huang and Young 2016). It is not content with 
activities that inherently challenge its authority. In this sense, NGOisation helps the state to secure 
influence over civil society by making the NGOs become integrated into the state system. The 
promotion of the ‘civic society’ generates a ‘manufactured’ civil society (Hodgson 2004): a civil 
society which is not developed organically but engineered or formed and funded through some 
type of state initiative, at least initially. Such civil society prioritises the state and tries to reach 
agendas set by the state that ‘manufactures’ it. Then, the state-manufactured organised civil society 
becomes ‘a tool for the government to co-opt and control [other parts of] civil society’ (Crispin 
2000, p. 21). 
 Furthermore, government-NGO collaboration raises an important question of what makes 
NGOs legitimate actors in late modern civil society and public affairs. In fact, some point out 
various sources of legitimacy which NGOs can claim (see Thrandardottir 2012; Beetham 2013; 
Lang 2013). Even so, this thesis argues that it is the process of NGOisation which significantly 
makes an NGO a legitimate and reliable partner for governments. 
 
 Donor-driven NGOs and ‘elite civil society’  
 Legitimacy from the donors is prioritised over that from the movement base. Upward 
accountability to donors is expected. As a result, NGOs are inclined to become a ‘memberless’ 
and donor-driven (see Atia and Herrold 2018). NGOisation makes NGOs learn to speak the 
particular linguistic repertoire of their donors for acquiring funds and status (Aksartova 2009). It 
is possible to say that NGOisation reveals one of the basic truths about NGOs: they are not only 
working for their beneficiaries as commonly assumed, but they are also serving their donor(s) and 
aiming to produce projects (see Krause 2014). The NGOs’ organisational reproduction becomes 
the goal around which work is organised, displacing other ends. 
 The greater collaboration between the state and NGOs also points to the rise of ‘elite civil 
society’ which is upwardly accountable to donors and the state, not the people. Carroll (2016) 
argues that NGOisation brings about selective political inclusion in which NGOs that are happy to 
cooperate and compromise with the state are legitimised and can gain better access and resources 
while those who are not willing to, are excluded. NGOisation, on the one hand, presents an image 
of pluralism and openness favouring non-state initiatives. Yet, on the other hand, it has the 
potential to divide civil society into the group that is ‘good’ and the other that is ‘bad’, seen as 
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closed and radicals. The ‘good’ ones tend to become an ‘elite civil society’ which functions on 
models of harmony and consensus, sharing certain common interests with the state and donors 
rather than with the constituencies they are supposed to represent (Choudry 2010; Guilhot 2007; 
Phatharathananunth 2006).  
  
 Institutional advocacy 
 The fourth implication involves the growth of ‘institutionalised advocacy’ (Lang 2013), a 
mode of work giving NGOs better access to institutional contexts and being competent and reliable 
experts in a particular state governance arrangement. Institutional advocacy refers to ‘the attempt 
to influence decision making by gaining some degree of insider status in institutions or in 
organisations that initiate, prepare, legislate or execute policy change’ (Lang 2013, p. 22). Major 
tools are lobbying and sharing experience and knowledge. It champions informal/internal 
consultation and collaboration. This is different from public advocacy, defined as ‘attempts to 
achieve policy success by engaging broader publics and… actively stimulating citizen voice and 
engagement in the process’ (Lang 2013, p. 23). Important to the latter approach are such tools as 
protest and social movement. It champions external communication with the public and 
confrontation. These advocacy approaches are summarised in the figure 2.2. 
 Although techniques performed in institutional advocacy seems to give greater help to 
NGOs in reaching their advocacy goals and getting in contact with the authority (see Adams 2007), 
it has drawbacks. Institutional advocacy diverts NGOs from their constituencies and public 
movement activities. NGOs tend to become elitist, upscaled, and uncommitted to the real lives of 
people (see Henderson 2003; Carroll 2016; Choudry 2010; Guilhot 2007). Institutional advocacy 
produces images of expert NGOs ‘speaking for’ instead of ‘engaging with’ their social base (Lang 
2013). NGOs also run a risk of NGOs being co-opted. In society where the NGO sector is 
developing, fragmented, and heavily dependent on the state for funding due to chronic lack of 
other resources, state-NGO collaboration can, and is likely to, be used as a ‘co-option’ strategy by 
government because the government may understand that NGOs are often guided, notably through 
fiscal and contractual mechanisms, toward provision of social services and away from advocacy 

















Source: adapted from Lang (2013, 23) 
 
2.2 Metagovernance 
 Metagovernance is a popular, yet often undeliberated, practice of contemporary public 
management conducted by different kinds of actors. As Sørensen (2006) wrote, ‘metagovernance 
can potentially be exercised by any resourceful actor – public or private. All it takes is resources 
and a desire to influence activities performed by self-governing actors’ (p.103). There has been an 
increased use of metagovernance as a scholarly concept since 1997, yet the concept is still 
relatively ill-researched and has never become a trending topic in academia. Meuleman (2019, p. 
84) suspects that this is because studying metagovernance requires people ‘to step out of their 
comfort zones’.  
The literature of metagovernance is varied across disciplines (see Stoker and Baker 2015; 
Jessop 2004, 2011; Kooiman and Jentoft 2009; Meuleman 2008; Torfing et al. 2012). As a 
conceptual framework, metagovernance generally encourages us to look at the modes or orders of 
social coordination and how they are manifested, utilised, and interacted. As a practice, it is about 
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deliberate attempts to facilitate, manage, and direct more or less self-regulating processes of 
interactive governance without reverting to traditional statist styles of government in terms of 
bureaucratic rule making and imperative command (Torfing et al. 2012, p. 122).  
 
Hence, any attempts to coordinate different modes of governance essentially is sufficient 
to be called metagovernance because at the heart of the concept is the interactive nature of 
governance. It is constructive to develop the analytical concept of metagovernance to help study 
the practice and process of steering better and more critically. 
 
2.2.1 Metagovernance and governance 
The concept of metagovernance cannot replace that of governance which provides the 
general basis for metagovernance. A discussion of governance is needed upon which to build the 
understanding on metagovernance. 
Governance is one of the most contested, but ubiquitous, concepts within the study of 
politics and public policy (Fawcett 2016; Bevir 2012; Frederickson 2005) where government has 
become an increasingly complex matter dependent on hybrid practices and diverse stakeholders. 
Governance broadly refers to a mode of social coordination (Thompson et al. 1991; Lowndes and 
Skelcher 1998; Meuleman 2008; Bevir 2012). The study of governance is believed to cover the 
study of structures and procedures (of the governance itself and the governor) and the relations 
with those who are governed, be they subordinates, partners, or clients (Meuleman 2019, p. 23).  
For Jessop (2016a, p. 74), ‘governance’ is ‘both equivocal, because it has different but 
stable meanings in different contexts, and ambiguous, as its meanings vary even in similar 
contexts’. Its utility is slippery (see Welch 2013) and the term is often used in conjunction with a 
particular qualifying prefix (Ansell and Torfing 2016). Hence, ‘governance’ has the character of a 
stipulative definition (Rhodes 1997) in which the term can be given a certain meaning for a certain 
purpose in a certain context. However, ‘governance’, in essence, could etymologically be traced 
back to the Greek word ‘kybernân’ or ‘kubernetes’ which means ‘the art of steering, governing, 
piloting’ associated with how to create a system of rule (Kjær 2004; Torfing, et al. 2012). 
As a theory of governing, governance is an analytical tool to understand and participate in 
the purposive actions and practices of attempting, directly or indirectly, to provide or coordinate 
ordered governing mechanisms/structures regardless of whether government plays an active role  
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(Peters and Pierre 2016; Ansell and Torfing 2016; Bevir 2012). Indeed, there is no ‘single theory’ 
of governance, but rather many overlapping theoretical discussions and debates (see Ansell and 
Torfing 2016). In the area of politics and public management, one common point the theories of 
governance contribute to is a re-consideration of the role of the state in governance arrangements. 
Governance theories do not suggest that the state has simply lost its power in governing but that 
the state is exercising power in a different manner. To study governance is thus to study the state 
and its relationship with society. 
 Two major generations of governance studies can be identified (Palumbo 2015; Ansell and 
Torfing 2016; cf. Rhodes 2012). The first generation has sympathetically focused on the 
innovations generated through changes in governance and usually highlighted their positive 
achievements. Its theories have revolved around a unidirectional shift from ‘government to 
governance’ suggesting that processes of governing were somehow self-organising and did not 
require government. This conceptualisation of governance is still dominant in the field. In contrast, 
the second generation has put more emphasis on the critical aspects of those alleged achievements. 
Governance is starting to be seen as not replacing government, but rather supplementing and 
transforming government. Some even prefer to see how governance operates in the shadow of 
hierarchy and how government participates in governance. In addition, critical analysis of any 
ideal forms of governing has been advocated. A form of governing is seen in itself susceptible to 
failure. This second generation of governance studies is inclined to envision governance in the 
broader sense emphasising the relational dimension of governance: ‘how different governance 
modes, hierarchies, markets, or networks co-exist and the potential tensions and dilemmas that 
arise from their co-existence’ (Kjær 2011, p. 106). Metagovernance is derived from, and positioned 
in, the second generation. 
 
2.2.2 Steering through hierarchies, markets, and networks 
 Given that governance involves a mode of social coordination in a complex, intertwined 
system, it not involves oversight and control (hierarchies), but also non-hierarchical coordination. 
Treated as a coordinating mechanism, several kinds of governance are identified by governance 
scholars (see Jessop 2011, 2016b; Thompson et al. 1991; Kooiman 2003; Meuleman 2008). The 
three most basic ‘modes of governance (steering)’ are often classified as hierarchies, market, and 
networks. This classification is typological or speculative rather than empirically grounded (Jessop 
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2016b). They are three ideal types of social coordination. Each of them depends on a certain form 
of steering to coordinate actions. Some see these modes as structural arrangements, the ways of 
providing direction towards certain governance problems (Pierre and Peters 2000). This means 
that there is a ‘right’ governance solution through manipulating the ‘structures’ within which it is 
presumed to be generated. In this respect, the occurrence of governance is at the intersection of 
different modes of social relations which then allows the plausibility of adopting different 
approaches to their interplays. Various hybrids are possible. 
 Each mode has its own distinctive strengths and weaknesses. They are not interchangeable. 
Hierarchies depend on authority and centralised control. They divide complex tasks into more 
manageable ones, thereby encouraging a division of labour, specialisation, and effective goal 
attainment. The typical hierarchical relation involves dependency and subordination. A good 
example of hierarchical governance is steering through rules and regulations. On the contrary, 
markets depend on prices and dispersed competition. They produce coordination through 
exchanges although most of their activities often rely on laws and governments. The typical market 
relation involves independency. Market governance aims to reach efficient allocation of resources 
typically through steering by contracts and grants. 
 In contemporary new governance arrangements where various non-state stakeholders and 
‘wicked problems’ (Peters 2017) are involved, hierarchies and markets are seen as not being 
sufficient for the distribution of public goods and services. On the other hand, networks are 
championed by governance scholars, especially those of the ‘network governance’ school (see 
Rhodes 1997; Smith 1998; Richards and Smith 2002). Networks depend on trust across webs of 
associations. They do not usually contain an authoritative centre to coordinate, but repeated and 
continuous dialogue. The typical network relation involves inter-dependency, coordination and 
reciprocity. Steering through co-operations, coalitions, and partnerships are good examples of 
network governance.  
 
 2.2.3 Conceptualising metagovernance 
 There are various conceptualisations of metagovernance (see Jessop 2004, 2011; Sørensen 
and Torfing 2007; Meuleman 2008; Stoker and Baker 2015). In general, metagovernance can be 
examined from the macro-level of the whole governance system (Jessop 2003, 2004; Kooiman 
2003; Kooiman and Jentoft 2009) and from the more micro- or meso-level which focuses on how 
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networks are steered and, if they can be steered, in what ways and by whom (Sørensen 2006; 
Meuleman 2008). The former chiefly emphasises how the national governance system rearranges 
and interacts, involving normative aspects. In contrast, the latter tends to see metagovernance as 
‘network management tools and techniques’ for steering networks by: (a) ‘hands-off’ approaches 
implemented at a distance such as design and framing contexts and conditions; and (b) more 
interventionist ‘hands-on’ approaches implemented by a network manager within the network such 
as through management and participation.  
 Metagovernance is also usefully comprehended through state-centric approaches (see 
Torfing et al. 2012; Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Jessop 2007, 2016b) rather than through more 
society-centric ones, which favour network governance and a relatively dominant role of non-state 
actors for steering networks. For the state-centric approach, metagovernance is focused on how 
the state revitalises its role in response to the changing context of governance. In such a context, 
the state might be less hierarchical in terms of organisation, yet hierarchies still play an important 
role in terms of coordination. As Scharpf (1993) contends, hierarchical organisation and 
hierarchical coordination are not the same. This means that hierarchical organisations can rely on 
non-hierarchical forms of coordination, or non-hierarchical organisations can rely on hierarchical 
coordination.  
In any public organisation, state power is routinely and authoritatively implicated in the 
exercise of all forms of governance. The state is central as it can bring to bear enormous financial 
resources to develop and support governance arrangements (Bell and Hindmoor 2009, p. 13). Even 
though the state has become less hierarchical, it does not necessarily ‘exclude a continuing and 
central political role for... states’ in creating the rules and context within which governance takes 
place (Jessop 2004, p. 66). 
State actors execute metagovernance with a relatively dominant role, mostly, by 
influencing the strategic context within networks (Jessop 2004; Daugbjerg and Fawcett 2017). 
Metagovernance is not only limited to the world of network governance. Advocates of state-centric 
metagovernance argue that the state plays a relatively crucial role, and non-state actors have little 
incentive to metagovern (see Bell and Hindmoor 2009). However, this does not mean that non-
state actors and institutions beyond the centre cannot perform metagoverning (Sørensen 2006; 
Sørensen and Torfing 2007; Meuleman 2019). They can metagovern but in the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’ where,  
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the state threatens—explicitly or implicitly—to impose binding rules or laws… in order to change 
their cost–benefit calculations in favour of a voluntary agreement closer to the common good rather 
than to particularistic self-interests (Börzel and Risse 2010, p. 116). 
 
Jessop is regarded as a prominent voice in studies on the state-centric conceptualisation of 
metagovernance. He originally defined metagovernance as ‘coordinating different forms of 
governance and ensuring a minimal coherence among them’ (Jessop 1997). Later, he described it 
specifically as ‘the organisation of the conditions for governance’ involving the calculated 
combination of modes of steering to reach the best possible outcomes as set by those engaged in 
metagovernance (Jessop 2003). In this respect, taking a bird’s eye view on governance, 
metagovernance is a matter of rebalancing different modes of governance grounded in the 
philosophy of critical realism (CR) (Jessop 2005). CR will be discussed in the next chapter as the 
philosophy navigating the research of the thesis. 
Besides, for Jessop (2004), metagovernance implies the co-existence of government and 
governance in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’. Governance does not exist without government. This 
suggests an analytical way of seeing the state-centric and the society-centric approach to 
metagovernance as a ‘continuum’, rather than a dualism (Fawcett and Daugbjerg 2012; Daugbjerg 
and Fawcett 2015). It is a matter of degree as to how the government and the governance merge 
themselves in relation to one another. 
 
2.2.4 The analytic of metagovernance 
Wood (2016, p. 527) argues that metagovernance is a ‘multilevel concept’ which,  
 
can be applied in multiple contexts, and can have both a deep critical theoretical and even 
philosophical meaning, but also refers quite legitimately to concrete acts that can be usefully 
measured in empirical research.  
 
It is possible to state that the analytic of metagovernance is a critical approach to the study 
of steering self-governing systems: a mode of thinking about how governance is structured and 
applied. Metagovernance broadens analytical horizons to the study of governance and is developed 
within four important conceptions of governance as shown in figure 2.3. 
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(1) The coexistence of government and governance  
Metagovernance arguably broadens the analytical capacity by encouraging us to critically 
examine the oversimplification of the oft-cited idea of unitary shift from old government 
(hierarchies) to new governance (non-hierarchies), concurred by mainstream governance theories 
in the aforementioned ‘network governance’ school. The ‘network governance school’ is often 
criticised for portraying naïve political relationships and underlying changes in governing 
characterised as ‘governance without government’, often equating governance simply with 
networks as the only realistic mode of steering if better governance is expected (see Marinetto 
2003; Peters and Pierre 2006; Davies 2005; Ungsuchaval 2017). Metagovernance contends that 
the importance of the state should not be deemphasised. Instead, it follows the research which has 
found that the state and hierarchical governance persist and function well even where network 
governance is predominant (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Peters and Pierre 2006; Lynn 2011; Hill 
and Lynn 2005). Metagovernance better captures the reality of public governance as the state in 
modern governance is a ‘congested state’, full of fragmented and plural forms of governance, not 
just those of networks (Skelcher 2000). 
Metagovernance does not pre-suppose that certain practices or actors are oriented to one 
superior kind of steering. The underlying idea of metagovernance to govern ‘better’, not less, is 
often implicitly associated with processes of governmentality (Sokhi-Bulley 2011). Subsequently, 
‘government’ and ‘governance’ should be given equal attention. Metagovernance does not portray 
Metagovernance 
‘governance of governance’ 
Interactive 
governance in 
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Higher, emergent 








governance and government as having an ‘either-or’, binary relationship, as mainstream 
governance theories often uphold. Instead, government (old, hierarchical steering) and governance 
(new, non-hierarchical steering) can coexist in a metagovernance perspective. As Whitehead 
(2003) argues, metagovernance breaks down the arbitrary divide that has been constructed between 
government and governance, suggesting instead a hybrid form of governance that is fashioned ‘in 
the shadow of hierarchy’. 
It is noted that the term ‘government’ used in metagovernance studies is not simply equated 
with the central administrative agency of the state. It can also mean any formal structures of the 
public sector, the apparatuses of the state, and the set of actors which exercise state power including 
non-departmental bodies (Peters and Pierre 2016). Government, accordingly, is not a single entity 
but a conglomerate of actors. The term can also be alternatively interpreted as a mode of governing 
featuring hierarchies. These two interpretations are often used interchangeably. 
Metagovernance treats modes of governance equally as the fundamental units of analysis. 
It highlights theory development of metagovernance in terms of ‘and-and’, not ‘either-or’ 
(Kooiman 2003). Government and governance are positioned as a duality, not a dualism (Marsh 
2011). Empirically, Kjaer (2010) argues that rather than involving contradictory developments, 
governing and governance in the case of the EU are mutually constitutive in that more governing 
implies more governance and vice versa. Torfing et al. (2012) found that governments are in fact 
capable of influencing policymaking in the decentred world of interactive governance through the 
exercise of metagovernance. 
There are numerous ways that governments establish the ground rules for governance (see 
Jessop 2016b). From a metagovernance perspective, how government and governance coexist, for 
instance, could be understood as a series of state transformation trends and counter-trends (see 
Jessop 1997). What should be emphasised here is the trend referred to as ‘a destatisation of politics’ 
where ‘governments have always relied on other agencies to aid them in realising state objectives 
or projecting state power beyond the formal state apparatus’ (Jessop 1997, p. 575). This correlates 
with the relational approach to state-society relations and interactive governance which suggests 
that governments often enhance their power and capacity by developing close, interdependent 
relationships with non-state actors and using networks to govern (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; 
Larsson 2013). Chosen governance strategies are in fact interactive showing a combination of 
different modes of governance, not merely those of the state. The trend signifies an increase of 
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‘partnerships’ between governmental, para-governmental, and non-governmental actors. The state 
integrates more non-hierarchical forms of governing and policy making such as networks and 
public-private partnerships into its system. This leads the state itself to consider metagovernance 
issues such as casting the shadow of hierarchy over governance arrangements or adjusting the 
relatively mixed modes of governing to ensure an effective outcome. 
 
(2) Dialectic of structure-agency in governing 
Promoting the co-existence of government and governance, often treated as binary, reflects 
a distinct stance regarding structure and agency in governance, which transcends mainstream 
governance theories. Different governance theories raise questions about structure and agency in 
governing and reflect different meta-theoretical positions (see Ungsuchaval 2016a). Some theories 
are inclined to be based decisively on structural explanations emphasising the mechanisms of 
institutional constraint of governance (see Peters 2011; Hay 2002) while the others are focused on 
decentring the institutions by prioritising the independent agents of governance and constructed 
narratives (see Bevir and Rhodes 2003, 2015). They place a different priority on structural or 
agential forces. 
However, metagovernance pays attention to the dialectic of structure and agency in 
governing. It can be seen as an outcome of strategic interaction between governance modes, 
interactions, and calculations (see Jessop 2005, 2007). As Jessop (2011, p. 108) asserts, 
governance comprises ‘the structures and practices involved in coordinating social relations that 
are marked by complex, reciprocal interdependence, and metagovernance refers in turn to the 
coordination of these structures and practices’. Grounded in the dialectic of structure-agency, 
metagovernance does not merely involve structures or processes but ‘social relations’.  
In analytical terms, the dialectic of structure and agency gives rise to the emphasis on the 
structural ‘tendency’ and the relationship a metagovernor has created.  Jessop (2004, p. 70) refers 
to metagovernance as ‘the organisation of the conditions of governance in terms of their 
structurally inscribed strategic selectivity, that is, in terms of their asymmetrical privileging of 
some outcomes over others’. Consequently,  a part of metagovernance points to the analysis of the 
strategic selectivity or ‘structural tendency’ of certain governance structures and arrangements 
(Jessop 2005, 2007; Biebricher 2013), namely of what is privileged by a metagovernor and  what 
context gives rise to a governance arrangement that is strategically-selective or structurally biased. 
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In other words, metagovernors have an ineradicable tendency to favour, produce and reproduce 
certain structures and structural configurations including actors, strategies, and discourses over 
others. At the same time, the structural tendency of the governance arrangement is a structural 
constraint influencing the operations and behaviours of the metagovernor so that they can orient 
their strategies and tactics to reach a satisfactory outcome. It is noted that the idea of structural 
tendency is about ‘tendency’ rather than absolutely constraining (Jessop 2016b). Steering is not 
apparently neutral. Coordinating modes of governance is thus about strategies in the web of 
complex interaction between structure and agency, and involves inbuilt tendencies or biases of 
privileging. Yet whether how and how far these tendencies are actualised depends on the changing 
balance of forces, strategies and tactics metagovernors perform in practice. 
In practice, metagovernance signifies the dialectic of structure-agency as well. In their 
application of metagovernance, Stoker and Baker (2015, pp. 38-39) assert that metagovernance 
‘recognises governmental capacity and the constraining role played by institutions and structures 
whilst allowing for the agency of networked actors’. Metagovernance gives the potential for 
simultaneous recognition of the continued power of the state that does the governing and the 
reflexivity of networked players that are the governed. Therefore, to study metagovernance, 
primarily, is to look at the role, capacity, and legitimacy of metagovernors to exercise control over 
the more devolved and decentralised forms of decision-making characteristic of network 
governance (Fawcett 2016). 
 
(3) Interactive governance in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ 
The emphasis of metagovernance is not only on the co-existence, but the interactive, 
interdependent nature of different concepts of governance. As mentioned, hierarchy, market and 
network as the major concepts of governance are normally conceived in terms of ‘ideal’ or ‘pure’ 
types. However, it is difficult to find one mode at work purely and solely, especially in the public 
sector. Bartlet and Le Grand (1993) argue that, in the area of social policy, ‘market’ is different 
from ‘pure’ ideal-type markets. In practice, all modes share some of each other’s attributes and 
function in combination. They rely on one another. 
For example, as hierarchies rely on networks, Larsson (2013) argues that networks also 
rely on sovereign power to preserve the conditions for effective network governance. Davies 
(2011) suggests that coordination of networks has the tendency to degenerate into hierarchical 
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systems because they fail to cultivate the ‘connectionist citizen-activists’ who could energetically 
solve policy and management problems in de-politicised, trust-based networks. Similarly, others 
also found that markets can and often do rely on command, as do networks on competition and 
hierarchies on trust (Grote 2012; Davies and Spicer 2015). Hence, networks are unlikely to exist 
without hierarchy and market influence. Markets are unlikely to function without hierarchy and 
network influence, and so on. In this way, the interactive form of governance proves the fact that 
government and governance coexist with one another (Fawcett 2016). 
Consequently, what is potentially found is quasi-markets, quasi-networks, and quasi-
hierarchy (Exworthy, Powell, and Mohan 1999). This corresponds with Torfing et al. (2012), who 
suggest two key forms of the interactive governance arrangement: quasi-markets (e.g. granting) 
and quasi-networks (e.g. partnership and governance network). If modes of governance are only 
perceived in ideal, pure form, one cannot make sense of a high degree of command and control 
found in managerialism associated with NPM and market-driven governance (see Deetz 1992; 
Carlisle 2011). NPM, in essence, combines the alleged efficiency of managerial and budgetary 
practices from the private sector and the regulatory efficacy of steering and funding from the public 
sector (Bartlett and Le Grand 1993; Hood 1991). It has never been the matter of the market alone. 
To see the interactive feature of governance is an important stance in the analytic of 
metagovernance. 
Actually, the idea that governance arrangement consists of a combination of modes of 
governance is not entirely new. What is new in what metagovernance offers is a theorised 
conception of the compatibility (such as potential complementarity) or incompatibility (such as 
tension) and the interactive feature of steering within a specific governance arrangement. The 
challenge of metagovernance in practice is how to provide direction to a governance system 
through mechanisms which maintain the virtues generated by delegated and devolved forms of 
governing while providing central direction and control. Indeed, metagovernance holds the most 
fundamental task of governing, that is, the balancing of control and autonomy. For Jessop (2011), 
the task of metagovernance can be conducted with the ‘collibration’ of governance: a strategic 
attempt to adjust or rebalance several modes of governance in the interconnected coordination to 
improve the effectiveness of steering. This strategic attempt is believed to take place in the ‘shadow 
of hierarchy’. 
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The ‘shadow of hierarchy’ refers to the influence, often subtle and indirect, the state 
exercises over other actors in political and civil society through either the real or imagined pressure 
of executive or legislative action, or both. Such influence draws on the state’s unique capacities 
and powers, including coercion (Jessop 2016a, 2016b; see also Scharpf 1994; Whitehead 2003; 
Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008). With the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, metagovernance involves the state 
capability and mentality to steer quasi-networks and quasi-markets by designing the context in 
which they operate to secure the compatibility of outcomes and broader interests of the state. The 
‘shadow of hierarchy’ is considered a defining feature of (effective) metagovernance (Jessop 2004, 
2011; Peters 2010; Meyer 2012). It allows the orchestrator of metagovernance to design and 
combine elements of different governance modes as well as switching between the modes when 
necessary so that the effectiveness of metagovernance is reached (Meuleman 2019). Even self– or 
co–regulation featuring networks and markets would not take place without the shadow of 
hierarchy. This stresses the importance of hierarchical steering running through any kind of 
governance arrangement (Rhodes and Visser 2011). It would not be surprising if the state is often 
seen as a default metagovernor which usually decides on the balance between, and the operation 
of, different modes of governance. 
Hence, it is likely that hierarchies in metagovernance are not merely a straightforward 
governing mechanism (hierarchical steering in a ‘pure’ sense) associated with order, efficiency, 
and centralised decision-making power;  they are in fact manifested as quasi-hierarchies in the 
form of the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ often positioned in a higher order to steer a governance 
arrangement. 
 
(4) Higher-order governance as strategic supervision 
 The analytic of metagovernance highlights the stratified reality of governance. Given the 
term ‘meta’ conveys meaning of something over and beyond, metagovernance is usually used to 
refer to the ‘governance of governance’ (Kooiman 2003; Jessop 2011; Meuleman 2008), that is 
the coordination/steering positioned above modes of governance. Specifically, Kooiman (2003) 
treats metagovernance as an emerging order, a third-order governance, which emphasises norms 
and principles for governing as a whole. This metagovernance goes beyond lower order 
governance which mainly deals with problem solving, the day-to-day activities of steering and the 
maintenance of the institutions where the activities of governance take place. In this sense, 
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metagovernance points to the significance of orders of governance, with metagovernance as a 
higher, emergent level conditioning and steering lower-order governance.  
 Comprehensively, Torfing et al. (2012, p. 131) address metagovernance as: 
 
a reflexive, higher order governance practice that involves (a) the production and dissemination of 
hegemonic norms and ideas about how to govern and be governed; (b) the political, normative, and 
context-dependent choice among different modes of governing, or among different combinations 
of governing modes; and (c) the strategic structuring and managing of particular institutional forms 
of governance in order to facilitate sustained interaction, prevent dysfunctions, and advance 
particular political goals. 
 
 The above definition arguably implies that metagovernance is a practice that 
simultaneously involves inward and outward steering. Metagovernance is interested in the 
governing of ‘oneself’ as it steers and conducts distinct, but operationally related, modes of 
governance within a metagovernor’s system of governance (see Jessop 2011). At the same time, it 
can be seen as a practice of governing ‘others’ involving steering and conducting ‘self-organising 
networks’ or governance networks (see Klijn and Koppenjan 2016; Torfing et al. 2012) operating 
outside a metagovernor. 
 It is believed that higher-order governance is necessity because lower-order governance is 
inclined to failure (Jessop 1998, 2000; Meuleman 2008) and therefore needs steering to increase 
its potential. Jessop (2004) argues that metagovernance is used to create some coherence among 
modes of governance and an appropriate balance among different stakeholders and interests for 
the sake of social cohesion. In reality, networks of non-state actors commonly assumed to be able 
to support state agencies in addressing the increasing complex governance problems (see Slaughter 
2004; World Economic Forum 2013; Anheier 2017; Munene and Thakhathi 2017) are not 
sufficiently united in their pursuit of a common goal and not functioning in an efficient, non-
conflicting way. Networks are highly political (Gerard 2017) and having depoliticising effect 
(Wood 2016). The lack of rules in self-governing networks limits their capacity to shape outcomes. 
Metagovernance in this sense is conducted to ensure the functionality of the networks (as lower-
order governance). 
 In practice, metagovernance as a higher-order governance can be framed as ‘strategic 
supervision’. As strategic supervision, metagovernance emphasises the coordination among the 
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actors and mechanisms of steering involved, or how the partnership is developed and run. It can 
posit values and goals for the partnership. Yet, no means of reaching the goals are necessarily 
specified. Those who govern thus retain a substantial degree of autonomy, a condition frequently 
referred to as (self-governing) governance. This is why metagovernance aims at governing, 
specifically steering and framing, ‘the environment of action… rather than the action directly’ 
(Peters 2010, p. 38). A good example of strategic supervision is shaping the structural and 
institutional conditions of the relationship by designing and directing the interactive governance 
arenas (Torfing et al. 2012). 
 To be specific, la Cour and Andersen (2016) suggest that metagovernance as ‘strategic 
supervision’ should stimulate promises about the committed continuation of relationship. For 
instance, merely developing the contractual relationship is not sufficient. Metagovernance should 
aim to build the possible perpetuation of the relationship and the common outcomes the actors 
have not yet created together. The relationship should not be temporary but institutionalised. In 
doing so, ‘soft’ instruments of steering are needed for governing at a distance so that stakeholders 
and partners are positioned into a certain governable terrain, where the metagovernor’s organising 
power and the latitude of the governed are simultaneously enhanced and a common goal is 
expected.  
 Therefore, metagovernance is a strategic attempt to indirectly govern or steer those 
engaged in the relationship, be they relevant actors or modes of governance. Although such an 
attempt is always conducted within the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ to prevent its potential failure, 
metagovernance, through ‘soft’ means, must allow some of the latitude of the actors engaged. In 




 NGOisation and metagovernance are the core theoretical frameworks employed in the 
thesis to investigate the THPF-NGO relations. The NGOisation framework helps explore in what 
way the NGOs are driven to develop certain characteristics by the funder. The metagovernance 
framework assists the researcher to investigate how the funded NGOs are steered by the THPF, or 
how the THPF strategically governs its NGO partners. Although the concepts are variously used, 
even in their own fields, they can be linked in a complementary way to study multiple aspects of 
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THPF-NGO relations. Each concept generates different answers to the same phenomenon which 
can bring us a better understanding of it. A ‘multilevel description’ is expected to emerge from CR 
research (O’Mahoney and Vincent 2014). The next chapter is dedicated to the discussion of the 
































The main purpose of the research is to explore why NGOisation happens through the 
metagovernance of the THPF by retroductively tracing back to the potential mechanisms which 
drive the processes. In this way, the thesis empirically investigates the operation and underlying 
mechanisms of the THPF used to steer its NGO partners and the NGOisation of them. Qualitative 
methodology is applied as research ‘orientation’ (Pernecky 2016) and critical realism (CR) is 
purposively chosen to help navigate the research which orients the empirical investigation in a 
distinct and a flexible way. This chapter aims to discuss the methodology selected and applied in 
the thesis. It starts with elaborating on the philosophy of CR adopted in the research and its 
methodological links. The retroductive research strategy, typically advocated by CR, will then be 
discussed as the dominant strategy. Then, the chapter explains the method selected for gathering 
and analysing data in practice. The chapter ends by discussing reflexivity, challenges and 
limitations of the research. 
 
3.1 Critical realism and social research 
CR is portrayed as a ‘seductive’ idea across a range of theories of human and social 
sciences, mostly because it is commonly known  to hold the ostensible and practicable middle 
ground between (or alternative to) two opposing poles of the philosophical spectrum: extreme 
positivism and radical constructionism (Sayer 2000; Archer et al. 2016; Pawson 2006). Essentially, 
CR helps combine and reconcile a realist/objectivist ontology with an interpretivist/relativist 
epistemology (Maxwell 2012; Sayer 2000, 2010; Bhaskar 1998).  
Even so, CR is a relatively young entrant into social science and its methodology. In 
qualitative research, it can be argued that CR is still developing, often based on some explicitly 
realist approach to the research (e.g. Maxwell 2012; Sayer 2010; Pawson 2006; Pawson and Tilley, 
1997). Not many appealing and accessible materials have been seriously developed regarding 
empirically applied CR or CR-informed methodology (see Yeung 1997; Oliver 2012; Ackroyd 
and Karlsson 2014). Most recognised CR research models (e.g. Bhaskar 2016; Collier 1994; 
Danermark et al. 2002) that are variously applied to the empirical research are often too 
complicated to be practically applied. When they can be used, the empirical application of the 
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models is contested and developing (see Craig and Bigby 2015; Blom and Morén, 2011; Fletcher 
2013, 2017). There is no ‘one-best-way’ to employ and adopt the CR research models. 
Nevertheless, among the contestation, the models are arguably similar in essence. They aim to 
investigate the underlying mechanisms, implicitly and explicitly. 
Many strongly advocate that CR can perform serious and useful work in social research 
and theorising, and as such has implications for methodology (Maxwell 2012; Sayer 2010; Carter 
and New 2004; Danermark et al. 2002), especially in terms of conceptualisation and conduct of 
qualitative research. Bhaskar (2016, p. 79) asserts that the interest of CR empirical study is 
typically ‘exploratory’, that is, ‘to identify, discover, uncover… structures, blocks, and 
(generically) causes, and the particular sequences, combinations, and articulations of them at work 
in specific times and places’. This thesis adopts the ideas of CR as follows.  
 
3.1.1 The layered ontology and the ‘emergence’ 
CR distinctively highlights a layered, but interwoven, ontology to social reality (Sayer 
2010): the ‘empirical’ domain of sensory experience; the ‘actual’ domain of material existence and 
events; and the ‘real’ domain of causal powers and mechanisms. The real domain is not always 
apparent in empirical and actual manifestations. It generates events, which might or might not be 
experienced. In this respect, the social reality is constituted, not only by events and our perceptions 
or experiences of the events, but also by structures and mechanisms which are often unobservable 
and involving tendency. As such the layered ontology of CR enables researchers to investigate the 
mechanisms located at the real domain which are not merely confined to the study of empirically 
observed characteristics held by positivism and symbolically expressed meanings held by 
interpretivism which are located at the empirical level (see Wuisman 2005).  
Moreover, the layered ontology points to the idea of ‘emergence’: the complex interaction 
between entities existing in different levels of reality where new, emergent phenomena cannot be 
reduced to phenomena existing in any one level of reality (Sayer 2000, Danermark et al. 2002). 
CR advocates an emergent approach that sees social phenomena as having distinctive qualities and 
emerging out of certain social conditions. As such the qualities are the ‘emergent property/power’ 
which makes the social phenomena an emergent reality that is irreducible to its discursive 
descriptions or component parts it is formed upon. In other words, the ‘higher level’ entities, which 
are emergent, cannot be reduced to the conditions provided by the ‘lower level’ entities. For 
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instance, NGOisation may be dependent upon certain developments such as institutionalisation 
and professionalisation which causally help constitute it, yet NGOisation has its own specific 
powers and characteristics which generate certain effects which cannot be reduced to the 
developments driving it. Likewise, metagovernance has a higher power than that of a mere mode 
of governance. It can strategically calibrate different modes of governance to reach an outcome in 
a way that each mode of governance cannot do, either alone or together. 
 
3.1.2 Epistemology 
The unique ontological position of CR, in turn, shapes the epistemology in a distinct way. 
For CR, reality does exist independently of our knowledge of it. However, how we see the world 
is theory-dependent or theory-laden, but not theory-determined. It is subject to conceptual 
interpretations. As summarised by della Porta and Keating (2008, p. 24), for CR, ‘there is a real 
material world but… our knowledge of it is often socially conditioned and subject to challenge 
and reinterpretation’. This double recognition of the realist ontology and relativist epistemology is 
relatively novel in social science research (O’Mahoney and Vincent 2014). It is important to note 
that, although CR recognises the interpretive notion of social reality as being communicatively 
and socially constructed, it does not aim to generate the interpretivist solution (Delanty 2005). CR-
inspired research is not interested in meaning, understanding, and interpretation of people as held 
by interpretivist research, nor factual knowledge and law-like generalisations as held by positivist 
research. Instead, CR advocates the search for the means to synthesise an account of key social 
mechanisms and processes with mechanisms from the available ideas and relevant data. 
 Given this, theories are essential to CR research. CR believes in a possible ‘better’ theory 
which can help build more accurate explanations of certain social phenomena and mechanisms. 
However, the theory does not necessarily secure successful empirical research. CR scholars 
believe that theories are the starting point for empirical research (Bhaskar 2014; Greenhalgh 2014). 
It is hard to visualise how the reality perceived could be appreciated without the help of theories 
to clarify and simplify what is observed. Such theories are not absolute but initial and fallible but 
which enable ‘a deeper analysis that can support, elaborate, or deny’ the theories themselves in 
order to ‘help build a new and more accurate explanation of reality’ (Fletcher 2017, p. 184). The 
theories used in the thesis are thus subject to alternation and development throughout the research 
process. This makes the research iterative (O’Mahoney and Vincent 2014) moving between 
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conception and application so that ideas are tested against what could be found and observed in 
empirical settings. 
The THPF-NGO relations are approached upfront through the analytical lens of 
metagovernance and NGOisation. These theories have significantly shaped the way the thesis 
studies the phenomenon. They are believed to be the ‘better’ theories possessing certain analytical 
power which can contribute to the analysis in an innovative way. 
 
3.1.3 Causation and mechanisms 
The aforementioned ontological and epistemological position of CR yields significant 
implications regarding CR research methodology in terms of causality. CR distinctively advocates 
the concept of ‘causation’. This concept is strikingly different from that of positivism, let alone 
interpretivism which rejects the idea of causal relation. Positivism promotes the ‘regularity’ theory 
of causation: the theory that sees causality as involving regular associations between events or 
variables and patterns in data. In contrast, CR employs the concept of ‘mechanism’ as central to 
explanation of causation (see Danermark et al. 2002; Sayer 2000). CR aims to look beyond 
outcomes such as ‘if A, then B’ and rather ‘use(s) perceptions of empirical events [those that can 
be observed or experienced] to identify the [unobservable, underlying] mechanisms that give rise 
to those events’ (Volkoff, Strong and Elmes 2007, p. 835). In other words, the CR view on 
causality is not about ‘a relationship among distinct events (e.g., the fact that event ‘A’ by and 
large has been followed by event ‘B’) but about realising the process and conditions under which 
‘A’ causes ‘B,’ if at all’ (Zachariadis, Scott and Barrett 2013, p. 857). 
According to Lawson (1997), a mechanism refers to the way a structured entity acts or 
works. The thing could not work or act in the ways it does without possessing the power to do so. 
In other words, the underlying mechanisms own inherent powers or tendencies which might or 
might not be actualised or mobilised and expressed in certain contexts (Bhaskar 2008). They reside 
in the properties of things and in tendencies in the real domain. The actualisation of the 
mechanisms or structures heavily depends on contingencies within the contexts. Hence, the CR 
version of causation is not universally deterministic, but contingent and emergent. For CR, 
causality is irreducible to either the actualised or the experienced. 
Given the focus of this thesis, the NGOisation under investigation might be observable as 
an emergent phenomenon but the mechanisms driving it are hardly seen empirically. CR helps the 
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research identify and investigate potential underlying mechanisms which generate the 
phenomenon. Such mechanisms are found to reside in the THPF-NGO relations and the way the 
THPF metagoverns its NGO partners. NGOisation is then arguably the unintended consequence 
of the metagovernance of the THPF. 
Furthermore, in CR research, the causal efficacy confirms the ‘reality’ of entities (see 
Collier 1994; Sayer 2010). In this sense, physical and mental (ideas and meanings) objects and 
processes, albeit inherently independent, are assumed to be equally real and mutually affect each 
other (Maxwell 2012). People’s beliefs have consequences for their actions and the reality they are 
embedded in and vice versa. The threat from managerialism to public governance is a good 
example. Even though it is not actualised and non-physical, it should be perceived as real because 
it has causal efficacy. Managerialism causes changes in public service management thinking and 
practice. It stresses a hierarchical top-down command and control style of management concerned 
with efficiency and control (Deetz 1992; Carlisle 2011). Although inactivated but perceived as a 
potential threat, managerialism leads to reaction and perhaps resistance. The effect of potential, 
indirect threat is real, at least in the minds of agents. This insight implies that meaning, intentions, 
or mental states and attributes given by interview participants, although not directly observable, 
are not just being simply theoretical abstractions or social construction but are parts of the real 
world having causal efficacy. They are considered as mechanisms. 
 The idea of causation and mechanisms ultimately directs the research to focus on 
explanations of why things are the way they are to a certain context. This predisposes the 
researcher to study internal (necessary) relations of the phenomena, the tendencies of the objects 
of study, the effects of one object on another, and the way the relations are actualised (Sayer 2000; 
Danermark et al. 2002; Reed 2008, 2009).  
 
3.2 Retroductive research strategy 
Ackroyd and Karlsson (2014, p. 21) argue that CR methodology should focus on 
connecting ‘the inner world of ideas to the outer world of observable events as seamlessly as 
possible’. In other words, CR research should aim, as closely as possible, to align explanations of 
reality (the mechanisms proposed to account for the outcomes) with reality itself (the actually 
existing mechanisms of ‘social object’) (Bhaskar 2008). To identify and explain the underlying 
 51 
mechanisms methodologically, CR suggests applying neither deduction nor induction, but 
‘retroduction’. 
CR-informed enquiry is believed to use a form of retroductive analysis (Blaikie 2010; 
Blaikie and Priest 2017; Reed 2008, 2009).  Retroduction guides the researcher from the 
phenomenon lying at one level to discover the underlying causal mechanisms lying at a different, 
deeper level (Blaikie 2010; Lawson 1997). In other words,  retroduction is a mode of inference in 
which empirical events are explained by reference to the processes and mechanisms that are 
capable of producing, or at least helping facilitate, them in particular contexts (Sayer 2010). In this 
sense, retroduction ‘works backwards’ from the certain substantive phenomena of interest or 
‘effects’ to the preceding interaction between various mechanisms and contingencies which 
produced and sustained the phenomena, or ‘explanatory structures’ (Reed 2008, 2009). A 
hypothetical model of causal mechanisms is then developed which is believed to produce 
observable events and objects.  
Retroduction prompted the thesis to look for the ‘cause’ of the NGOisation of civil society, 
that is, to look at what led to the phenomenon. The research aim and questions are formulated in a 
CR-inspired way, focusing on why NGOisation happens: what mechanisms can explain the 
NGOisation of civil society and the THPF-NGO relations and why it is the way it is. Blaikie (2010) 
affirms that retroduction is the best fit concept for asking ‘why’. Accordingly, this thesis aims to 
create ‘explanations’ of the underlying mechanisms. It is an exploratory study of the mechanisms 
responsible for driving NGOisation, which resided in the THPF-NGO relation and in the way the 
THPF metagoverns its NGO partners. The researcher’s model of causal mechanisms essentially 
involves agents’ deliberations and reflections on pre-existing relevant social structures (e.g. 
governance, funding and contracting, and partnership) which had facilitating and constraining 
implications for action. The model helped to explain the participants’ experiences of 
metagovernance and NGOisation. NGOisation is seen as an unintended consequence of the 
metagovernance of the THPF in the context of the THPF-NGO relations.  
Through retroduction, the role of the researcher is not to predict or to understand, but to 
establish whether a postulated structure or mechanism exists and operates in the way hypothesised 
(Blaikie 2010) in order to create potential explanations of why certain phenomena are the way they 
are and yield outcomes that they yield. Knowledge produced in this way is invariably context-
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specific and does not allow the formulation and testing of predictive laws or hypotheses (Reed 
2009).  
As such the explanation is theoretically- and empirically- grounded. It is ‘theoretical’ 
because the process of creating explanations involves the intellectual imagination and the 
abstraction of the characteristic and the operation of underlying mechanisms. The mechanisms are 
chosen from amongst ‘known’ mechanisms (Blaikie 2010), which are potentially made up on the 
basis of what we know or we think we know (Williams 2018). It is ‘empirical’ because the 
explanations of the mechanisms are not a work of pure fiction. They are derived from a methodical 
search - through reasoning, interviews, and other methods - for empirical evidence which supports 
the behaviour of the mechanisms in the context they reside in.  
Besides, the theoretical and the empirical are dialectical in the search for mechanisms. 
Some conceptualise the dialectic as the moves between the ‘concrete’ to the ‘abstract’ (see 
Danermark et al. 2002). What the mechanisms look like at first is depended on where the research 
starts from, namely theoretical frameworks. The mechanisms are drafted along the description of 
‘the context of the action, intentions of the social actors, and the processes through which social 
action and interaction are sustained and/or changed’ (Blaikie 2010, p. 21). The mechanisms are 
then confirmed or/and refined through empirical data analysis which later are established as the 
key underlying mechanisms explaining the phenomenon.  
 
3.3 Data collection and analysis 
This section addresses the practicality of the research process by discussing the methods 
and techniques used for collecting and analysing data. The research instruments are structured for 
the unit of observation, that is, the THPF and the funded NGOs which are represented through key 
informants. The research for this thesis utilised in-depth interviews as a core technique with 
supplementary material via document research and observations. These techniques are interactive. 
In-depth interviews mainly aim to engage with participants at the management level of both the 
office of THPF and the funded NGOs. Documentary research deals with text-based resources 
representing what the THPF professes as an organisation and governance issues at board level. 
Observation was occasionally conducted to help the researcher become familiar with and be better 
able to comprehend the field.  
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3.3.1 In-depth interviews 
According to Gorman and Clayton (2005), in-depth interviews usefully (a) give immediacy 
and mutual exploration, focus on investigation of causation (or why individuals or organisations 
act in certain ways), (b) provide data which is otherwise perceived as confidential or sensitive (a 
concern which is particularly prevalent in regard to the study of inter-organisational relations), and 
(c) generate a large amount of data in a relatively short time period and render complete data sets.  
Knowledge generated through interviews provides information on the experience of the 
participants regarding a certain issue (Brinkmann and Kvale 2015). This experience represents two 
important aspects (see Zølner, Rasmussen and Hansen 2007; Brinkmann and Kvale 2015). The 
first aspect involves participants’ observations from places and settings - which could be referred 
to as ‘factual’- which the researcher has not been able to see first-hand. This ‘factual’ data is 
obtained through ‘descriptive’ kind of questions, namely ‘when’, ‘what’ or ‘who’.  These questions 
were asked to encourage the participants to talk about an issue/subject as they had experienced it.  
The second aspect involves participants’ inner perceptions and experiences, in the sense of 
their perception of the social reality and interpretation of such perceptions. These perceptions and 
experiences are acquired through ‘evaluative’ questions, namely ‘how’ and ‘why’. These questions 
demanded the participants to elaborate on their reflections on issues such as their own role, other 
participants’ roles, and internal relations. Examples of questions used to guide the interview can 
be seen in Appendix A.  
In addition, probing was used to generate the follow-up questions which shape participants’ 
responses into useful data. Two specific techniques of probing were employed. The first technique 
is ‘levelling’ (see Orne and Bell 2015) which refers to the technique the researcher used to shift 
participants’ mode of thinking to generate new kinds of information. For example, the participants 
were implicitly asked questions which navigated their opinions to move upwards to narratives and 
experiences and downwards to theorising and mechanisms. This means that the interview guide 
was not strictly used in chronological order. The second technique involves asking agonistic, 
challenging questions which imply disagreement. For instance, the participants were asked to give 
their reflections on a criticism that the THPF is ‘a hub of elite civil society’ in Thailand, or the 
negative effects of the THPF’s funding which leads the funded organisations to be more project-
based and fragmented, spoiling the value of civil society. These questions made the participants 
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defend their statements, generating more information than the researcher would otherwise have 
obtained. 
Indeed, interviewing is a valuable and often the only, way to gain a description of actions 
and events that took place in the past or in which observational access is unavailable. In this sense, 
interviews are a means to gain insights into diverse perspectives related to the inner workings of 
the THPF-NGO partnership, which, in turn, provide the possibility for reaching both the ‘official’ 
account and different viewpoints that infrequently come to the fore. However, it is important to 
note that interview data is merely a description of the observational units, or what the participants 
‘said’ at the experience domain (Maxwell 1992). In CR, there is also a need for the researcher to 
make inferences from the description in order to analyse the social contexts and underlying 
processes and mechanisms, the explanatory unit which is couched in another domain, which 
represent different aspects of a multi-layered social reality within which the participants act. CR-
informed interviews are more than merely appreciating the interpretations of the participants, an 
activity commonly favoured by interpretivists (Smith and Elger 2014). 
To be specific, CR approach to interviewing emphasises the importance of the active, 
investigative, and analytically informed orientation of the researcher/interviewer in generating data 
and participants’ descriptions. As Pawson and Tilley (1997) argue, the interviews should be 
explicitly theory-driven. The subject matter of the interview is ultimately the 
researcher/interviewer’s theories and conceptualisations, which are then confirmed, falsified, 
or/and refined by the participants’ thoughts and actions using their own conceptual basis. This 
suggests that the interviews help connect the research agenda of the researcher to the 
understandings and experiences of the participants. Data collected from the interviews is not 
merely detailed information about the ‘factual’ and the participants’ insights but also hypotheses 
which help to enquire into the relationships among the different causal mechanisms (e.g. modes of 
governance), the contexts in which these mechanisms operated, and the outcomes, whether 
anticipated or unanticipated. 
In practice, a semi-structured interview guide (see Appendix A) was designed and 
structured in four major parts. Part A collected general information on the organisation and the 
interviewee’s experience within it. Part B is specifically focused on the working experience and 
relationship the participants have with their partner organisation(s). Part C is designed for the 
participants to give an assessment of certain hypothesised questions involving influences of the 
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THPF on the funded organisations. Lastly, part D collected the participants’ reflexive opinions of 
the subject being studied. 
The interview guide was pretested in three interviews to increase its validity and 
applicability. These pilot interviews took place in August 2016. Consequently, the original 
interview guideline was revised, shortened, and streamlined in some points. The revised guideline 
was then used with two interviews in December 2016. However, the interviews for the main field 
phase were conducted over an extended period of six months, from March to August 2017. Every 
interview was conducted face-to-face. Over this period, 37 stakeholder semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with THPF staff in different positions, different NGOs under the funding of THPF, 
and relevant stakeholders. In addition, 8 interviews with experts in the academic field were 
conducted to provide supplementary insight on the issues and research challenges. Hence, the total 
number of interview participants is 50 people (see appendix B).  
The interviews lasted between 60 minutes and 90 minutes and were recorded and fully 
transcribed anonymously. This is for reasons of internal validity and reliability and to derive 
verbatim citations which supported accurate data analysis. Receiving ethical approval from the 
Research Ethics Committee of the University of Kent’s School of Social Policy, Sociology, and 
Social Research in October 2016, the research is conditioned to grant anonymity, namely 
pseudonyms, to all participants. Accordingly, no direct connection between the information or 
statements and the participant’s name is presented. It is also noted that the interviews were 
conducted in the Thai language. All citations were translated into English by the researcher. 
Moreover, every participant was first approached personally by the researcher via a face-to-face 
meeting, e-mail or mobile contact with the cover letter and other related documents. The 
documents included the information sheet which consisted of a brief description of the research 
goals and methods, a consent form and the interview schedule. 
The participants in the research were selected through purposeful sampling by seeking out 
people likely to give rich, informative interviews relevant to the study (Morris 2015; Bryman 
2012). Precisely, they were recruited through ‘theoretical sampling’ based on theoretical reasons 
seeking ‘presentedness’, or what is present in the case, rather than representation (Orne and Bell 
2015; Blaikie 2010).  For example, research found that resistance to the funder, at least verbally, 
is common among upper management in NGOs (Ebrahim 2005). The interview is then designed 
to interview senior officers in NGOs which have obtained the THPF’s funding because they tend 
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to show more critical thinking. An interview list of NGO officers was created based on the NGOs 
participating in the public hearings for the Thai Health Promotion Foundation Act (2001) 
amendment in March and April 2017. These events involved key stakeholders of the THPF which 
was a good starting point for contacting relevant stakeholders. Additionally, several more NGOs 
have been added from complementary sources such as the internet and recommendation through 
snowball techniques. Snowball sampling, or relational recruiting, in particular, leverages the social 
networks of the participants to reach people the researcher would not otherwise be in contact with 
(Orne and Bell 2015). As a result, the participants from the NGO sector were at the management 
level of either an organisation or a project.  
Likewise, the participants from the THPF were purposively chosen from the top of the 
organisation, namely executive staff and the board members, and relevant key stakeholders. The 
THPF is a public organisation with a relatively flat hierarchical command chain. The CEO and the 
directors of sections are responsible for the management and the governance of the office. They 
all have experience of working with NGO partners and are involved with funding issues so they 
can provide data at both the strategic level and operational level. The participant recruitment 
network is illustrated in Appendix D. 
Although the interviews support the research in terms of providing rich and in-depth 
insights of the participants, they have limitations. The participants commonly attempt to provide 
what they ‘think’ is an accurate portrayal of events (Rubin and Rubin 2012). This is the ability of 
the participants to construct a social ‘reality’ which is usually hard or impossible, to check (Morris 
2015). Other techniques are thus needed to help verify, if possible, the interview data. 
 
3.3.2 Supplementary methods 
Document research as a secondary method was carried out in order to access data which 
could not be gained through interviews or required further clarification with the hope that it may 
allow any other unforeseen content to come forth (Bryman 2012). Also, it was used to deal with 
the inadequacy of interviews with the board members of the THPF. Not many interviews were 
conducted with the board members because most of them were difficult-to-reach, higher-up 
politicians or bureaucrats, who are political appointees and are not normally much involved with 
the THPF’s operation and relationship with the NGOs. 
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In general, key information from the THPF is well-documented while that of NGOs is 
poorly-documented and less publicly available. This is because the THPF is a public agency bound 
to officially produce official documents while the NGOs are non-state agencies which may or may 
not publish their organisational documents. Also, there is a serious lack of detailed information, 
both statistical and descriptive, about the size and the scope of the NGO sector. Government 
reports relating to NGOs necessarily reflect the state’s representation and bias (e.g. The Secretariat 
of the Senate 2003).  
Analysed archival data include the THPF and its partners’ websites, annual reports, 
minutes of meetings and other relevant publications. Among them, the minutes of the THPF’s 
board meetings and annual reports are particularly interesting and useful. Firstly, analysing the 
minutes helped complement the data analysis on the decision-making and the governance level of 
the organisation. Originally, the minutes of meetings between November 2003 and November 
2006, and December 2008 and December 2011 were requested by the researcher. Many THPF 
staff and NGOs claimed that at those times they were governed by governments that were friendly 
to civil society and the THPF, and actively supported social policies and programmes. However, 
access to the records required permission from the THPF. The researcher was asked to provide 
several important documents related to his identity and status as a researcher and the research 
description in order to obtain permission to access them. It turned out that he was only granted 
access to the minutes between November 2003 and November 2006. The permitted minutes were 
also censored, mostly in parts concerning the exact cost of a proposed project and the amount of 
granting to politically sensitive projects. This does not considerably affect the research because 
the figures for granted projects are not the main enquiry of the thesis. Secondly, examining the 
annual reports provided data on what the THPF has stated as an organisation. It also helped 
generate the data on how the THPF operates and interacts with its funded organisations. 
 Apart from the document research, participant observation was also used as a 
supplementary technique, which helped the researcher to familiarise himself with the issues under 
investigation, to make connections and networks benefiting the fieldwork, and to grasp how the 
participants communicate with each other (Bryman 2012). Throughout the fieldwork period, the 
researcher had the opportunity to observe the operations and the activities of different sections of 
the THPF. For example, the researcher ‘officially’ attended events, such as the ‘Sharing for Health’ 
forums, the ‘Presenting, Sharing, and Networking’ forums, and the ‘Thai  Health Talk’ (a 
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considerable event to celebrate the 15 year anniversary of the THPF). These events were organised 
by the Partnership and International Relations Section (PIRS), a main unit of the THPF dealing 
with networking and capacity building of the granted organisations.  
Importantly, the researcher participated in the public hearings for the 2001 THPF Act 
amendment held by the government in March and April 2017. The events allowed the researcher 
to make contact with and continue to observe the ‘Thai Health Promotion Movement’ (THPM): a 
loose movement founded in 2016 consisting of several key NGOs and activists, both within and 
outside the area of health, which aims to develop a health promotion system, health watch policies 
and to advocate the function of the THPF. The meetings and forums of some granted NGOs were 
also observed. For instance, the researcher contributed to NGO events organised by the ‘Capacity-
building Programme for Leadership for Change and Social-Health Justice (Roottogether)’, such as 
the ‘lesson summaries and directions for civil society movement’ forum. The events were critical 
as they generated discussions about the future challenges of the NGO sector and civil society in 
Thailand (see Ungkultassaneeyarat 2017).  
  
 3.3.3 Data analysis 
 Many CR researchers actively used a grounded theory approach to data coding and analysis 
(see Yeung 1997; Oliver 2012; Kempster and Parry 2014). Nonetheless, this study follows Fletcher 
(2017) in taking the position that this approach is not ideal for a CR study and not suited to this 
research. Two major reasons can be provided. Firstly, grounded theory avoids active involvement 
with existing theory during the analysis process. Grounded theory conducts coding to gradually 
develop theories grounded in the data, rather than in theories and concepts derived from elsewhere 
(Corbin and Strauss 2008). CR instead emphasises that ‘active thought experimentation is needed 
before research even begins’ (Hart, New and Freeman 2004, p. 166). This leads to the theory-led 
data processing ‘to find the best explanation of reality through engagement with existing (fallible) 
theories about that reality’ (Fletcher 2017, p. 186). Secondly, grounded theory is principally 
inductive in terms of inferential processes while CR is retroductive. In other words, grounded 
theory is more data-driven while CR involves a more theory- and researcher-driven analytical 
process. 
Given the nature of the data collected in which the ordering and exact wording of the 
answers as well as the questions themselves differ between participants, the thesis adopted a 
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thematic analysis (Orne and Bell 2015; Ritchie, Spencer, O’Cornor 2003) as the strategy of 
analysing data which has the capacity to support the creation of explanatory accounts based on 
empirical data. Searching for themes or codes, in CR, is to look for ‘demi-regularities’, or the 
tendencies of entities and patterns at the empirical level of reality (Fletcher 2013, 2017). It is ‘demi’ 
because CR believes in the open system of the social world where any number of occurrences and 
events often overlap and interact (Brown, Fleetwood and Roberts 2002; Sayer 2010). In such a 
system, absolute, law-like regularities are barely possible. 
 In practice, the interview transcripts were read several times in order for the researcher to 
understand what tendencies or themes/codes were emerging (Silverman 2014). A number of initial 
codes drew on the author’s research agenda mainly inspired by the relevant literature which was 
then supplemented by other codes which emerged from the interview data. In other words, these 
codes were eliminated, changed, and supplemented during the process until every interview 
transcript was coded. This way of generating codes allowed the researcher to avoid the 
preconceptions the researcher had which could distort the interpretation of the data (Fletcher 
2017). For example, there were several important codes which particularly indicated the CR’s 
ideas of emergence, layered reality, and structure-agency, such as ‘network’, ‘relationship’, 
‘funding/granting’, ‘identity’, ‘power/authority’, ‘transformation/change’.  Several codes, such as 
‘governance/governing’, ‘civil society’, ‘NGO’, ‘tri-power strategy’, ‘proactive granting’, 
‘innovation’, and ‘partnership’ were employed to analyse how the THPF metagoverns its NGO 
partners. Other codes including ‘policy advocacy’, ‘professionalisation/professionalism’, 
‘bureaucracy’, ‘project-based’, and ‘accountability’ were developed and used to analyse 
NGOisation. Overall, there were 25 codes. Table 3.1 shows each code used and examples of their 
empirical links. NVivo (version 11) computer software was used to support the categorising and 
coding of data. 
These codes were connected together with other relevant materials at the end of the coding 
stage to identify the various structures, agents, and underlying mechanisms building the relations 
between the THPF and the funded NGOs and the processes driving NGOisation. In other words, 
the data analysis was guided by the following questions in reading the transcripts: what types of 
relationship are established between the THPF and the NGOs? What mechanisms are at play? 
What pattern, if any, is emerging? Who is positioned and perceived as passive, dependent or active, 
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independent? What is implied and what is not said? What consequences do they lead to? To what 
extent are they generating the NGOisation of civil society? 
 
Table 3.1 Codes and their links to empirical data 
Codes Examples of empirical link 
Accountability In a positive way… the THPF made us accountable to the accountability 
system. The Thai NGO sector so far has, frankly speaking, no such system. 
If there is one, it’s weak. Some might not want to receive grants from the 
THPF because they are afraid of being investigated. The point is that this is 
making the NGOs become more professionalised. NGOs must be transparent 
and accountable (Mr Jet, interview). 
Bureaucracy THPF financial regulation, especially the part that requires an external 
auditor, is new to us [NGOs]. This matter might be normal for business 
organisations but for NGOs it is not. Auditing social development projects 
creates difficulties [for NGOs]. It takes time to adapt [to the system]. The 
regulations are also stricter than ones of bureaucracy… For example, we 
need to submit the original receipts for things or services [bought for running 
the project] (Mr Tan, interview). 
Civil society In fact, civil society organisations should be created easily and terminated 
easily as well. If they achieve their missions, they can disappear (Mr Pun, 
interview). 
Community Many NGO workers are thinking that they have done well at community 
work, solving local problems, and fighting for ordinary people. Anyway, that 
era has changed (Dr Luke, interview). 
Development The THPF has helped expand the boundaries of social and development 
enterprises by framing them as relevant to daily life. The work entailed is 
made to become seen as helping oneself, not only others. The enterprise is 
everyone’s business. People at any level started to perceive the social issues 
as their own health issues… Social and development work has become 
diversified (Ms Cat, interview). 
Funding/granting For foreign funders, when they decided to grant, they just granted. They 
didn’t have any interventions after that, but there might have been some 
conditions… They didn’t ask us to write a proposal in order to check whether 
the ideas proposed matched their ideas. They didn’t expect what we should 
do… [Instead,] the way the THPF uses [the strategic framework] is to guide 
the course of what we do by setting the strategic framework and policy 
priority for the funded organisations. Sometimes it becomes involved in the 
activities. Moreover, the THPF has implemented many stricter rules into the 
project review process (Mr Wan, interview). 
Governance/governing The process [of the THPF] in terms of feedback management, maybe, should 
be better than this. This is difficult to say… When I first began to work with 
the THPF, the process of drafting three-year plans was designed by boards 
and committees. The meeting was run by the inner circle [of the THPF]. 
Recently, I’ve invited hundreds of partners. They’re happy for the 
participation. We got new, interesting views. Even so, the process did not 
cover the broader public. We are not there yet… I can’t say that the others 
did the same way I did. Yet, my section is rather more advanced than the 
other sections (Dr Pan, interview). 
Health/well-being The THPF has shifted from the curative approach to health toward the 
preventive approach by making health became the shared responsibility of 
all people. Health for the THPF refers to ‘well-being’ involving everyone in 
the society and having much deeper social roots (Board of Governance 2005, 
2 March, item 4.1). 
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Identity My organisation and I have been working before the THPF was created. So 
the THPF recognises what our identity is and supports us in our direction. 
This is a good point. Yet, I don’t know how the ones founded after the THPF 
will get the support like us unless they build their own identity first (Mr Jet, 
interview). 
Innovation The THPF can be considered as an innovation for civil society because it has 
more than money. It also develops our work and skills… (Mr Pun, 
interview). 
Lobbying The THPF has emphasised the lobbying strategy [through getting into 
contact and having informal conversations with the authorities] because the 
state and the government are authoritative. If we often run external advocacy 
[including public protest and mass mobilisation], the government is surely 
not happy. We will only increase our chance to get attacked (Dr Top, 
interview). 
Movement By adopting the Ottawa Charter, the THPF envisions that the promotion of 
health is not to provide a service by professional health workers but to make 
a change through social movements (Board of Governance 2005, 2 March, 
item 4.1). 
Negotiation/resistance We don’t comply with every suggestion the THPF has made. Recently, I 
disputed with the THPF over withholding tax on wages. What the THPF 
suggested was contradictory to my organisation’s policy. If we had complied 
with the THPF, we would have broken the rules. I made it clear to the THPF 
that we still wanted to do as we have always done… (Ms May, interview) 
Network the THPF is supposed to stay in the original design, that is, to be clever 
enough to know that what to do to enable the changes and how to do it. Some 
changes need money. Others may need knowledge and networks… It is a 
matter of strategy that the THPF should employ different tools, engage with 
different types of actors, to make different changes (Dr Sor, interview). 
NGO Each colour of NGOs has pros and cons. The THPF must properly interact 
with them. With the dark brown, we need to be careful or sometimes avoid 
them when the opponent is the government. The THPF anyway is a state 
agency. We asked our NGOs working in ‘hot’ issues not to show the THPF 
logo, wear THPF jackets and so on. This isn’t only to protect the THPF but 
the NGOs themselves. The government might not be able to deal any hard 
measures with the funded organisations or individuals but it can suppress the 
THPF, the funder… If the government sees the connection between us and 
them, and it can’t deal with the NGOs directly, the government comes to us. 
The NGOs will be worse off in the end (Dr Korn, interview). 
Partnership the way we work as ‘pakee’ [partnership/partner], the term has become 
influential because of the THPF. It was spread to the public… (Mr Pun, 
interview). 
Policy advocacy To advocate policies is to get in contact with the political or policy 
authorities, talk to them with a good manner. We can’t go and order them to 
stop doing anything we don’t like… In politics, negotiation is important. 
They always ask us ‘why should I believe you?’ We need to convince them 
with evidence and rhetoric. I’m trying to create an expertise in advocacy 
[lobby] but it’s so hard (Dr Top, interview). 
Politics/political The THPF is extremely sensitive and defensive on issues such as rights, 
environments, etc. which represent the contemporary peoples movement. 
The THPF is rather happy to work with alcohol and tobacco reduction… I’ve 
faced an unexplained freeze of a project involving human rights literacy 
which challenged the government. The THPF was afraid that the project 
might cause harm. Although the project resumed later, I think this was not 
right. The THPF should indeed execute ‘health’ beyond physical 
dimensions, to cover social and environmental determinants as it always 
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claims. Civil society cannot limit itself to only alcohol and tobacco control 
(Ms Peach, interview). 
Power/authority I told my colleagues that I would take care of it. I started the centralisation 
strategy to gain authority over management. Every decision then was pooled 
into the centre… This centralised strategy is believed to provide coherent 
direction, efficiency and secure time. When things ended, the management 
resumed to the normal (Mr Heat, interview). 
Proactive granting If we emphasise outcomes, the proactive grant can yield more results than 
the open grant. Partners in the proactive scheme are the strategic partners 
such as alcohol and tobacco control movements. They’ve operated for some 
time to know how to make the work successful. Proactive schemes deal with 
ones who can work continuously and advocate policy (Dr Luke, interview). 
Professionalisation/professionalism In a positive way… the THPF made us accountable to the accountability 
system. The Thai NGO sector so far has, frankly speaking, no such system. 
If there is one, it’s weak. Some might not want to receive grants from the 
THPF because they are afraid of being investigated. The point is that this is 
making the NGOs become more professionalised. NGOs must be transparent 
and accountable (Mr Jet, interview). 
Project-based we’re granted less… we’re questioned [by the government and the board] on 
how long we will ask for THPF money. They asked the question with a 
project-based mentality and wanted the clear starting and finishing points. 
Yet, we think with process-based mentality. Work should also empower both 
the people and their thinking. The mentalities [between us and them] are 
different… By thinking in terms of project-based, concentrating on 
indicators, the sustainability [of the activities and works] is reduced (Mr Tan, 
interview). 
Relationship As Buddhist teaching says about interdependence, the NGO is a part of the 
THPF and the THPF is a part of the NGO (Dr Pan, interview). 
Transformation/change We’re only a small NGO, overlooked by the state. How is it possible for us 
to change a policy which some ministries are still unable to change? Is this 
underpaid work? You [the THPF] gave me a few million Baht while the 
public budget for public agencies is a thousand billion Baht, and they still 
cannot change a policy (Ms Jeep, interview). 
Tri-power strategy/Triangle that 
moves the mountain 
The ultimate goal of the Triangle… is mutual learning. Making policy 
change without learning isn’t right. Lobbying is not the goal… The Triangle 
does not suggest the lobbying of authorities… Those working with the THPF 
often assume that in order to make a policy change, they need to use lobbying 
(Dr Rat, interview). 
 
3.4 Reflexivity and research challenges 
 
 3.4.1 Research reflexivity 
Being ‘reflexive’ is to acknowledge that the researcher and the participants are part of the 
social world under investigation (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). It is to acknowledge the 
inevitable injection of (frequently unexamined) motives, beliefs, personal characteristics, and 
theories of the researcher into the research process on the outcomes (Blaikie 2010; O’Mahoney 
and Vincent 2014; Maxwell 2012).  
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In CR, the idea of value-oriented research is strongly advocated (Porpora 2015). 
Subjectivity and bias do not need to be controlled or eliminated, but instead paid attention to and 
explicitly stated for the sake of the production of knowledge (Maxwell 2012; Bhaskar 2016). They 
can be productively used in the research (see Maxwell 2013; Tolman and Brydon-Miller 2001; 
Hatch 2011), for example, through the process of listening to one’s own thoughts, and having an 
inner conversation about the research processes. In qualitative research, the main instrument ‘is’ 
the researcher him/herself whereas in quantitative research, the researcher ‘has’ instruments. To 
seek a better understanding of the research phenomenon, it is suggestive to incorporate the point 
of view of social actors involved in the research including the researcher. 
As the use of in-depth interviews requires an intensive period of involvement in the social 
world, the researcher has been involved to a certain degree with the participants. Many of them 
have met the researcher. The researcher has grown up in and variously engaged with the NGO 
community in Bangkok for more than a decade. The position of the researcher thus lies somewhere 
between an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’. However, many of them considered the researcher as one 
of their ‘young generation’. Consequently, the researcher decided to ‘go native’, becoming a part 
of the world of the researched and being drawn into the participants’ constructed reality for the 
sake of a better and adequate understanding. It is noted that although the researcher knew the 
community well, he was no longer merely a creature of that environment. The researcher could 
imagine a universe beyond the community and a different way of perceiving and understanding it. 
During the fieldwork, an academic stance, detached from the field when necessary, was also 
applied.  
This research has been a very difficult and challenging task. The position of the researcher 
granted both advantages and disadvantages. The most obvious advantage was access to research 
participants through personal connection. This does not mean that the researcher did not need to 
put effort into gathering data, but the connection significantly helped make the contact possible. 
Some participants were kind enough to refer the researcher to other participants who he was 
originally unable to reach. On the other hand, the most obvious disadvantage for the researcher 
was the label of being from the ‘young generation’ which refers to ‘children’ as well as ‘ones who 
know few things’. Some participants acted as if they were giving a lecture to the researcher and 
did not provide answers to the interview questions. Nevertheless, the researcher saw this issue as 
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an opportunity to use the role of a curious-to-know child to obtain the narratives, data or the 
responses from the participants. 
 
3.4.2 Difficulties in finding mechanisms 
Ackroyd and Karlsson (2014, p. 32) note that ‘identifying the mechanism is largely a 
conceptual matter’. Finding the mechanisms at work, as aforementioned, requires the researcher 
to be actively involved with, rather than detached from, the theories guiding the research 
(Danermark et al. 2002; Sayer 2000). This is because the mechanisms are mostly unobservable 
and not easily uncovered by interviewing people about them (Archer 1998). Interviews are 
requisite for approaching human thought, meaning, and experience, but they are not by themselves 
a sufficient basis for analysing the multiplicity of causal factors in play in social relations (Smith 
and Elger 2014). It is the task of the researcher to interpret and produce explanations of the 
mechanisms. In addition, there is a challenge in identifying the mechanisms which are neither too 
generic nor too contingent. If the mechanisms are too general, they would lose explanatory power. 
On the contrary, if they are too specific, they can only be relevant in a narrow context where it was 
indicated. Theories are thus particularly essential as a guide, not only to identify, but to generate 
the balance of the mechanisms. Indeed, proposed mechanisms are potential explanations (Sayer 
2010) which are repeatedly evaluated through the process of data collection and analysis until 
closure is reached. Again, such closure relies on the theoretical insights and the researcher.  
Furthermore, it is likely that the actors responsible for the mechanisms themselves might 
have little awareness of them (Reed 2009). Brown and Roberts (2014 , p. 306) then suggest that 
‘to gain adequate information about mechanisms, it is… critical that knowledge possessed by 
respondents is also taken seriously and not brushed aside as being ‘inadequate’ to the proscribed 
goals of a research project’. The researcher needed to ensure that the participants achieve some 
insight into the conceptual goals of the research project (see Pawson 1996). In other words, the 
researcher needed to find a way to enable the participants to become fully aware of the potential 
mechanisms affecting the context under investigation (see Pawson and Tilly 1997). In practice, the 
participants, for instance, were asked to think on how they ‘reason’ about a certain context and 
what resources they feel facilitate or constrain them to behave in certain ways in the context. These 
points also stress the significance of the researcher as the instrument of the research. 
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3.4.3 Problems encountered during the fieldwork 
Unfortunately, at the time the researcher was conducting interviews in Thailand there was 
a crisis concerning the THPF and its NGO partners. They were undergoing serious government 
investigation and public scrutiny. As a consequence, they were defensive regarding any kind of 
interview if they did not really know the interviewer and his/her background; this made access to 
them extremely difficult. Some of the provisional participants rejected the request to be 
interviewed. In addition, the THPF is a public organisation where bureaucratic culture, to a certain 
degree, has influence. Access to management and governance level personnel required strong 
connections. The researcher first tried to reach the participants through official contacts but mostly 
failed to do so. The researcher then used personal connections to reach the participants. This 
proved more effective. Personal connection thus played a significant role in making the interviews 
possible.  In fact, the interview participants remarked that my project is the first to succeed in 
obtaining information from most of the high-level people at the THPF. 
Sometimes, it was hard to place certain participants into a certain category: the THPF or 
an NGO. For example, Dr Rice, a senior health officer in a government department, gave an 
account of his multiple experiences working with both the THPF and the NGOs: 
 
The THPF invited me to be a reviewer since its inception because I have been an expert in mental 
health and children development. My first engagement with the THPF is to review project 
proposals… I have been often invited to do so. Then, the THPF asked me to launch my own 
projects… My team and I built an NGO to receive the THPF’s grants. At that time, I was a recipient 
as well as a reviewer… After I finished with my projects, the THPF invited me to be a member of 
a PAC [Plan Administrative Committee] related to my expertise… I have been promoted along the 
way becoming the chair of my PAC. I stopped receiving any THPF’s grants when I have become 
the committee member. Finally, I was appointed to be a member of the Board of Governance (Dr 
Rice, interview). 
 
The story of Dr Rice, along with many other participants, exemplifies the blurred line 
between the state and civil society in action.  
 As the interviews were conducted in Thai but presented in English, they obviously 
underwent a degree of interpretation by the researcher when translating from Thai to English in 
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the process of the data analysis. Nevertheless, this seems not to be a problem because close analysis 
of participants’ discourse and language is not the objective of the research. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 This thesis prescribes a qualitative approach as a research orientation. With the use of the 
philosophy of CR, the research is value-added both in data collection and data analysis, focusing 
on potential mechanisms at work. Retroductive research strategy is then developed and applied in 
order to distinctively reach and understand the phenomenon. In-depth interviewing is selected as 
the main way for collecting data in order to acquire both factual information on the NGOisation 
process and the metagovernance of THPF and to gain insight into the participants’ perception of 
these. Interview participants (n=50) are purposively chosen from senior officers at the management 
level of both the THPF and the NGOs. Interviews are supplemented with documentary analysis 
and observation. Data collected is then coded and analysed thematically. These research 
techniques are solely to gain access to information seen to be particularly important in further 
developing the researcher’s understanding. The techniques are not ends in themselves. It is 
important to note that CR-inspired methodology is a challenging and creative task. There is no 
absolute rule book when applying CR to social research. The methodology discussed in this 
chapter is thus an attempt to apply CR to navigate the study of the relationship between the THPF 















State-society relations, NGO funding, and the THPF 
 
This chapter aims to provide a background to the thesis, beginning with some discussions 
about state-society relations in Thailand. Then it moves to explore civil society and NGO 
development in relation to the funding landscape. Such development is juxtaposed with the 
changing governance of the state as the NGO sector has increasingly relied on public funding, 
typically managed by autonomous public organisations (APOs). Then, the chapter critically 
explores the establishment and the development of one of the major public donors of civil society, 
the Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF). Contexts, such as the agencification and health 
promotion movements, which together gave rise to the THPF, will be discussed. This is followed 
by a discussion of the THPF’s approach to health promotion and the governance and the 
development of the THPF. 
 
4.1 State-society relations in Thailand 
Analyses of the state-society relations of Southeast Asia, including Thailand, reveal that 
antecedents of civil society have been largely ‘fostered’ by state policies and funding and made to 
remain considerably dependent on it. They have thrived alongside and through, state apparatuses 
which tend to exert more ideological and programmatic control over societal actors (Weiss 2008; 
Schak and Hudson 2003; Saravanamuttu 1997). The distinction between the realms of the public 
and private sectors is blurred.  
Unlike portrayed in most of the developed, liberal societies where civil society has often 
explicitly challenged government objectives (Kallman and Clark 2016), the interaction between 
the state and civil society in Asia often characterised with an authoritarian tradition is not explicitly 
and necessarily confrontational (Alagappa 2004a). State-society relation in Thailand is rather 
dynamic and complicated including collaboration, confrontation, and reciprocity (Shigetomi 
2002).  
Civil society in Thailand is ineluctably conditioned by an authoritative state.  This means 
that ‘civil society operates within the normative confines of the state, is shaped by state policies 
and discourses, and often finds itself directly incorporated into state policy process’ (Gilley 2014, 
p. 45).  Organised civil society gains its legitimacy and efficacy, or even identity, from its status 
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and relationship with the state.  The growth of the NGO sector is heavily dependent on a political 
space, namely government policies.  The shift of government policy from control to support is a 
key factor for the sector’s growth.  
The Thai state has sponsored significant organisational innovation which can be a 
precursor to civil society.  For example, governmental bodies have given birth to ‘government-
organised NGOs’ or GONGOs (Chaiyasan 2013; Thammachot 2008) which have successfully 
worked in various fields.  Many umbrella organisations and coordinating bodies for NGOs were 
initiated by the state as well.  
Since the state has become the key source of NGO funding, it is likely to influence, 
neutralise, depoliticise, and manipulate the activities of partnership (Phatharathananunth 2006), 
demanding in return a disciplined partnership. This was particularly true in rural areas.  The Thai 
state was not consistently pushed back by civil society but managed to discover methods to 
marginalise or co-opt NGOs (Crispin 2000). Collaboration became a favoured strategy for the state 
to indirectly supervise the NGOs (Simpkins 2003). It is a strategy which demonstrates the effort 
made to bring NGOs into range of the government's radar.  Hence, the Thai state can be best 
described as ‘ consultative authoritarianist’  (Teets 2013) which simultaneously promoted the 
development of a fair civil society and instruments of state control. 
Certain parts of civil society in Thailand have been moving more toward explicit 
coordination with the government and state agencies, often through subcontracting and funding. 
This shift alters the dynamic of the NGO sector significantly, moving it away from an 
‘independent’ sector towards a position of third-party government (Salamon 1995) prescribing the 
new governance arrangement.  Thai civil society is regarded more commonly in an instrumental 
sense for its role in enabling or preventing change. It is rarely considered as an autonomous arena, 
independent of the state, for self-governance (Alagappa 2004a). NGOs have in part become an 
arm of the state, sharing a common development ideology with the state to control and discipline 
people’s lives (Rakyutidharm 2014a). By creating their own spheres as part of the state, NGOs can 
keep their role in the new governance arrangement. It is possible to see that Thai civil society has 
become ‘ elite- led’ , if not ‘ state- led’  (Albritton and Bureekul 2002).  The idea of ‘ state- led civil 
society’ (Frolic 1997) can well describe the situation of Thai civil society. 
The state mechanisms linked to the prominent idea of ‘partnership’  among NGO workers 
have, perhaps unintentionally, weakened civil society by allowing it to become part of the state 
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whilst strengthening the state’ s position within civil society (Phatharathananunth 2006; 
Jumnianpol 2001). It invites governmental agencies to engage in a vast range of activities formerly 
carried out independently by organised civil society, thus augmenting the state’ s control over 
society. 
However, it is also possible to see that the Thai NGO sector has seemed to be both critical 
of the performance of the state and optimistic about potential cooperation with public institutions 
and authorities (Sapyen 2004). They simultaneously cooperate with and suspect each other.  
NGOs and the state have a reciprocal, interdependent relationship which means that the 
NGOs are neither completely autonomous from the state nor completely dependent on the state. 
This corresponds with the notion of ‘semi-civil society’ (He 1997), instead of a ‘full’ civil society. 
This situation places it in the middle position between a kind of ‘ fully present’  civil society in a 
liberal society and the entire absence of civil society in an absolute authoritarian society. It serves 
to illustrate the problematic tension in which NGOs are not absolutely autonomous from the state 
while the state remains dependent on NGOs, suggesting the interdependency between state 
agencies and society actors. 
 
4.2 NGO funding 
The contemporary Thai NGO sector is funded. Funding from other organisations is 
essential to the sector. The main source of revenue for the Thai NGOs is not public donation as is 
generally understood (Chutima 2004).5 Scholars suggest that, regardless of the negative impacts it 
may create, funding, especially by the government and other public organisations, is an essential 
key which makes organised civil society ‘grow’ (Kuhonta and Sinpeng 2014; Simpkins 2003). In 
Thailand, NGOs could be nurtured and be active in any political regime if the government supports 
them. 
                                                        
5 This is mostly because:  (1)  most of the NGOs are not membership-based organisations (Thabchumpon 
2011) and cannot require their members to pay a fee; and (2) fundraising practices are not successful because a large 
part of charitable giving only goes to religious causes, organisations, or projects under royal patronage, and exceptional 
well-known charities or foundations. Most NGOs have been left out from such giving circles which are largely driven 
by religious beliefs and is mostly done through traditional forms of charity represented by temples, established 
foundations, and charities (Phaholyothin 2017, p. 189). 
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This section aims to provide a description of the funding landscape of the NGO sector. In 
Thailand, funding has come from both foreign and domestic bodies, with the former being 
predominant until the middle of the 1990s and the latter becoming essential throughout the 2000s 
into the present. 
 
 4.2.1 Foreign funding: rise and decline 
 Historically, the NGO sector has been actively supported by a variety of international 
bodies. Foreign and international assistance has been widely welcomed as a part of modernisation 
since the 1960s and provided the basis for domestic philanthropic practices and the voluntary 
sector ( see Pongsapich and Kataleeradabhan 1997; Logerfo 1997). The relationship between 
domestic NGOs and international bodies has been tightened since then. More importantly, during 
the 1980s, there has been a dramatic increase in numbers of NGOs (see Figure 1.1). An increase 
in foreign funding for development projects in Thailand (Quinn 1997; Delcore 2003) was a major 
catalyst together with the state having more liberal policies. This NGO boom coincided with the 
opening up of the Thai market to neoliberalism.  Most large- funded NGOs were financed and 
patronised by development aid agencies, which in turn, were funded by Western governments and 
international organisations. 
 In this regard, international and foreign bodies had a considerable role in shaping Thai 
NGOs (see Chutima 2004). Knowledge, institutions, and policies were imported to Thai society 
without due care.  Donors ‘embraced civil society development as a necessary part of democracy 
promotion and launched hundreds, even thousands, of projects under that rubric’ (Ottaway and 
Carothers 2000, p. 293). They came up with their ‘priorities’ and ‘preferences’. In particular, Thai 
NGOs were pulled to welcome a Western style civil society and NGO working system 
characterised by a professional office and employer culture.  T hrough foreign grants, Thai NGOs 
developed offices and facilities that seemed respectable and ‘Western-looking’.  
Between 1985 and1989, the ‘Local Development Assistance Program’ (LDAP) was funded 
by the Canadian International Development Agency, which, in turn, gave financial and academic 
support to NGOs in local areas. NGO projects covered activities across the country and positively 
affected the development of the sector.  LDAP then developed into the ‘ Local Development 
Institute’  ( LDI)  in 1991 focusing on the local and community area as well as national NGO 
networking (see Leangchareon 2000; Connors 2005; Simpkins 2003; Chutima 2004). LDI was one 
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of the first major packages of foreign financial support for civil society.  Core NGOs which 
operated actively at that time were past or present members of the programme family (Gohlert 
1991; Goldschmidt and Boonyarattanasoontorn 1992). 
Then during the 1990s, NGOs in Asian countries experienced fluctuations and decreases 
in foreign funding (Parks 2008). Without an alternative source of funding, most NGOs were forced 
to alter their activities and goals to suit donor priorities and to acquire future funding. In Thailand, 
external funding declined in the mid- 1990s as a result of domestic economic and political 
development that in turn necessarily decreased the perceived need of foreign donors (Chutima 
2004; Thabchumpon 2011; CIVICUS 2015).  This brought about the shrinking of donor funding 
for NGOs (Shigetomi 2004a; Chutima 2004). Besides, the 1997 Asian economic crisis affected 
the funding situation as most of the NGO budget had relied on foreign funds (Kulkakornsakul 
1999; Poungsomlee, Plainoi and Punpung 2002). NGOs were then encouraged to reconfigure their 
relations with the state, seeking more support from domestic donors. 
Friendly connections between the NGOs and the foreign donors, however, caused tension 
between the government and NGOs.  The government suspected that NGOs could threaten the 
order of the state government and so clung to the nationalist idea of criticising NGOs for being 
dishonest recipients of foreign funding. It aimed to jeopardise the link supporting the development 
of the sector. Some NGO activists were even accused of being provoked, if not brainwashed, by 
ill-intentioned ‘third-hand’ or ‘foreign-infiltrated’ NGOs (Sattayanurak 2006). There was even a 
government effort to try and ‘negotiate’ with foreign sponsors of Thai NGOs to withdraw their aid 
(Phongpaichit and Baker 2009, p. 144).  With such an accusation, the government permitted the 
use of violence against protestors and activists who were claimed to be creating chaos and 
obstructing national development (Sattayanurak 1995; Hongthong 1995; Prasertkul 2009). 
Therefore, since the end of the 1990s continuing through the beginning of the 2000s, restrictive 
foreign funding regulations have been enacted by the government in the name of philanthropic 
protectionism based on the fear concerning government security. One major consequence of the 
regulations is that the NGOs must report sources of revenue to the government (Dupuy, Ron and 
Prakash 2014). 
 The state influence over the financial flows of the NGOs and the decline of foreign funding 
has led the NGOs to rethink their financial strategies and seek alternative sources of funding. As a 
result, the NGO sector has managed to survive by successfully advocating the creation of 
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alternative viable domestic sources of funding, notably public funding managed by APOs and 
charitable foundations such as the THPF.  The shift from foreign to domestic funding has taken 
less than two decades. It is assumed that the Thai NGO sector is relatively well-adapted compared 
to neighbouring nations (Parks 2008).  
 
4.2.2 Public funding and the rise of quangos 
In Western societies, the amount of government subsidy for NGOs is significant (see 
Salamon 2012; Kendall 2003), yet Thailand has a relatively small proportion of public subsidy for 
non-profit institutions (see Salamon et al. 2012 ; National Economic and Social Development 
Board 2010).  Traditionally, the interaction between the state and NGOs in terms of funding was 
not positive.  The NGOs did not totally welcome governmental funds. Many of them rejected the 
assistance because they were sceptical about the true motive of the state (Delcore 2003) and afraid 
of being controlled or co-opted. NGOs suspected that the government was likely to provide grants 
to non- political activities or organisations in a hope that this would potentially decrease the 
advocacy role of the sector.  It is believed that funding pressures from the government can make 
an issue of GONGOs which are reluctant to oppose the elites (Ungpakorn 2009). Yet, in fact, there 
were many cases to prove that although NGOs received funding from the government, they still 
protested against it (see Parks 2008). 
Most government subsidies for NGOs prior to the 2000s were limited in scale (see SRI 
2003), even though some governmental agencies did set up funds to aid them. Two pioneer funds 
were the ‘ Rural Development Fund’  ( RDF)  and the ‘ Urban Community Development Fund’ 
(UCDF). Unfortunately, the two funds covered just a particular area. It was very late in the 1990s 
that the closer relationship between the state and NGOs in terms of funding really began.  The 
government, by taking loans from the World Bank and other institutions (Bunyaratanasunthon 
2000), instigated the ‘ Social Investment Fund’  ( SIF)  to assist NGOs in responding to the 1997 
economic crisis (Shigetomi 2006, 2009; Pongsapich 2000).  SIF was seen to be mainly managed 
by NGOs and their sympathisers (Shigetomi 2006). It employed a participatory approach to 
improve people’ s well- being by promoting long- term self- reliance and empowerment.  SIF was 
the first occasion that the government channelled funds directly to NGOs (Pongsapich 1999). 
 Around the same time, a wave of political reform focusing on decentralisation during 1995-
1996 together with the 8th National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP) (1997-2001) 
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demanded the creation of a national finance institution to help local organisations (Department of 
Rural Development Coordination 1997).  Two important ideas were emphasised:  agencification 
and financing for social development. 
Firstly, public sector reform in Thailand throughout the 1990s, particularly through the 
‘Master Plan of Public Sector Reform B.E. 2540-2544 (1997-2001)’ focusing on restructuration 
of the scope and mission of public agencies, together with the 1997 constitution, transformed the 
structure and governance of the state. Under the plan, alternative concepts and forms of public 
service delivery were promoted.  The idea of ‘agencification’ was predominant allowing an 
opportunity to set up non-departmental bodies, quasi-autonomous public organisations or 
‘quangos’ (see Bowornwathana 2006; Luangprapat 2008, 2013).  Agencification refers to the 
programme of transferring as many government activities as possible into quasi- autonomous or 
agency- type organisations (Pollitt et al. 2005; Talbot 2004).  As such the agencification was 
considered as a part of the autonomisation of the state and the first official New Public 
Management (NPM)-driven reform in Thailand (Bowornwathana 2006).  Consequently, the 
‘Public Organisation Act, B.E. 2542 (1999), also known as the ‘agencification act’, was enacted. 
The ‘agencification act’ conceptualises and interprets quangos as agency- type organisations, so-
called ‘ autonomous public organisations’ ( APOs) , and has made the term relatively well-known 
across the country (Bowornwathana 2012). The agencification act establishes standard rules and 
regulations for the all organisations created under it. In the 2000s, public management in Thailand 
was regarded as moving to the beginning of the period of public services by APOs (see 
Luangprapat 2013; Whangmahaporn 2013). 
Secondly, the idea of financing for social development became a central issue of the ‘Policy 
Committee on Distributing Prosperity to the Provinces and Localities’. The government 
formulated the policy committee in 1995 as a consequence of the 7th and the 8th NESDP starting 
from 1992 which began to mention fiscal decentralisation. The 8th NESDP plan in particular was 
evidence of the changing attitude of the state towards civil society as it addressed the importance 
of public participation.  The committee gave rise to the formulation of the ‘ Fiscal and Financial 
Master Plan for Social Development (1997-2001)’ chaired by the executive director of the Ministry 
of Finance.  The idea of financing for social development was thus introduced for the first time in 
order to advocate the use of fiscal and financial measures to support and promote the ties between 
business organisations and community organisations so that they would be strengthened. This was 
 74 
developed in concert with the idea of creating a new type of public organisations, that is, quangos, 
to work to support local organisations. 
Consequently, APOs operating to give support, typically financially, to NGOs and 
organised civil society as a strategic partner were established.  For example, the ‘ Community 
Organisation Development Institution’ (CODI) was established in 1998 by merging the previous 
RDF and the UCDF. However, the CODI began to operate completely in late 2001. The CODI is 
an APO run under the ‘agencification act’ and the supervision of the Ministry of Social 
Development and Human Security.  CODI’ s main function is to give support and funding for 
development activities of organised civil society, in particular community organisations across the 
country.  However, it was criticised by NGOs who felt that they were overlooked or had been 
missed out from the CODI, most of whose funds went directly to community organisations 
(Chutima 2004).  
Another important example is the establishment of a huge fund, the ‘Thai Health Promotion 
Foundation’ or THPF in 2001, which is the main object of the study of the thesis. The THPF is an 
independent APO operating outside the formal structure of government and obtains money from 
two percent of the taxes from the sale of alcohol and tobacco.  It is arguably the product of elite 
NGOs and progressive bureaucrats, particularly in the field of public health (Ungsuchaval 2016b) 
and chiefly administrated by social activists, academics or NGO sympathisers. The THPF provided 
more than 1,000 million Baht or about 30 million US Dollars to promote numerous NGO projects 
(see Thai Health Promotion Foundation 2011), thereby becoming one of the most important and 
the biggest fund for civil society at the time (Chutima 2004).  This fund is also used to strengthen 
civil society by stressing community- based development and self- reliance.  It has also played a 
crucial role in shaping NGO strategies.  NGOs which got money from the THPF were inclined to 
follow THPF’ s administrative system and project advice.  However, the THPF invited NGOs to 
share opinion, collaborate in planning, hold joint activities, and support each other to reach mutual 
goals.  The idea of partnership was advocated. The THPF referred to grantees as ‘ partners’  or 
‘ owners of the issues’  while positioned itself as ‘ supporter’ (Rakyutidharm 2014a).  The idea of 
‘ network’  or ‘ alliance’  was popularly used to explain the relationship between NGOs and the 
THPF.  It was the first time that NGOs were drawn to fully operate with the state with their own 
missions. The development of the THPF will be further discussed below. 
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The rise of the CODI and the THPF reflects the rise of quangos, especially those which are 
focusing on social financing, and the immediate need of alternative domestic funding sources. 
Particularly, the establishment of THPF arguably marked the beginning of the new funding 
landscape for civil society in Thailand. As already discussed in Chapter 1, the THPF is a new form 
of philanthropy. The THPF is the first funder that allows the recipients to pursue their own 
missions while under granting contract.  It uses strategic, proactive funding schemes and does not 
rely on request for proposals (RFPs).  Besides, it is new because it is driven by domestic forces as 
a result of development of the sector.  The development of civil society funding is summarised in 
the figure 4.1. 
 














Hence, over time, NGOs in Thailand have increasingly depended on the state, especially 
in the financial aspect, driving the centralisation and the state-dependency of civil society 
(Kanchoochat 2019). Nowadays, a limited number of Thai NGOs get funding from foreign donors. 
Research has found that the majority of NGO funding comes from domestic sources and public 
agencies (SRI 2003; Rakyutidharm 2014b; Srisanga, Kummuang and Wasi 2015; Rujisatiensap 
and Yoosamran 2016).  The government and APOs have become new patrons for civil society 
replacing the foreign donors since the middle of the 1990s. Table 4.1 summarises the three major 
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eras of NGO funding in Thailand.  The landscape of the funding has shifted from ‘foreign 
patronage’ during the 1980s-1990s to ‘state patronage’ from the mid-1990s which was then 
overlaid with the ‘quango patronage’ from the 2000s onwards. It is obvious from the table that 
domestic donors are increasingly significant, with the NGOs trying to move beyond funding from 
external pressures; also the changing nature of state- NGO relations is becoming more 
collaborative. 
There are advantages and disadvantages of the ‘quango patronage’. On the positive side, it 
is believed that the financial support for NGOs became more institutionalised with the support 
from APOs (Shigetomi 2006).  However, the arrival of quangos in civil society made the funding 
landscape more complicated. For example, there is an issue about the neither-state-nor-NGO status 
of such agencies. Interviews with NGO participants revealed that NGOs are ambivalent towards 
the status of the agencies.  As will be discussed in the next chapter, the THPF is differently 
perceived by stakeholders. This has affected the activity of funding and the relationship between 
them.  Besides, NGOs are criticised for becoming an arm of the state governed through quangos 
(Rakyutidharm 2014a) as quangos are the manifestation of the NPM-driven state governance 
which aims to enhance the efficiency and the coherence of public management (Hood 1991; Clarke 
and Newman 1997) . It is possible to state the NGOs and their funding ecosystem are now in the 
‘quangocracy era’. 
 
Table 4.1 Eras of civil society funding in Thailand 
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4.3 The rise of the THPF 
As aforementioned, the creation of the THPF came about at the turning point of the NGO 
sector when it was facing a decline in foreign funding and was uncomfortable with patronage from 
government departments. Arguably, the THPF is an odd institution due to its twofold origins. First, 
having emerged out of the agencification, the THPF is a result of the changing state starting from 
the 1990s. It is an independent APO.  The agencification provided an ‘institutional basis’ for the 
THPF and gave an opportunity to link public purpose with the enterprise and innovation potential 
of the organisation.  Second, the THPF originated from the global health promotion development 
in creating sustainable mechanisms to promote health policy and a healthy society. Among the 
prominent mechanisms promoted was the establishment of ‘health promotion foundations’ (HPFs) 
which operate by funding partner organisations. The health promotion development provided 
‘content’ on how the THPF operates.  In this sense, the status of an APO of the THPF gives the 
funded NGOs more autonomy, while the status of an HPF encourages the THPF to offer innovation 
and cross-/multi-sectoral initiatives. The following discussion in this section is dedicated to an 
account of these two developments. 
 
4.3.1 Agencification movement and the creation of independent APOs 
In fact the idea of agencification in Thailand did not only start from the enactment of the 
1999 ‘agencification act’. Before that, quangos ( or equivalent)  were already in existence and 
operating under their own legislative bases ( see Sawaengsak 2006; Nitikraipot 2000) . This 
situation corresponds with many other countries where legally independent bodies have generally 
been established earlier than standardised semi-autonomous agencies (see Van Thiel 2012).  
However, since the launch of the ‘agencification act’, there are two types of APOs 
operating in Thailand. The first type is the agency- type APOs founded and governed under the 
‘agencification act’. These APOs are not at all autonomised. They do not work at arm’ s length of 
the government as they should do. Instead, they have become an integral part of the ‘bundled 
government’ and been accountable to the high level bureaucrats and politicians ( Bowornwathana 
2012) .  The prime example of these APOs is the CODI. The second type is independent APOs 
founded and governed under their own legislative foundations. These APOs are also known as 
autonomous organisations; they have their own legal bases, separated from the standardised 
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‘agencification act’.  Each of these APOs is unique. The differences are summarised in the table 
4.2. 
 
Table 4.2. The differences between agency-type APOs and independent APOs 
 Agency-type APOs Independent APOs 
Legal basis The 1999 agencification act Ones’ own specialised act 
Autonomy Lower Higher 
Example Community Organisations 
Development Institute (CODI) 
Thai Health Promotion Foundation 
(THPF) 
 
It would be misleading to consider the THPF as a normal APO founded on the 
‘agencification act’. To be precise, the THPF is an ‘independent APO’ with its own dedicated 
legislative basis, that is, the ‘Health Promotion Foundation Act, B.E.2544 (2001)’  or the ‘THPF 
Act’. When the THPF was established, public management in Thailand was in the beginning of 
the period of public service through APOs.  The agencification thus provided an institutional 
environment for the possibility to create THPF as an APO.  The establishment of the THPF 
symbolises the shift from the bureaucracy model to the disaggregated, autonomised model of the 
state.  As an APO, it suggests that the Thai state has allowed an alternative form of policy and 
service provision. 
 
 4.3.2 Health promotion movement and the creation of the HPFs 
 Since the 2000s, Thailand has become recognised as a world leader in health promotion 
and disease prevention because it has relatively advanced policies and programmes years ahead of 
neighbouring countries ( Galbally et al.  2012) .  One important policy often mentioned by the 
international community is the implementation of the first tax-financed Universal Health Coverage 
(UHC) Scheme which guarantees that all Thais can access health services regardless of their ability 
to pay (see Hughes and Leethongdee 2007; Evans et al. 2012; Hanvoravongshai 2013). However, 
there is another policy which has become a model for other countries. It is the creation of the first 
HPF in Asia, that is, the ‘THPF’, which reflects the necessity for reorienting existing health 
promotion infrastructures toward a greater capacity for social mobilisation (Buasai 1997). The 
establishment of the THPF marks a new era of health promotion and partnership working in 
Thailand. Nowadays, the THPF is regarded as a prominent partner of the government in addressing 
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‘non- communicable diseases’ (NCDs) (Chan-o-cha, 2018). The continued relationship between 
them generates a synergy for the national health system (see Watabe et al. 2017). 
 
 The global health promotion movements 
The creation of the THPF does not only reflect changes and developments in health 
promotion systems in Thailand, but also those of the world. As the NCDs have become the greatest 
global disease burden (Horton 2007; Abegunde et al.  2007; WHO 2013), health promotion has 
been widely advocated as an essential part of public health around the world.  Specifically, it has 
become a global policy imperative since 1986 at the first Global Conference on Health Promotion 
in Ottawa, Canada, where one of the most important documents in public health was produced. 
The document is the Ottawa Charter on Health Promotion which emphasises the new goals of 
health promotion: to go ‘upstream’ building health-promoting public policies and having an impact 
on the socio- economic and environmental determinants of health; to focus on population health; 
to emphasise prevention rather than treatment; and to build capacity in communities and 
individuals (WHO 1986; Naidoo and Wills 2016). Health promotion has then become 
conceptualised as the process of enabling people to increase control over their health and its 
determinants.   
 As a result, the idea of ‘ healthy public policy’  ( HPP) and ‘social determinants of health’ 
(SDH) were promoted. HPP encouraged the government to place health in all policy-making at all 
levels so that people would be aware of the health consequences of their decisions and behaviours 
( WHO 1986) .  Later, HPP has been integrated into the ‘ health in all policies’  ( HiAP)  approach 
which refers to a broad strategy to address health challenges and promote behavioural change 
through an integrated policy response across different sectors of government and inter- sectoral 
collaboration (Naidoo and Wills 2016). 
SDH suggests the externalities of public health threats ( Deber, McDougall and Wilson 
2007), that is, the economic and social factors, shaped by politics and policies, that have a profound 
effect on health (Dahlgren and Whitehead 1991; WHO 2008, 2009; Marmot 2010). These factors 
are believed to be the root cause of social inequities and the unfair and avoidable differences in 
health and well-being status. SDH necessarily links the issues of health with non-health issues and 
advocates the use of partnership and a multi-sectoral cooperation (Corber 2007; Delaney, 1994) to 
address the factors. The SDH is perhaps the clearest example of health promotion being one of the 
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most controversial areas in public health. It is criticised for intervening with different actors, 
policies, and social lives which are often outside the health area (see Naidoo and Wills 2016; 
Berridge 2016; Bambra, Fox and Scott-Samuel 2005). 
 The changing approach to health promotion helped connect public health with the rise of a 
mixed mode of governance (Rocan 2010; Kickbusch and Gleicher 2012; Malby and Anderson-
Wallace 2016)  where the public health personnel attempt to influence the outcome of health 
promotion with and through non-health networks.  This provided a framework for creating a new 
model of health promotion financing and infrastructure (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2017), that is, 
HPFs. 
In 1987, an HPF was founded for the first time in Australia. It is called the ‘Victorian 
Health Promotion Foundation’ (VicHealth) which obtains funding from government- collected 
tobacco taxes and is mandated to promote health in the State of Victoria ( see VicHealth 2005) . 
The VicHealth reflects the idea that an HPF should ideally be a part of the state but at a proper 
arm’s length in order to act freely in pursuit of its goals (see Vathesatogkit, Lian and Ritthiphakdee 
2013).  HPFs should be independent statutory agencies which have a separate budget stream, 
ideally from a mechanism for health promotion (for example, a tax on tobacco and alcohol). With 
a strong leading role in promulgating HPF, the VicHealth has become the role model for HPFs 
around the world including Thailand.  It affirms that HPFs can be one of the most effective ways 
to address SDH and promote HiAP ( Mouy and Barr 2006) .  Additionally, Ottawa’ s health 
promotion principles must be integrated into the main features of HPFs ( see Galbally et al.  2012, 
p. 19).  
 
Health promotion movements and financing for health in Thailand 
Prior to the THPF, the Thai health system was traditionally totally passive focusing on the 
curative dimension, and all health services were provided by the state ( Vathesatogkit and Buasai 
1998; Puaksom 2015) .  Efforts to promote the preventive approach were not widely debated and 
acknowledged.  Health promotion was only subtly developed in the movement on health system 
development (Jindawatthana and Sri-Ngernyuang 2011).  
However, there already was a strong record in health promotion provided by non-state 
actors. The role of civil society and NGOs in health sector governance and development has been 
well- recognised in Thailand ( Chuengsatiansup 2008) .  They have variously engaged in public 
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policy processes, running campaigns on social issues, advocating legislative changes, and 
sometimes working as political watchdogs.  There are two groups which can be considered as 
significantly contributing to the creation of the THPF. 
The first group is the anti-smoking and tobacco control movement, led by the ‘Action on 
Smoking and Health Foundation’ (ASH) . This group has been widely recognised in its advocacy 
role to promote policies and regulation to reduce and ultimately prevent the consumption of 
cigarettes (see Supawongse 2007; Vathesatogkit and Charoenca 2011). Starting from 1986, it is a 
pioneer for tobacco control and health promotion work in general. Among its activities, the 1993 
campaign to increase the excise tax on cigarettes and earmark the surplus for the Ministry of Public 
Health ( MoPH)  is a milestone in developing an HPF because it marked the first time that taxes 
had been increased for health purposes, not for generating greater revenue for the government 
(Vathesatogkit 2010; Wipfli 2015). 
The idea of diverting the earmarked tobacco (and alcohol) tax to finance health promotion 
is essential for building the sustainable and innovative income of the THPF. As mentioned, the 
decrease in foreign funding for NGOs in the 1990s led to a lack of civil society funding, so a 
handful of social activists and NGOs started to seek for new alternative funding within the country 
and stimulated research and lobbying for the use of the ‘ earmarked tax’  for social and health 
development ( Vathesatogkit and Charoenca 2011, p. 231) .  The ‘earmarked tax’ refers to a non-
traditional practice requiring the tobacco and alcohol industries to pay an additional amount of 
excise taxes (two percent in case of the THPF) to the Ministry of Finance whenever they pay their 
excise taxes and to put the surcharge revenues into an HPF account ( Vathesatogkit, Lian, and 
Ritthiphakdee 2011, p. 10) .  It is not subject to annual budgetary review. This unusual financial 
mechanism is believed to be one of the most effective and innovative for sustainable health 
promotion in the world (Moodie et al. 2000; WHO 2016). 
The second group is the health system development movement, led by the progressive 
reformist ‘Rural Doctor Movement’ ( RDM) . Staring from 1978, the RDM has worked to 
encourage professional contribution to the health of the poor particularly in rural areas. This group 
are considered to be pioneers in using innovative approaches to social movement, such as the 
constant use and sharing of resources and statuses among the governmental and non-governmental 
sectors; many members are prominent health and social policy architects of both sectors in the 
country (Sapyen 2013). Besides, it has developed one of the most famous ideas in policy advocacy, 
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that is, the ‘Triangle that Moves the Mountain’ (Wasi 2000), which later became a core of THPF 
strategy (Adulyanon 2012) . The idea refers to a strategy based on three necessary and 
interconnected angles (knowledge, social mobilisation and political advocacy) to solve difficult 
social and health problems and create social change (symbolised as the immovable ‘ mountain’ ). 
Also, research found that its members have actively participated in health system development and 
also political/social development in general (see Wibulpolprasert 2003; Sapyen 2013; Puchchong, 
Anupongpat and Chuengsatiansup 2013) . The new institutional design of the health system, such 
as the UHC and the THPF, was considerably influenced by the RDM (Centre for Peace and 
Conflict Studies 2013; Chokevivat 2014; Sapyen 2013) .  For the RDM, the idea of the THPF 
effectively supports the UHC as it was meant to reduce expenditure for UHC (Supawongse 2007) 
and costs of treatment by promoting a healthy life style and society.  
Health promotion in Thailand has only become a serious topic in public policy from the 
late 1990s. With the introduction of the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion, the scope of ‘health’ 
has been profoundly re-shaped to integrate physical, mental, social, and spiritual dimensions, and 
to advocate civil society engagement. This became the strategy of the THPF. The Charter also 
helped strengthen the compact of health and governance by emphasising the promotion of good 
governance and social equity. Together with the promulgation of the 1997 constitution which 
opened up a new era of participatory democracy, health promotion has been most clearly and 
intensively adopted (Jindawatthana and Sri- Ngernyuang 2011).  Health outcomes became a key 
factor defining good governance in Thailand (Funahashi 2016). 
The health movements to build the THPF were supplemented by the idea of financing for 
health promotion. Many arguments presented to support the creation of the THPF framed the issues 
as economic rather than as purely health concerns ( Vathesatogkit and Charoenca 2011; 
Pokpermdee 2010; WHO 2016) .  The arguments referred to the financial burden of treating 
diseases caused by tobacco and alcohol consumption as well as other NCDs, and traffic accident 
injuries from careless alcohol use.  In this way the burden could be mitigated by an investment in 
health promotion, namely by preventing and altering risky behaviours beforehand. 
Indeed, the idea of the THPF as an HPF was one of the key measures, along with the UHC, 
stated in the Fiscal and Financial Master Plan for Social Development (1997- 2001) (Siwaraksa 
2005; Ungsuchaval 2016b). The plan was to promote the use of financial instruments to build and 
sustain the relationship between private organisations and community bodies as well as support 
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the capacity of community for infrastructural service delivery.  The plan then encouraged a study 
of the possibility to establish an HPF as an autonomous body in Thailand (see Thirapanish 2001). 
The creation of the THPF reflects the changing state that supported fiscal decentralisation and 
financing for social development as well as allowing the innovative practice of earmarking tax for 
social development.  
In sum, the THPF can be understood as a product of policy synergies and consensus 
between finance and health sectors, and between the state and the non-state. The context of the 
1990s, principally the increase in collaboration between the government and NGOs, the decrease 
of foreign funding for civil society, public sector reform and the health promotion movements, 
together provided significant institutional and content bases for the operation of the THPF. 
 
4.4 Health promotion in the era of the THPF  
The THPF is regarded as the most innovative agency designed to finance population-wide 
promotion and prevention activities (Watabe et al.  2017) .  The THPF claims to be the first 
organisation of its kind in Asia. Through collaborating with all sectors of the society, the THPF 
serves as an ‘innovative enabler’ or a ‘catalyst’ to enhance health promotion and a healthy society 
and environment for all people in Thailand (Buasai, Kanchanachitra and Siwaraksa 2007; 
Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong 2015). In practice, the THPF administers a long-term 
health promotion fund and provides financial and technical support as well as ongoing monitoring 
and evaluation to anyone who shares its visions.  It also owns resource centres that assist civil 
societies in applying, utilising and accounting for its funds efficiently and appropriately (Watabe 
et al. 2017). Ultimately, the THPF is interested in facilitating sustainability by promoting structural 
change. With the operation of the THPF, Thailand is considered to have a high intensive mode of 
coordination and integration between health and other sectors (Shankardass et al. 2001; Lin and 
Carter 2013). Many hybrid and innovative initiatives are witnessed through the support of the 
THPF (see Innovation Support Unit 2016, 2017; Chunharas 2008). 
 
 4.4.1 THPF’s approach to health 
Health is by nature a ‘wicked problem’: complex, multi-factorial, often long-term, and 
contested (Rocan 2012). The THPF has shifted from the curative approach to health toward the 
preventive approach by making health became the shared responsibility of all people. Health for 
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the THPF refers to ‘well-being’ involving everyone in the society and having much deeper social 
roots (Board of Governance 2005, 2 March, item 4.1). In other words, health is not only the absence 
of disease but a product of social, biological, and environmental factors. ‘Health’ is made to 
become recognised as a state of complete physical, social and mental well- being and not merely 
the absence of disease or infirmity ( Achananuparp 2007). The THPF, therefore, marked the new 
era of health promotion in Thailand. 
 By adopting the Ottawa Charter, the THPF envisions that the promotion of health is not to 
provide a service by professional health workers but to make a change through social movements 
(Board of Governance 2005, 2 March, item 4.1). Health care which belonged to medical 
professional specialists was reframed into issues for which everyone is responsible and able to 
promote. Health has become societal and somewhat ‘solvable’. This in turn advocates HiAP and 
manipulates SDH to improve levels of health. The THPF also redefines many social issues, not 
only concerning health, and makes connections to everyone’s daily life. It has made people realise 
the effects of social and environmental problems as their own ‘health’ problems. Ms Cat, a senior 
NGO working for media literacy and child development, argued that: 
 
The THPF has helped expand the boundaries of social and development enterprises by framing 
them as relevant to daily life. The work entailed is made to become seen as helping oneself, not 
only others. The enterprise is everyone’s business. People at any level started to perceive the social 
issues as their own health issues… Social and development work has become diversified (Ms Cat, 
interview). 
 
The reframing helps direct policy and practice towards a more collaborative path based on 
an engagement with policy areas outside health to include various actors from non- health sectors 
across society. Specifically, the THPF has connected NGOs in different fields and brings them 
into the same place.  
  It is possible to categorise the THPF’s approach to health promotion into 6 major groups 
(Galbally et al. 2012, p. 23): increasing tobacco and alcohol taxes; promoting healthy sponsorship 
of sports and culture; developing healthy environments; developing multisectoral support for 
health promotion; taking a social determinants approach; and promoting innovation and new 
knowledge. These areas of health promotion strategically operate under ten- year goals and the 
creation of an annual master plan. The development of the master plan is flexible and based on the 
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Ottawa Charter, government policies and cabinet resolutions, partners’ and experts’ opinions and 
experiences of the office (Board of Governance 2005, 2 March, item 4.1).  
Currently, there are 15 plans ( see Table 4.3)  that the THPF has endorsed and is bringing 
together into the master plan. These plans are proactively executed through its recipients 
nationwide, administrated by different sections of the THPF office, and directed by the Board of 
Governance (hereinafter the board), the CEO, and the Plan Administrative Committees ( PACs) 
(see Figure 4.2). This proves that the THPF has a flat, less hierarchical structure compared to other 
state organisations, with only the CEO at the top and different sections (granting sections and 
support sections) placed underneath.  
 The plans are divided into three interwoven categories: issue-based, areas/settings-based, 
and system-based. The area/setting-based plans develop and prepare favourable conditions for the 
issue-based plans to work in-depth. The issue-based plans generate best practices for the 
area/setting-based plans to extend the work. The system-based plans provide support for the other 
two groups.  
 
Table 4.3 Strategic plans of the THPF and their administration 
Approach Plan Main Administration 
Issue-based 1. Tobacco control plan Major Risk and Factors Control Section 
2. Alcohol and substance abuse control plan 
3. Road safety and disaster management plan  Social and Health Risk Control Section 
4. Health risk control plan Healthy Risk Control Section 
5. Physical activity promotional plan  
Healthy Lifestyle Promotion Section 6. Healthy food promotion plan 
7. Healthy media system and spiritual health 
pathway promotion plan 
Area/setting-
based 
8. Health promotion plan for vulnerable 
populations 
Health Promotion for Vulnerable Populations 
Section 
9. Health child, youth and family promotion 
plan 
Healthy Child, Youth, and Family Promotion 
Section 
10. Healthy community strengthening plan Healthy Community Strengthening Section 
11. Health promotion in organisations plan Health Promotion in Organisations Section 
12. Health promotion in health service system 
plan 
Health System Development Section 
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13. Health promotion innovation and open 
grant plan 
Health Promotion Innovation and Open Grant 
Section 
System-based 14. Health promotion mechanism development 
plan 
Support sections 
15. Health literacy promotion plan Support sections 
 



















Source: adapted from Galbally et al. (2012, p. 137) 
 
The THPF classifies its grantees into two major groups: change agents and partners. The 
change agents are the grantees typically channelled through the open grant section. They are 
expected to ‘make a difference’ by what they propose and are then supported to do. The partners 
are a, if not the, major grantee of the THPF, channelled by most of the granting sections. Although 
























THPF’s budget is spent (Galbally et al. 2012). The partners are also expected to ‘make a difference’ 
and even ‘change’ the policy and society through the ‘tri-power strategy’, the THPF’s working 
model developed from the aforementioned ‘triangle that moves the mountain’. This strategy will 
be discussed later in Chapter 7. 
 
 4.4.2 The governance of the THPF 
 
 Macro-level governance 
With its dedicated ‘THPF act’, The THPF is relatively and highly autonomous compared 
with other APOs as it is not governed under the standardised ‘agencification act’ and not solely 
supervised by the Minister of Health, but the independent board of governance under the 
supervision of the Prime Minister. The ‘THPF act’ and the board can be regarded as the 
mechanisms enhancing capacity for the continuation of the THPF. Both the Cabinet and, especially 
the Parliament, must act in order to change or abolish the organisation.  
The THPF’s board was invented to have a coordination focus by aiming to supervise the 
organisation’ s governance and works, political development, budget allocation, and regulation 
enactment. It is chaired by the Prime Minister with the Minister of Public Health as the First Vice-
Chair ( and Acting Chair)  and the selected independent expert as the Second Vice-Chair. Nine 
senior bureaucrats from different departments and eight independent members from different fields 
and sector make up the rest of the board.  
Involving different government departments is a key to pursuing the broad social health 
agenda of the THPF which shows that THPF’ s work has not been merely occupied by the health 
sector.  Besides, the board is designed to have a strong link with the top levels of government. 
Having the PM as Chairman is assumed to ensure that the THPF was positioned from the start as 
a high- level public organisation, on similar footing with government ministries.  This helps 
facilitate the operation of the THPF which needs cooperation from different government 
departments.  This is also believed to be a mechanism which helps the THPF to survive political 
conflicts (Galbally et al. 2012).  
However, it is important to note that such model runs at the expense of flexibility. It runs 
the risk of becoming bureaucratised.  It is possible to see that the board is bureaucrat- oriented 
consisting of a large number of senior bureaucrats but fewer political executives.  The dominance 
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of bureaucrats in the THPF represents the legacy of bureaucratic polity and the agencification 
process which were based on a ‘bureau-shaping model’ (Dunleavy 1991). In Thailand, the creation 
of new APOs which have new authority and budget ramifications is based on the passion to expand 
the power and organisation of high government officials and bureaucrats. The agencification 
signifies the operationalisation of bureaucratisation within the process, which in turn affects the 
degree of autonomy and control over APOs ( Pratama 2017, p. 51) .  The creation of new APOs is 
thus less about improving public service delivery and more about generating benefits to high-level 
bureaucrats and politicians (Bowornwathana 2006, 2012). 
Apart from the board of governance, the THPF also has the ‘Board of Evaluation’ which 
is independent of the board of governance and the office.  This board is responsible for providing 
important insights and suggestions for improving the THPF and its operation, and reassuring the 
board of governance and Parliament that the THPF is on track, going in the planned direction.  In 
practice, the board takes a macro approach in assessing the overall quality and effectiveness of the 
THPF’ s governance and operations, plans, programmes and activities.  The relationship between 
the two boards and the relevant national authorities can be illustrated in the figure 4.3. 
 













Source: adapted from Galbally et al. (2012, p. 135) 
 
Evaluating, 


















Although the THPF is accountable, typically through annual reporting, to the national 
authorities, there is no direct command chain of them over the governance and management of the 
THPF. This proves that the THPF, to some extent, operates at arm’s length. Even so, it is important 
the note that the THPF has in effect scarcely been independent of government, let alone the state. 
The THPF has never been ‘ independent’  in the sense that its most enthusiastic, perhaps naïve, 
defenders assume. For example, the board is political/state dominated in that 11 out of 20 executive 
members on the board are political/ state appointees (2 politicians and 9 related high-ranking 
officers in ministries). Additionally, according to the ‘THPF act’, bureaucrats and other state 
officers are not prohibited from becoming independent members of the board - a position which is 
supposed to belong to the non-state sector. However, a least fifty percent of board members must 
be from the non-state sector, therefore only four seats (out of 8 independent members) are secured 
for them. The number of political/state appointees on the board often leads to instability and 
inefficiency of steering as well as political/state interference. It is thus unavoidable that this 
influences how the THPF operates and also its public image.  
Nevertheless, it is noted that the THPF has not always functioned like a straightforward 
instrument of the government or the governing classes either. Independent APOs are not in unison 
with government departments. They tend to pursue their own organisational interests which might 
not be the same as, or be in competition with, those of departmental bodies (see Lane 2016; Hood 
et al.  2005) .  In this sense, the THPF has engaged in, using Mills’s language (2016, p. 4) , ‘a grey 
area—sometimes darker, sometimes lighter—between government and civil society’. 
 
 Meso-/Micro-level governance 
In a more meso-/micro-level, the governance of the THPF’s projects/programmes heavily 
relies on a series of expert advisory committees.  Among them, the PACs are the most essential. 
Currently, there are 7 PACs and their practical operation is flexible and varied. Each PAC has its 
own autonomy to organise itself and oversee its plans. PACs are an internal mechanism developed 
by the THPF office itself in 2004 to oversee the implementation of the plans launched. It is 
expected that the PACs can stimulate: (1) the plan-driven operation regulated by the PACs as an 
executive body; and (2) the decentralisation of decision-making, moving consideration of non-
major issues away from the board in order to boost efficiency and effectiveness (Board of 
Governance 2004, 29 Nov, item 3.2). Dr Luke, a former THPF senior officer and a PAC member, 
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explained that a PAC is an expert-driven committee which consists of specialists in a particular 
area.  
 
 To set and run each PAC is dependent on personal judgment of each section director of the THPF’s 
office… Some PACs consisted of representatives from the relevant organisations in different fields 
such as alcohol consumption prevention and anti-tobacco. The representatives could be the THPF’s 
fundee. They could come from either the governmental or non-governmental sector… We thought 
that, when we wanted to advocate some policies, who would be involved to make the advocacy 
success. For example, if we wanted to advocate a certain tobacco consumption control policy, the 
PAC responsible for the task would include the representatives from the Department of Disease 
Control, the MoPH, the Ministry of Interior, the Royal Thai Police, and other social organisations. 
The PAC might need to cover the representatives from media organisations, law units, academic 
institutions if PR and relevant tasks were involved (Dr Luke, interview). 
 
To increase the effectiveness of the steering over the projects/programmes, the PACs can 
appoint ‘Project Steering Committees’ (PSCs)  to oversee the overall performance of any 
project/programme  that receives a grant of 20 million Baht (about 620,000 USD) or more. These 
two mechanisms are expected to function as a coordinating mechanism, namely an intermediary 
body, bridging the gap between the board and the office. Some PAC members are also board 
members. As a result, the board is kept updated about the progress of projects. Misunderstanding 
and conflicts between the board and the office can be prevented and mitigated. Given this, the 
PACs help connect different bodies in the implementation of the plans and funding; they can also 
improve the monitoring of the projects/programmes. 
In addition, the PACs and PSCs are believed to increase efficiency and proximity of the 
granted projects/programmes.  They sometimes invite external members, typically those working 
for the funded organisations. The THPF staff provide secretariat functions within the committees. 
In this sense, the committees can be considered as ‘inter-structure mechanism(s)’ (see Ebrahim 
2005) which allow the THPF and the funded organisations to raise coordination or mutual control 
over each other’ activities and behaviours. In practice, in an effort to coordinate the demands of 
the funder, the NGOs can set up an advisory board or committee consisting of representatives from 
relevant organisations including the funder. In a case where a representative of the funder is 
present, and to prevent a conflict of interest, the THPF cannot send its staff or executive members 
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to be a representative in a funded organisation. However, it is possible for the funded NGOs to 
share representatives, committee members, or experts of the THPF.  
It is obvious from the interviews that many NGOs have certain experts, who are PAC or 
PSC members, as advisors or board members of their own organisation. Members of such advisory 
committees tend to be distinguished or respected people in the field who can serve to coordinate 
or negotiate, directly or not, with the funder and bond the partnership or alliance with them. In 
other words, the NGOs are inclined to have someone the funder listens to. This exemplifies the 
way in which both parties can use the committees as vehicles for co-opting or partially absorbing 
key external organisations with which they are interdependent. 
The function of advisory committees reflects the autonomy of THPF managerial practices. 
Besides, the committees are given great authority over how they operate. They have their own 
preferred style of work. For example, one PAC preferred working with experts and holding 
workshops while the other favoured close working with programme managers and fieldwork 
(Board of Governance 2005, 16 Jun, item 3.3). Therefore, on the one hand they create the 
specialisation of work by leaving things to experts. On the other hand, they can lead to 
fragmentation as each committee encounters difficulty in standardising and integrating its work. 
 
4.4.3 The development of the THPF 
The governance of the THPF does not exemplify the ‘ strong board, weak CEO’  model, a 
common characteristic of Thai APOs (see Bowornwathana 2006, 2012). Instead, the status of an 
independent APO grants the executives of the THPF considerable autonomy. From interviews, the 
executives are seen closely linked to the performance and the development of the organisation, 
rather than that of the board. It is the office that actually deals with detailed managerial practices 
and granting. In particular, most granting is more associated with section directors who have actual 
authority over granting and interaction with the grantees. The direction of the operation of the 
advisory committees and granting is thus heavily reliant on the directors. 
Besides, the CEO’s annual performance appraisal is also considered as an appraisal of the 
THPF’s performance. Based on interviews with several THPF executives, the development of the 
THPF can be classified into three important stages or eras based on the performance of the CEO 
and external environments, such as politics and society. Each era has its own uniqueness. However, 
the eras are not mutually exclusive. Some characteristics of earlier eras have continued to affect 
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the later eras. One important reason is that the later CEOs had been part of the executive team 
since the early days of the organisation.  
 
The era of foundation and establishment (2001-2010) 
The THPF in its early years was focused on building the foundation of the organisation. 
Resources were invested in systems and processes, in particular the ones related to granting. The 
first half decade of the THPF was dubbed by some as the age of ‘many things to many people’ 
(Carroll, Wood and Tantivess 2007). The current philosophy of the health promotion the THPF is 
a legacy of this era. 
The CEO is seen as the centre of the administration of the office surrounded by staff who 
had a background in public health (which is not the same as medical) and research. The CEO was 
said by interview participants to be a good strategist and lobbyist. This corresponds to the 
assessment given by the board which saw the CEO as excelling in dealing with politics and external 
stakeholders but under-interacting with partners (Board of Governance 2005, 17 Nov, item 5). The 
THPF was seen as rather inward-looking in the eyes of the partners that favoured lobbyist politics. 
However, the THPF successfully built its image as standing ‘behind’ partners, supporting them.  
As a new organisation with a significant amount of budget, the THPF soon became the 
target of politicians. Interviews with THPF senior officers sadly revealed that too many resources 
were wasted to protect the organisation from political intervention, opposing businesses and 
conservative bureaucrats of the MoPH. The tensions between the THPF and these three groups 
still continue to the present. To prevent the abuse of funds, the THPF introduced strict regulations 
and internal policies regarding COI (see Carroll, Wood and Tantivess 2007). One unintended 
consequence of such a protective stance is that it brought about bureaucratisation because the 
THPF needs to create extra rules and regulations as measures to prevent against political 
intervention and help the survival of the organisation. Many of these regulations were later 
regarded as undesirable.  
 
The era of expansion and venture (2010-2016) 
The second era can be said to begin with the direction of a new CEO to drive the THPF to 
become a business-like, entrepreneurial and smart organisation. This reflected the adaptation of 
managerialism to the organisation. The CEO introduced a re-branding of the THPF by revising the 
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organisation’s logo, expanding the scope of working areas to cover non-health areas, and setting 
up new support units such as a Social Marketing Section and the Partnership and International 
Relations Section (PIRS).  
This CEO was said to be rather extrovert and innovative. He emphasised new social sector 
initiatives such as social enterprises. Although the THPF in general has always been seen to be 
sympathetic to civil society, this particular era was the time when the THPF explicitly supported 
civil society. Some projects dedicated to the development of the NGO sector were actively granted, 
resulting in the enactment of the Regulations of the Office of Prime Minister on Supporting and 
Developing Civil Society Organisations, B.E.2558 (2015) and the creation of the Civil Society 
Empowerment Institute (see Kanjanadit 2018).  
The new regulation in particular indicates that the THPF’s CEO must be a part of its 
national committee. Also, Mr Pun, a senior NGO activist who has been engaged in the process to 
create the regulation since the beginning, interestingly pointed out that the THPF and civil society 
parties are given a certain authority to select members of the committee. 
 
[We are given] a way of organising movement. The selection of a committee member to join the 
committee… was influenced by us [the THPF and civil society]. We proposed the candidates. We 
helped screen them.  The authorities, to a certain degree, allowed us to intervene in the selection 
process. This is why we got a fine committee that we know and can work with (Mr Pun, interview). 
 
Given this, the THPF was made became more visible and recognised by the public. The 
image of the THPF was re-positioned to become the one standing ‘beside’ partners. However, the 
re-branding brought some backlash. First, the greater visibility of the THPF as a civil society 
partner intensified its complicated, comfortable relationship with the state. Second, expanding 
working areas to greater cover non-health areas was sometimes criticised for the misdirection of 
funding and the authoritative tendency of the THPF. An image of the ‘intervening father’ of the 
THPF, who preaches his ‘health’ doctrine to people even outside the health sector, was developed. 
This resulted in the tense political intervention by the military government in the next era. Third, 
the adaptation of managerialism focusing on techniques of management was criticised for making 
the THPF lose its original spirit. Terms such as the value and ideology of health promotion were 
less discussed. Dr Sor, a founding member of the THPF, strongly warned against this point. 
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If we [THPF’s staff] do not prioritise the value of health promotion and only emphasise techniques, 
THPF will not survive. People will keep seeing the THPF as a mere granter holding money (Dr 
Sor, interview).  
 
 The era of rebalancing and professionalisation (2016-the present) 
 This era started with unprecedented, tense political intervention by the government. The 
military government suspected that the THPF subsidised certain ‘non-health’ projects which 
supported anti-government movements. The granted research project, ‘Re-examining the Political 
Landscape of Thailand’ (see Satitniramai, Mukdawijitra and Pawakapan 2013), was particularly 
labelled as a threat which mobilised the ‘red-shirt’ movement, the anti-coup and military 
government movement, despite the fact that the project’s real intention was to understand the 
changing landscape of politics, economy, and society in Thailand in the last decades with a special 
emphasis on the ‘red-shirt’ movement narrative. Being afraid that the THPF might potentially be 
an anti-government incubator, the government thus censured the THPF for its misdirection of 
funding. For the government, there is no link between the THPF – which is supposed to work in 
the health issues - and the research project. There were also alleged scandals concerning THPF 
board members concerning issues of conflict of interest (COI). The government, by the authority 
of the PM, censured seven independent board members from civil society who were involved with 
the funded NGOs for malfeasance and immediately suspend them from duties (Post Reporters 
2016a). These together made the government subject the THPF to a corruption investigation and 
a series of state investigations in the governance and the management of the THPF.  
Following this, the THPF was driven to become more bureaucratised than ever. Its NGO 
partners suffered from a budget freeze as well as trivial, but numerous, bureaucratic procedures 
(Wangkiat and Mahitthirook 2016). Civil society has been weakened. To survive the crisis, the 
THPF prioritised professionalisation. With the management of the third CEO, the THPF has re-
focused the scope of work by placing more emphasis on health promotion work. The CEO has a 
vision to make the THPF become more recognised as a professional player in the health promotion 
business. In particular, he has tried to rebalance the positioning of the THPF between standing 
‘behind’ and ‘besides’ the NGO partners. This implies stepping out from the backstage of the 
THPF to stand at the front while effectively retaining a supporting and enabling position.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
 State-society relations in Thailand are dynamic and interdependent. The NGO sector is 
facilitated and constrained by the state. Thai civil society should rather be perceived as a ‘semi-
civil society’. Thai NGOs are not totally independent from the state while the state is also 
dependent on NGOs. In terms of the development of the sector, the Thai NGO sector has 
traditionally been heavily funded through international and foreign donors. The changing 
landscape of NGO funding which has changed since the 1990s due to the decline in foreign funding 
has significantly impacted on the Thai NGO sector. The sector was driven to reconfigure its 
relationship with the domestic donors, typically public organisations. Then, the sector has become 
more reliant on public funding, typically managed by APOs. One source of the funding that is 
particularly important is the THPF which emerged from the agencification and the health 
promotion movements. Through agencification, the THPF operates as an independent APO outside 
the domain of government with its own mechanisms. Through health promotion, it functions to 
promote a healthy public policy and favours a multi-sectoral approach. The next chapter will 
explore the way NGOs differently relate to the THPF. It also discusses the different characteristics 
of the THPF as perceived or expected by relevant stakeholders. These will provide a basis for 

















THPF-NGO relations: relational aspects 
 
 This chapter aims to discuss the THPF-NGO relations, or how they are related. Although 
it seems that the NGOs are financially reliant on the THPF, the relationship they have is not totally 
dependent. Instead, this chapter argues that looking at the relationship as ‘interdependent’ can 
bring more analytical value. The THPF and the NGOs have mutually relied on each other for 
operating. Yet, different NGOs have different interaction with, or degrees of interdependency with 
the THPF. This potentially leads to multiple perceptions of the characteristics of the THPF. 
Therefore this chapter explores the different roles and positions of the THPF as perceived and 
expected by stakeholders. It also holds that the capacity of the THPF to steer is also reliant on what 
roles it is expected to be able to perform. 
 
5.1 The THPF, NGOs and their interdependent relations 
 
 5.1.1 Resource dependent NGOs? 
 As shown in the previous chapter, the Thai NGO sector is funded. At the national level, 
available statistical studies similarly indicate that the major sources of revenue for the Thai NGO 
sector are grants and donations from other organisations, either private or government (National 
Statistical Office 2014; Salamon et al. 2012; NESDB 2010). At the THPF-NGO relation level, it 
is apparent that what NGOs obtained most from the THPF is money. Unfortunately, there is no 
exact statistical data on how much the THPF has spent on NGOs. However, it is possible to 
estimate the budget the THPF has invested in non-state/non-governmental actors by examining its 
annual reports. As shown in table 5.1, since its establishment, the major beneficiary of THPF 
funding has been mostly non-governmental agencies. Interviews with THPF executives and 







Table 5.1 Proportions of the annual THPF funding separated by types of agencies (%) (see THPF 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019) 
Year Nongovernmental agencies (e.g. foundations, 
associations, communities, academic institutes) 
Governmental 
agencies 
Other agencies (business, 
professional associations, etc.) 
2001 49 26 25 
20026 56.8 39.1 4.2 
20037 33 59 8 
2004 46 42 12 
2005 60 40 -8 
2006 46 38 16 
20079 - - - 
2008 65.74 17.74 16.52 
2009 63 21 16 
2010 62 2510 13 
2011 55 24 21 
2012 43 38 19 
2013 43.4 39.4 17.2 
2014 51 32 17 
2015 39 46 15 
2016 59 33 8 
2017 60 25 15 
2018 62 26 12 
                                                        
6 This is the exact number stated in the annual report. It appears that the summary of proportion slightly 
exceeds the percentage amount. However, this does not affect the proportion of the funded. 
7 No exact number is provided for the nongovernmental agencies and the other agencies in the annual review 
this year. This number is estimated by the author based on the annual review. 
8 Private organisations are included with nongovernmental agencies in this year’s report. 
9 No information is provided in the annual report this year. 
10 This year’s annual report places governmental agencies with communities and local organisations. 
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 Arguably, there is an issue concerning the possible financial dependency of the funded 
NGOs on the THPF. Most NGOs interviewed in this study have THPF funding as their main source 
of revenue. Few NGO participants have THPF funding accounting for less than half of the total 
budget of the organisation. For the latter group, the alternative funding comes from other 
government agencies or international donors. Dependency here can be characterised as a result of 
large asymmetries in resources determined by three important factors: 
 
(1) Resource importance – the extent to which a resource is needed by an organisation for survival 
and operation; (2) Discretion over resource allocation and use – the extent to which an 
organisation can control how the resource received from another organisation is allocated and 
used; and, (3) Concentration of resource control – the extent to which alternative sources of a 
resource are available and accessible (Ebrahim 2005, p. 60).  
 
For the NGO sector, THPF funding is extremely significant and essential to the function 
of the sector. As there has been a serious lack of both foreign and governmental funding, the THPF 
became prominent in civil society funding. Mr Pun, a senior NGO worker, revealed that:  
 
[In the past] we could choose any donors we wanted to work with as there were many of them. [We 
could ask] ‘who is interesting in our work?’ We then got the money to work for what we genuinely 
believed in… Their granting systems were also not micromanaged… [Yet] the THPF came into an 
environment in which it is the only funding source… We used to have funders who wanted to help 
us. Now, we realise that the THPF is the only available one we can access. It is advocating ‘health’, 
so we need to adapt ourselves to the funder… They [donors] sought us. Now, we desperately seek 
them [donors] (Mr Pun, interview). 
 
Seeking THPF grants raises a question on the mission of the NGOs: is their work related 
to ‘health’? If they are, based on the broad notion of health, the NGOs are at least safe in a sense 
that they have a chance for a grant. If they are not, some NGO interviewees mentioned trying to 
adapt some parts of their mission to relate to the health promotion of the THPF. To obtain a grant 
is then reliant on the ability to connect to the funder, to make it feel that the NGO is working for 
the same purpose.  
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Yet, the matter of such connection does not necessarily mean that the THPF totally 
overwhelms the NGOs’ mission. Mr Pun also defended the system by saying that: ‘indeed, we are 
still working guided by our ideological values. We just change the language we use… We just add 
a little bit of ‘health issues’ and can get the money to use. I see this as an adaptation’, (Mr Pun, 
interview). Even so, it is imperative to note that the endeavour to connect the NGOs’ missions to 
the THPF’s missions cannot be understood merely as a change in language. Language is an 
‘expressive behaviour’ and integrally related to relations of power and dominance (Jacobs and 
Manzi 1996). It is an activity in itself, not a naïve medium. Changing the language used necessarily 
affects the changing mentality and practice. The NGOs, to a certain degree, tend to be driven to 
divert their genuine values towards those advocated by the THPF. 
Interestingly, the THPF perceived this issue as having both pros and cons. On the one hand, 
the THPF was pleased to see that there has been an expansion in health networks and civil society 
focusing on health promotion, either expressly created for the purpose of health or turning from 
other areas (Board of Governance 2005, 17 Nov, item 3.1). It was regarded as a success. On the 
other hand, interviews with THPF senior officers and some NGO activists show that they realise 
this problem as potentially leading to the monopolisation of funding and civil society. That is why 
they were motivated to actively advocate the creation of alternative funding for non-health and 
social purposes, such as the Thai Social Enterprise Office (TSEO), the Thai Media Fund, and the 
Civil Society Development Fund. The belief is that such alternative funds can alleviate the 
concentration on the THPF fund, provide civil society with more options, connect other forms of 
organised civil society outside the THPF radar, and synergise the THPF’s businesses. 
Unfortunately, the extent to which the NGOs have financially relied on THPF granting 
cannot be statistically demonstrated due to the lack of information. Yet, it can be qualitatively 
elaborated through the help of interviews. One common point interviewees agreed is that the NGO 
sector significantly relies on THPF granting for carrying out activities or even for their survival. 
Grants from the THPF were even mentioned as being essential to the daily operations and 
management of many NGOs. Many of the interviewees from the NGO sector even contend that, 
to date, they have never, or rarely, known NGOs which have never received grants or support from 
the THPF. 
 It appears from the interviews that the funded NGOs cannot control how the financial 
resource is allocated but they are, to a certain degree, capable of managing how to use the fund in 
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field operations. The allocation of the THPF fund is regulated by law. It cannot be otherwise. 
However, the funded NGOs are seen as capable of manipulating the use of the fund through their 
writing of reports. The monitoring system is mainly focused on the requirement for the funded to 
submit reports and follow accounting protocols. Even so, many NGO participants similarly 
mentioned that they sometimes conduct certain activities but reported otherwise. This was 
particularly the case for advocacy NGOs which often launch emergent campaigns. Some public 
campaigns and movement activities cannot be planned beforehand because they are responsive 
and situational. For instance, an anti-alcohol activity is normally created when alcohol businesses 
have taken an action. Hence, the funded organisations are allowed, in practice, to manipulate how 
to spend money within the granted budget. Movements of money within the granted funds are 
usually seen as an acceptable practice. This signifies that reports submitted to the THPF have not 
always represented what actually happened in the project. There are thus mismatches between the 
official reports and the way money is used in practice, albeit legally conducted.  
Based on the foregoing analysis, the funded NGOs seem to be dependent on the THPF for 
financial resources. However, it would be misleading to imagine the total interaction the NGOs 
have with the THFP as one of dependence. In effect, the THPF-NGO relations are much more 
about financial relationship. It is better perceived in terms of ‘interdependence’. 
 
5.1.2 The interdependent relation 
As CR-inspired research, the thesis holds that all relations are seen as interdependent and 
relational. In fact, the THPF and the NGOs are neither fully dependent nor fully independent of 
one another. They are ‘interdependent’ as each one needs resources from the other in order to 
achieve its goals: the NGOs rely, mostly financially, on the THPF to maintain and keep their 
organisations running while the THPF depends on the funded NGOs for the implementation of its 
work and for securing or developing its performance and reputation. In other words, the THPF 
cannot solely work by itself. It works through others, the NGO partners. Dr Pan, a THPF senior 
officer, interestingly argues that ‘as Buddhist teaching says about interdependence, the NGO is a 
part of the THPF and the THPF is a part of the NGO’ (Dr Pan, interview). This implies that the 
THPF is inseparable from the NGOs and, perhaps, vice versa. They are necessarily related in the 
THPF-NGO partnership. In particular, the THPF has an internal relationship (Sayer 2010) with 
the NGOs in defining its activities. It cannot function without NGO partners. 
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Such interdependence implies power relations. The THPF as the governing organisation 
has tended to deploy resources and use bargaining strategies to try maximising outcomes 
favourable to it. In contrast, the funded NGOs have tended to avoid becoming dependent on the 
THPF in the game. It is too naïve to think of the THPF as dominating the NGOs. The relationship 
is rarely a zero-sum game but a positive-sum one in which parties exchange resources to reach 
goals (McAnulla 2006), albeit not necessarily equally. 
In practice, the THPF needs to earn the expertise, support or assistance of the NGOs in 
order to successfully formulate and implement its programmes/projects. In return, the THPF needs 
to provide the NGOs with a means to influence policy. The interaction is not unilateral or merely 
formed by financial interaction. The THPF is not always in a position to unilaterally impose its 
preferences. The relationship is interdependent because neither the THPF nor the NGOs totally 
control all of the conditions needed for reaching the desired action or outcome (see Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). 
It is commonly assumed that the less the NGOs depend on the THPF grants, the more the 
NGOs can retain their autonomy in the use of funds. However, in practice, even though they are 
financially dependent, the NGOs can manage to retain organisational autonomy and even enter 
into a reciprocal relationship with the THPF. The interdependency is a matter of degree. It would 
be misleading to assume that relations between different funded NGOs and the THPF in the THPF-
NGO partnership are the same. From the interviews, it could be gleaned that the relations are 
differently actualised in the context of interacting factors, namely areas that the NGOs work in and 
the time of their founding. 
First, the NGOs’ working areas, whether health-related or not, influence the concentration 
of the mission. Health-related NGOs tend to well serve the THPF mission while non-health/social-
related NGOs would be less prioritised. However, due to the broad approach of THPF health 
promotion aiming to address the SDH, some non-health/social related NGOs have received special 
attention, such as media NGOs.  
Second, whether the funded NGOs were founded or actively operated before the operation 
of the THPF does influence the nature of the interaction. NGOs which were founded before the 
operation of the THPF tend to have a strong commitment to work and a clearer professionality. 
The professionality of the funded organisations matters in the THPF’s perspective. Dr Pan, a THPF 
senior officer dealing with NGO partners in major planning, argued that: 
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we see that NGOs founded before the operation of the THPF tend to have missions and passions 
showing their own signatures. Because the THPF did not exist, they have seen social problems with 
[their own] passion to solve them… Although they need funding, they can find it. It doesn’t 
necessarily have to be from the THPF. Hence, for them, with or without the THPF, they can operate 
(Dr Pan, interview). 
 
The professionality the NGOs have also makes them experts in their fields. The excerpt 
from the interview with Mr Jet, a senior NGO worker, as shown below can well exemplify the 
argument: 
 
Mr Jet: Given that the NGOs were founded after the creation of the THPF, they might need to 
follow the THPF. 
The researcher: Are they the ones run by THPF funding? 
Mr Jet: Yes. They are, in a sense, problematic. My organisation and I have been working before 
the THPF was created. So the THPF recognises what our identity is and supports us in our direction. 
This is a good point. Yet, I don’t know how the ones founded after the THPF will get the support 
like us unless they build their own identity first.  
The researcher: Does the professionality of the organisations matter? For example, a large NGO 
which tends to be professional already might be less influenced by the THPF. The THPF cannot do 
much to them. In contrast, an NGO which isn’t professionalised albeit founded before the THPF is 
more exposed to the influence from the THPF. 
Mr Jet: Yes. You are right. The unprofessionalised ones are likely to encounter difficulties on 
negotiation with the THPF as the THPF has not seen their identity yet (Mr Jet, interview). 
 
Interestingly, other interview participants used the term ‘ownership’ when they referred to 
their superior expertise on the topics. For example, Dr Luke, a senior officer of a think tank for 
civil society on tobacco control funded by the THPF, said: 
 
I feel like I have a high sense of an ownership of the topic. I am one of the people who have played 
a very important part in building the THPF… I was working in the area long before the THPF came 
along, so I tend to believe that I know better (Dr Luke, interview).  
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It can be conceived that these funded NGOs have their own signature missions and 
passions. They are professional and have the power to negotiate with the THPF. From interviews, 
the power to negotiate with the funder is closely linked to the degree of professionality. Although 
the THPF allows its NGO partners to freely exercise their activities and managerial decisions over 
a granted project/programme, the ability to negotiate with the funder is relative and dependent on 
the character of those steering it too. 
For example, NGO ‘X’ is an academic-based women’s health advocacy which aims to 
advocate sexual health and raise awareness on gender roles in order to create large-scale 
behavioural change. It had a strong link with an international agency based in the US.  NGO ‘X’ 
has been one of the first among others in the area of sexuality, gender, and reproductive health in 
Thailand. According to the interview with Ms Jeep, a founding member of the NGO ‘X’, 
professionality does matter when dealing with donors: 
 
If we know what we are, regardless of how small or big the organisation is,… and do not want just 
to take donors’ orders, we must be clear about what we are doing and would like to do… This is 
the standpoint, the direction. When granting comes, we need to see whether the project and its 
indicators serve our missions. Hence, to manage the organisation, we must not manage it following 
only project-based activities. We must keep and look at our concepts (Ms Jeep, interview). 
 
On the contrary, the NGOs founded after the operation of the THPF, let alone the ones 
initiated by the THPF, tend to be less professionalised. A network of these NGOs is rather 
fragmented. Their activities are overshadowed by the THPF. The THPF tends to take a leading 
role in this relationship, normally by setting the agenda, and gathering and coordinating the 
relevant actors in the field. These NGOs have been significantly reliant on THPF funding. These 
NGOs have grown with a mind-set that there is always an available source of funding out there, 
that is, the THPF and there is no need to seek for alternative funding. 
Therefore, different NGOs have different interaction with, or degree of interdependency 
against, the THPF. The relationship the NGOs differently have with the THPF is influenced by the 
aforementioned factors. It is possible to classify the funded NGOs into four major kinds. Each kind 



















(1) Parenting relations  
The NGOs in this group have been dramatically influenced by the THPF. These NGOs 
have a key mission in health-related policies or services. They were founded after the inception of 
the THPF. For some NGOs, the THPF has even played a pivotal role in initiating them and has 
since been crucial to funding as well as in influencing organisational policy through its 
membership on their boards. They can be seen as ‘manufactured civil society’. They are the NGOs 
engineered by the funding and the initiation of the THPF.  
This does not simply mean that THPF managerial staff are actually members of NGO 
boards. THPF experts or members of PACs or PSCs played a part on NGO boards or even in their 
managerial teams. In this case, a high level of proximity is witnessed between the NGOs and the 
THPF where the latter has heavily invested in and been involved with them.  
Arguably, these NGOs entered a kind of ‘parenting’ relationship with the THPF. Those 
initiated by the THPF have been seen as growing through the THPF’s resources and moral 
principles. They are dramatically, or even totally, reliant on THPF funding. This funding is 
essential to them and the THPF takes an active role in the relationship. It defines the issue of 
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be as a result of the THPF. There are questions raised towards the professionality of these NGOs. 
For example, Dr Pan strongly criticised and questioned such NGOs and their relations with the 
THPF Fund. 
 
I feel that the NGOs should have their own visions and passions. They are not the THPF’s staff… 
Some NGOs were criticised for being servants of the THPF and are always ready to protect and 
defend the THPF. Why not? They are seen as recipients of THPF money… They defend the THPF 
as if they were defending themselves… The THPF should support ones with strong visions which 
are able to work without THPF funding… Now, it is apparent that the THPF is the largest funder 
[of NGOs]. If we support them more, see, it is like we have 200 THPF staff sitting outside the 
office… Right? If the THPF is demolished, I wonder, will they do something else [or continue 
doing NGO work]? (Dr Pan, interview). 
 
These NGOs tend to follow the suggestions of the THPF and its experts when 
implementing projects/programmes. Mostly, the NGOs’ goals are similar to the THPF’s goals. 
This is why they are often criticised for functioning to serve THPF goals. These kinds of NGOs 
are thus struggling to search for autonomy and professionality. Besides, they hold limited power 
with which to negotiate with the funder, especially at what the THPF excels. The prime examples 
of this type of NGO are those working for anti-alcohol campaigns such as the StopDrink Network. 
The StopDrink Network was founded by the initiative of, and has been being supported by, 
the THPF to launch anti-alcohol campaigns and act as a watchdog and voice for an effective 
alcohol policy in Thailand. It was seen as a useful model which uses ‘a hypothecated tax or levy 
on alcohol sales which is then used to fund NGO activity’. It was viewed as a successful ‘model 
of active linkage with all elements of civil society and has taken a proactive role in supporting 
alcohol policy’ (Anderson et al. 2013, pp. 246-247). Such an NGO was often seen by interview 
participants as a ‘child of the THPF’. 
However, the heavy influence of the THPF over an NGO does not totally jeopardise the 
potential of a partnership for the NGO. Mr Tan, a senior officer of the anti-alcohol NGO, critically 
reflected that: 
 
we [the THPF and the NGO] work together. THPF staff have worked with us. Both of us were new 
in the field [when began the anti-alcohol work]. We share the foe which is alcohol. So we do not 
 106 
think of ourselves as field workers of the THPF. We are rather partners. We share responsibility, 
help each other think… Alcohol consumption is a co-mission and a major mission of the THPF. 
They [the THPF] need to share responsibility with us (Mr Tan, interview). 
 
(2) Complementing relations 
Although they are directly working in the health area, these kinds of NGOs have been 
considerably less influenced by the THPF compared to the previous ones. They are seen to be more 
professional in what they do. They were founded and actively operated before the existence of the 
THPF. These NGOs arguably enter a ‘complementing’ type of relationship with the THPF.  They 
can function and continue without the THPF but THPF funding functions to complement the 
NGO’s. It goes well with what the NGOs have already done. 
The NGOs in this kind of relationship can effectively negotiate with the funder. The THPF 
cannot totally occupy the leadership role in the relationship. However, the THPF has played an 
important role in funding and sustaining the operations of these NGOs and has, in turn, been crucial 
to their functioning. Shared experts and committees were also witnessed between the two. This 
type of NGO has shown a close proximity with the funder too. A good example of this kind is 
ASH Thailand, an anti-tobacco NGO.  
 The history of ASH Thailand can be traced back to the year 1986 and its initiation by Dr 
Prawes Wasi, a prominent health thinker who later became one of the most important architects of 
the health system reforms including the creation of the THPF. Ash Thailand is the first NGO 
working to reduce tobacco consumption in the country and has been an active advocate for the 
creation of the THPF. Ash Thailand and the THPF are closely linked. Many successful 
programmes conducted by Ash Thailand were even adopted by the THPF as examples of best 
practice for the other NGOs. Ms Day, a senior officer of the anti-tobacco NGO, vehemently 
expressed her organisational autonomy: 
 
The THPF didn’t dare to change us even though it cut some of our latest budget. Our NGO has a 
clear signature and direction of our own. We are different from an anti-alcohol NGO which was 
initiated by the THPF and then had to do whatever the THPF said. We haven’t operated by 
following THPF orders. No one can replace us. The only thing the THPF can do is to stop giving 
us more work. If it does, we would reject it outright because we know our limits… The THPF are 
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not our parents. We are not like the anti-alcohol NGO which is the child of the THPF (Ms Day, 
interview). 
 
(3) Supplementing relations 
The NGOs in this type can be considered as functioning at the furthest distance from the 
THPF. They were created and fully operational before the THPF came to exist. Their missions are 
out of the health area, yet included as they are linked to the SDH. It appears that they have their 
own signature and a high degree of professionality. Some aspects of their work are even more 
advanced than that of the THPF. They are NGOs working in areas concerning children, women, 
sex and gender, human rights, the environment and the like.  
These NGOs arguably enter into a ‘supplementing’ kind of relationship with the THPF. 
The THPF funding adds an extra element or aspect to the NGO projects. These NGOs are less 
influenced by the THPF. Many of them had experienced a variety of funders, either domestic or 
international. They were capable of finding alternative sources of funding. Such a skill has made 
these NGOs more autonomous. 
Besides, often these NGOs even take a lead in the relationship. They often see flaws within 
the THPF and rely more on themselves.  For example, Mr Jet, a senior NGO worker in a women’s 
NGO, mentioned that his cross-networking working model is more advanced than that of the 
THPF. Much of his collaborative work has functioned without the involvement of the THPF.  
 
I did not run my project through the network initiated by the THPF because I already knew Mr Pen 
personally as has been taking care of the programme I want to collaborate with. So we just 
connected and worked together… One problem of the THPF so far is that it can’t effectively link 
or integrate its internal units [to help networking the partners]. Yet, we [the NGOs] have done it 
already [with our own resources]. What the THPF can do is just supplement our work. (Mr Jet, 
interview). 
 
(4) Niched relations 
These types of NGOs are those which operate in non-health or social-related areas. They 
are less prioritised by the THPF and mostly approach the THPF only for its money in order to 
sustain their work. In interviews, some of them particularly addressed the funding as a window of 
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opportunity to upgrade their work. For instance, Ms May, a senior NGO officer working for family 
relationship development, asserted that: 
 
The THPF is a support. It is the organisation, I think, that has the potential to make a change in 
policy at national level. The THPF should be our linkage. My NGO is a small unit working in local 
areas. The THPF is needed to create an opportunity for us to play a larger role and link us to the 
policy level (Ms May, interview). 
 
Although their areas of work are not in the major plans of the THPF which deal directly 
with major health risks control, it seems that the THPF would like to expand its scope of work to 
cover these areas too. Although it takes the NGOs’ opinions into account, the THPF makes it clear 
that the THPF is ultimately in charge. By casting its ‘shadow’, the THPF practically aims to set a 
perimeter around the NGO work, that is, the direction of the project/programmes granted. 
However, it has often resisted being involved with the implementation of the projects/programmes. 
Arguably, this drives the NGOs into niched relations with the THPF. These dynamic NGOs 
are a small, specialised group which the THPF have dealt with; good examples are family NGOs 
and media NGOs. These NGOs are a minority group within the NGO community. They can be 
considered to be influenced by the THPF because their expertise and signature were not well-
established before the operation of the THPF. The latter would be likely to compete with the NGOs 
to frame the issues and in most cases can dominate, thereby exerting a considerable influence on 
the funded NGOs. For instance, in media policy, the THPF successfully established the ground 
rules for developing the first Thai Public Broadcasting Service (ThaiPBS) (see Siroros and 
Ungsuchaval 2012; Ungsuchaval 2014). Media NGOs were then supported to function in the 
direction of increasing more creative programme content for children and family and a space for 
independent producers. 
Interestingly, these NGOs have potential to be professionalised. Some of them later 
managed to establish their signatures as they are working outside the core THPF area. They could 
negotiate with, or even resist the funder on some important issues. Again, Ms May referred to an 
incident concerning how her NGO resisted the THPF’s suggestion. She said:  
 
We don’t comply with every suggestion the THPF has made. Recently, I disputed with the THPF 
over withholding tax on wages. What the THPF suggested was contradictory to my organisation’s 
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policy. If we had complied with the THPF, we would have broken the rules. I made it clear to the 
THPF that we still wanted to do as we have always done… It might be true that, before getting the 
money, we tended to agree with the THPF’s comments. Yet, when we already had the money, we 
just did what we thought was right. This does not mean that we broke the contract. Our work still 
reached the project’s goals perfectly well, but the means to reach them rather depended on us. When 
the THPF suggested that we added to some aspects of the work, I said ‘it’s fine’. Texts in reports 
could be later written or amended in any way to serve what the THPF wanted. But when the project 
was implemented, it was supposed to be done in our way (Ms May, interview). 
 
However, it is important to note that whatever type of relationship the NGOs are in, 
personal connection remains key to every step of the relationship and granting process. It 
represents a kind of patron-client relationship/tie which is considered as the backbone of 
organisation and informal forms of contract in Thai civil society and societal networks. Formoso 
(2014), reasons that such ties bring a powerful sense of obligation, reciprocity and moral 
indebtedness which are equivalent to the values sustaining the voluntary associations in the West. 
The sense and obligations of such ties were re-told several times by interview participants. It is 
possible to state that the stronger the clientship the NGOs have, the less their autonomy.  
In sum, the interdependent relationships between the THPF and the NGOs are varied 
depending on the context of interacting factors, namely the working areas of the NGOs and the 
time of their founding. They are, in turn, influenced by contingent factors such the degree of 
professionality, signature, and the dependence of the NGOs. The THPF can influence the funded 
NGO while the funded NGOs can exert their agency and negotiate with the funder too. The four 
major kinds of NGOs classified here enter different types of relationship. As a result, together with 
other stakeholders, they tend to have different perceptions regarding the role and the position of 
the THPF. This will be explored in the next section. 
 
5.2 Multifaceted character of the THPF 
 This section argues that different experiences that the stakeholders have with the THPF 
shape the different ways they perceive the THPF. Also, how the THPF is perceived or expected to 
perform by stakeholders influences the extent to which the THPF can extend its capacity to steer. 
This can facilitate as well as constrain the steering of the THPF. This section looks at this issue 
through an examination of ‘perceptions’ of relationships based on how stakeholders perceive and 
 110 
talk about their relations with one another. As CR reminds us, ideas and perceptions are as real as 
physical materials, and the mechanisms of the steering are potentially conditioned by them. 
Perceptions do have causal efficacy significantly influencing and conditioning the relationship and 
the governance arrangement in practice. Tensions in relationships due to dissimilarities in 
perceptions and asymmetries in resources are also given attention. As shown, the THPF-NGO 
relations are complex interdependencies generated by complementarity and tension between the 
THPF and the NGOs.  
It is possible to differentiate distinctive emphases of the role and position of the THPF into 
three major aspects: grantor, alliance of civil society, and health and societal promotion enabler 
(see table 5.2). These aspects are analytically constructed. In reality, they are not mutually 
exclusive. It is possible to see that the role of a ‘health and societal promotion enabler’ overlays 
the other roles. However, these perceptions of different roles and positions shape the capacity to 
steer the THPF in certain ways. 
 
Table 5.2 Perceived roles, positions, and steering capacity of the THPF 
Perceived/expected role Grantor Alliance/infrastructure of 
civil society 






dealing with multiple 
actors in different 
sectors on equal terms 
Social organisation 




strategically dealing with 
multiple actors in different 
sectors 




(e.g. strategic granting) 
 
Market + Network (e.g. 
strategic granting and 
networking, capacity 
building) 
Market + Network + 
Hierarchy (e.g. strategic 
granting and networking in 
the shadow of hierarchy) 
 
5.2.1 Grantor 
The role of grantor is the most basic expectation of the THPF held by all stakeholders. 
Such a view is related to the perceived position of the THPF as a ‘public organisation’ which is 
supposed to interact with multiple actors in different sectors on equal terms. To put it simply, the 
THPF is only expected to be a passive funder whose job is to react to an everyday request-for-
proposal. What the THPF should do is just to grant. Experience of the relationship tends to be in 
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the direction of the grantor-recipient interaction. Granting is perceived as the major mode of 
coordination. 
An interview with Dr Top, a THPF founding member, revealed that ‘the original idea of 
establishing the THPF came from the need to fund anti-smoking work’ (Dr Top, interview). Before 
the THPF, the government budget for anti-smoking programmes was limited. The THPF is 
expected to support the scarcity of government resources. The funding was later developed to 
include broader health promotion work and became what it is at the moment. 
When the THPF is only treated as a funder, money becomes the centre of attention and it 
becomes problematic in two important ways. First, when the THPF is treated as a mere granting 
agency, the interaction it has with the grantees is only about reviewing proposals, completing the 
project/programme granted, and meeting the  required conditions. Such a position denotes that 
everything is about paper and proposal. Development work is reduced to a technical activity of 
writing proposals. However, many parts of the THPF have tried not to be like this and actively 
engage with the innovative developmental work. This is why some NGOs turn against the THPF 
when their proposals are rejected because they only see the THPF as a granting agency which is 
supposed to respond to proposals and then grant funds. They do not expect the THPF to be involved 
with their internal organisation, programme/project development, and the strategic decisions on 
the project proposed. 
Second, as a significant source of money, interview participants from the THPF and the 
NGOs similarly mentioned that the THPF has been under continuous pressure from conservative 
bureaucrats in the MoPH and politicians as they have tried to manipulate the fund for their 
purposes. For them, the THPF mostly is a considerable source of budget. Since the THPF was 
established, there have been political controversies over how the budget ought to be used, with 
many arguing that the budget could be spent for other, more urgent purposes (Wipfli 2015). Some 
governments have played a crucial role in defending the activities of the THPF which, in turn, 
made the THPF and its network grow significantly. Others have obviously tried to abuse and 
oppose the THPF, wanting to get direct control of the use of funds. This observation concurs with 
other research suggesting political intervention in the THPF (see Watabe et al. 2017).  
 Given this, the THPF has used granting to increase the protection of the fund. It granted 
funds to a number of APOs under the supervision of the MOPH to satisfy the bureaucratic 
department. The THPF also granted funds to government bodies and committees to help their 
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policy development process and to develop an alternative mechanism to discuss and recommend 
policy issues directly from civil society to the authorities. It also granted money to organised civil 
society and mass media which resulted in an extensive of network which could become the 
protector of the THPF against state intervention (Watabe et al. 2017). This granting can be seen as 
a strategy to co-opt the stakeholders. Hence, granting is not passively used but strategically 
calculated. 
 
 5.2.2 Alliance/infrastructure of civil society 
The THPF was often perceived as an alliance, or even an infrastructure, of civil society. At 
times, the THPF is a good example of the state appropriation of civil society and non-department 
initiatives (Cohen 2008). The THPF is considered as a product of the neo-liberal state subscribing 
to a new health paradigm which favours non-state actors (Wibulpolprasert 2002). In addition, 
health academics explicitly portray the image of the THPF as sympathetic of civil society. They 
portray the THPF as having the objective to empower civil society and its main portfolios are broad 
based civil society campaigns (Srithamrongsawat et al. 2010). 
Dr Sor, a founding member of the THPF, stressed the importance of the THPF towards 
civil society:  
 
The THPF is a part of national infrastructure which has a mission to support and strengthen civil 
society. THPF itself isn’t a ‘player’, but a ‘platform’ supposed to nurture the development of civil 
society (Dr Sor, interview).  
 
NGO participants, in particular, were likely to see the THPF as a ‘social organisation’ 
favouring organised civil society. They did not treat and expect the THPF to be a public 
organisation. For Mr Pun, a senior NGO worker: 
 
The THPF is the best source of funding in Thailand for civil society, especially in social-health 
development areas… It has a good resilience. It can build a people’s movement and civil society. 
It has brought many innovations and gathered skilled and dedicated people (Mr Pun, interview). 
 
There is explicit evidence that the THPF has advocated the strengthening and the 
development of civil society. For example, as aforementioned, most of the time the majority of 
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grants go to non-state actors, such as NGOs, community organisations and think tanks, rather than 
the state actors (see table 5.1). Additionally, the era of expansion and venture of the THPF, 
discussed in Chapter 4, stresses the point that the THPF has granted and advocated the 
implementation of the law and the institution in supporting civil society as well as creating the in-
house support unit dedicated to the work of segmenting, building capacity, and networking civil 
society partners. Through this, the THPF is using a combination of market and network 
mechanisms such as strategic granting, networking, and capacity building. When the THPF is 
perceived to work in favour of civil society, it becomes more than a grantor. It becomes a supporter.  
 Nonetheless, there are concerns towards this role and position of the THPF. A 
romanticised, depoliticised version of the THPF which is supposed to align with NGOs in whatever 
circumstances is oft-cited among the NGO community. The NGOs were inclined to be 
disappointed in the THPF if it did not function as they expected. Some interview participants even 
demanded that the THPF play a protective role for the NGOs when the latter were investigated by 
the state. Likewise, for them, it is the NGOs and civil society which became the protective shield 
for the THPF when it came under public scrutiny. They are not realistic in seeing the THPF as a 
politicised organisation which can function in a way that might be contrasted with, or even harm, 
the NGOs. The romanticised view of the THPF highlighted by the NGOs also sometimes 
aggravates negative view the government has of the THPF. The government dislikes the THPF 
when it explicitly supports civil society and then subjects the THPF and its NGO partners to state 
control. Sometimes, advocating the THPF to support the NGOs paradoxically restricts the NGO 
movement itself. 
 
5.2.3 Health and societal promotor enabler 
Dr Korn, a senior officer who has been with the THPF since its early years, interestingly 
gave a statement regarding the work of the THPF staff. 
 
I was a health promotor prior to joining the THPF. I promoted health literacy in the community I 
was in. When I am here [in the THPF], I can still be a health promotor. Yet, the better term for my 
current position is a health promotor enabler. The main job of the THPF as a health [and societal] 
promotor enabler is to enable the health promotors [and societal actors] across the country to work 
effectively. It is to develop the health promotors (Dr Korn, interview). 
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For Dr Korn, working in the THPF requires professionality. By being professional, the 
THPF can stay on its original course that is, promoting health and facilitating the health promotor 
as an independent APO. It is convincing to perceive the THPF as a ‘health and societal promotor 
enabler’ because the real objective of the THPF is to enable changes at the national level through 
its resources, not only funding. 
This perception was especially echoed among the executive of the THPF. For example, Dr 
Sor, a founding member and a former executive of the THPF, contended that: 
 
We didn’t expect the THPF’s primary job to provide funding. Funding is just one method to achieve 
the work. The real mission of the THPF is to enable changes. Changes would not happen through 
request-for-project and the funded projects. It is impossible. Therefore, the THPF is supposed to 
stay in the original design, that is, to be clever enough to know that what to do to enable the changes 
and how to do it. Some changes need money. Others may need knowledge and networks… It is a 
matter of strategy that the THPF should employ different tools, engage with different types of 
actors, to make different changes (Dr Sor, interview). 
 
The term ‘strategies’, said Dr Sor, is consequential. It denotes the ability of the THPF in 
strategically dealing with multiple actors in different sectors to reach goals. In this sense, the THPF 
can strongly support civil society if it can reach such goals so as to support the state. Some changes 
should be made through NGOs while others can be made through collaborating with public sector 
organisations. With such an idea in mind, the THPF should not only, or specifically, engage with 
NGOs. Making changes at the national level requires multi-sectoral collaboration and partnership. 
In the partnership, the THPF can only provide strategic direction or even participate in the activities 
of the partnership. This is to be strategic. 
Besides, being strategic encourages the THPF to combine different kinds of steering to 
achieve its ends. Although it is sensible that some changes could be made through budgeting and 
granting, others could be made through knowledge, networking, or social marketing. This function 
was originally designed to distinguish the THPF from other organisations.  However, the THPF 
was originally designed to utilise new modes of coordination rather than older, hierarchical ones. 
Networking and marketing tools are routinely seen as the main functions of THPF operations.  
Being an ‘enabler’ for the THPF means to provide ‘grants, assistance, and expertise’. This 
enabler role performs much of the guidance and collective learning-functions which are seen as 
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defining attributes of new modes of governance (see Sokhi-Bulley 2011). They are steering tasks 
performed by actors with expertise, or more precisely experts. It is not exaggerated to see the THPF 
as a ‘network of networks’. The THPF represents, to many interview participants, a collection of 
multiple actors, or nodes in a rather heterarchical network. Such nodes, in practice, are funded 
NGOs and programme/project managers. As the THPF governance ecosystem is complex, if read 
uncritically, power relations tend to be concealed. 
 
The enabler role and capacity to steer 
Treating the THPF as a ‘health and societal promotor enabler’ gives rich analytical value. 
This thesis suggests that the THPF should be seen as functioning with various kinds of 
mechanisms. It allows the conceptualisation and the analysis of the THPF in a way that the THPF 
can be simultaneously seen as an independent APO and an HPF. Granting is not the only role of 
THPF operations. In relation to its partners, the THPF is ultimately interested in the capacity 
building of its partners. Goals cannot be reached only by granting. Unfortunately, being the most 
visible part to the public, granting is mistakenly seen to occupy all dimensions of THPF functions. 
It resembles the peak of the iceberg which is easy to see but does not constitute the whole (see 
figure 5.2). 
By investigating the THPF in this way, apart from funding which is easier to be 
experienced, there are also other key, underlying functions which have made the granting possible 
and made the THPF become what it is today. They represent the body of the iceberg which 
constitute THPF functions, the part which is hardly seen by the public. For instance, the THPF is 
keen on building networks and then utilising them to achieve goals. Granting and networking 
require the creation of relevant knowledge. They together are made efficient by the flexible 
management of the THPF. 
From this, it is possible to see that the THPF performs various roles in its relationship with 
NGOs. These roles are not mutually exclusive in reality. However, each different role facilitates 
or constrains the ability of the THPF to steer. As a grantor, the THPF is mostly expected to use 
market steering mechanisms such as granting. As an alliance of civil society, apart from granting, 
the THPF is expected to also use network steering mechanisms such as networking and capacity 
building of partners. The steering used in this role is rather more strategic in a sense that it 
privileges civil society actors over the others. 
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Figure 5.2 Iceberg model of THPF key functions 
 
 
Source: illustrated in accordance with THPF interview participants 
 
The role of a health and societal promotor enabler can be regarded as the most sophisticated 
role of all. It is expected to include the tasks and the mechanisms of the previous roles but to utilise 
them in a distinct way. To achieve efficiency and effectiveness, the THPF inevitably performs a 
regulatory role via the help of hierarchical steering. Strategic granting and other strategies are 
implemented in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’. Command and control is needed to supervise the 
direction of the practices in order to secure the stability and the effectiveness of the tasks. The 
modes of governance are coordinated to perform complex health and societal promotion enabler 
role. None of the governance modes alone can be effective for all situations. Hence, the role of a 
health and societal promotor enabler reflects the most complex capacity to steer the THPF. This 
role signifies the potential of metagovernance. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 This chapter is trying to answer the first research question regarding the the nature and 
characteristic of the relationship between the THPF and the funded NGOs. It is suggestive to 
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perceive the THPF-NGO relations in terms of interdependence. The THPF and its NGO partners, 
in practice, rely on each other to operate in the relationship. The relationship the NGOs have with 
the THPF is varied. Four major types of relationship can be specified and when different 
stakeholders engage with the THPF, they experience the character of the THPF differently. Many 
perceptions are identified regarding the roles and the positions of the THPF and these different 
roles are consequential for the capacity of the THPF to steer as the steering is facilitated or 
constrained by what roles the THPF is expected to perform.  
 This chapter suggests that the THPF is better perceived as a health and societal promotor 
enabler. In this role the THPF is expected or perceived to strategically combine different modes of 
governance and deal with multiple actors across sectors and allows the THPF to perform 
metagovernance. The following chapters will investigate the THPF as a metagovernor and how 






















Metagovernance of the THPF (I): interactive governance and the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ 
 
For foreign funders, when they decided to grant, they just granted. They didn’t have any 
interventions after that, but there might have been some conditions… Western funders trusted us 
more than the THPF… They could hire people to monitor us but they didn’t do it. What they did 
was to look at our portfolios and performance or to visit us once a year… They didn’t ask us to 
write a proposal in order to check whether the ideas proposed matched their ideas. They didn’t 
expect what we should do… They also had the strategic frameworks [like the THPF] but they were 
different… [Instead,] the way the THPF uses [the strategic framework] is to guide the course of 
what we do by setting the strategic framework and policy priority for the funded organisations. 
Sometimes it becomes involved in the activities. Moreover, the THPF has implemented many 
stricter rules into the project review process (Mr Wan, interview). 
 
 The statement above was given by Mr Wan, a senior NGO activist who has a rich 
experience in working with foreign and domestic donors and the Thai NGO community. He 
portrayed the THPF as a more interventionist donor than the Thai NGOs have previously engaged 
with. What he said is very interesting in the sense that the THPF seems to perform a role beyond 
a mere granting. It covers strategising, monitoring, and so on. This corresponds to the role of a 
health and societal promotor enabler discussed in the previous chapter. Such a role for the THPF 
is rather novel for the Thai NGO community and is having a significant impact on the sector.  
Responsible for health promotion of the entire Thai population, the THPF is capable of 
taking responsibility for enormous amount money and then spending it on projects through other 
actors. This reflects the role of metagovernance as mentioned in Chapter 2. The THPF has a ‘state’ 
status associated with powerful resources and the tendency to influence and govern activities of 
self-governing actors, the NGOs, through formal legislation, the ‘THPF Act’. Private organisations 
in Thailand alone are not capable of performing such a task. The THPF exercises every capacity 
to be a metagovernor and this thesis argues that the THPF can be considered a metagovernor which 
strategically steers its partners through its interactive modes of governance. 
The following two chapters will investigate the THPF as a metagovernor and how the 
THPF uses and coordinates the different modes of governance as well as steering its NGO partners 
in practice. To begin with, this chapter begins with an analysis of the THPF as a metagovernor. As 
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metagovernor, it deals with strategies and creates a certain governance arrangement which is 
strategically-selective resulting in a structural tendency in the way it steers and coordinates modes 
of governance. The THPF tends to favour the steering of civil society and coordinates interactive 
governance, especially market-driven and network-driven steering. This steering and coordination 
are conducted in ‘the shadow of hierarchy’. The next chapter aims to further examine the key 
mechanisms of metagovernance conducted by the THPF to steer its NGO partners: partnership 
strategy and proactive granting. These key mechanisms are made possible through interactive 
governance and the shadow of hierarchy. 
 
6.1 The THPF as a metagovernor 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the relationship that the metagoverning THPF has created has 
structural ‘tendency’. In other words, as a metagovernor, the THPF deals with strategies and 
creates a certain governance arrangement which is strategically-selective resulting in certain 
tendencies in the way it steers and coordinates modes of governance. This section looks at what is 
privileged or biased, by the THPF and what context gives rise to such a tendency. Although being 
a health and societal promotor enabler engaging with multiple actors across sectors and tools of 
steering, this does not mean that the THPF cannot have a preference for certain actors and tools. 
This section argues that the metagoverning THPF is inclined to privilege the steering through civil 
society and coordinate interactive governance.  
These tendencies can be seen to be derived from the origins of the THPF, discussed in 
Chapter 4, namely the health promotion movement and the agencification movement. The health 
promotion development influenced by the Ottawa Charter has facilitated THPF funding in a 
direction that supports the non-state actors. The funding is strategically selective, having civil 
society actors as the main beneficiaries. Moreover, as an independent APO, the THPF is 
distinctively designed to operate outside central government mechanisms. It utilises interactive 
governance, especially non-hierarchical mechanisms such as those that are market-driven and 
network-driven. Yet, as a part of the state system, the interactive governance is typically conducted 
in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’. These two tendencies are interwoven in practice. Their synergy is 
what makes the metagoverning THPF what it is. Dr Top, a THPF founding member, said that: 
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Having an independent status would help the work of NGOs because traditional bureaucracy has 
not truly recognised the NGOs as partners. The idea of the fund [the THPF] is to give NGOs and 
public agencies that do not work in the health sector an amount of budget to work with. The key 
principle is that the fund must engage non-health sectors to address health (Dr Top, interview). 
 
6.1.1 The metagoverning THPF and NGO sponsorship 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the THPF’s approach to health is to encourage people to take 
greater control over their own health and its determinants, which has in turn increased the role of 
community and civil society activities. It has successfully reframed the issues of health, making it 
relevant to everyone. Health has become the business of the whole society which can be 
collectively solved. As such, the ability to reframe the problem is considered an important attribute 
of a metagovernor because it facilitates the way the THPF has formed its governance arrangement 
and relationship.  
Arguably, the THPF has structural tendencies regarding working partners. It favours actors 
from civil society, typically NGOs, over others. The THPF’s approach to health promotes an 
attempt to mobilise civil society to make changes. The ideal is that the THPF should treat all 
stakeholders across different sectors equally.  
There is convincing evidence to state that the THPF in effect favours NGOs. First, the 
emergence of the THPF can be considered as a progressive movement to include civil society in 
the health sector. Like many other places (see Peters and Pierre 2016), decisions in the health 
policy area had been rather dominated by professional groups and bureaucrats. Civil society has 
been absent in health sector reform for a long time (see Chuengsatiansup 2008). The very existence 
of the THPF reflects the idea of the shrinking state which advocates a major role for the non-
governmental sector and civil society as alternatives to the state and the market. 
Second, the emergence of the THPF also reflects the movement which sought alternative 
funding for NGOs. This has resulted in granting to a large number of projects/programmes 
particularly to NGOs and other people organisations (see Table 5.1). For example, in 2014, the 
THPF spent about 137.3 million US$ (4,874.8 million Baht) of which more than half (51 percent) 
is used to fund non-governmental agencies (THPF 2015). Since its inception, the major beneficiary 
of THPF funding has been mostly non-governmental agencies.  
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Third, NGOs are considered important strategic partners in enabling changes in the THPF. 
One of the most essential THPF working models, the ‘tri-power strategy’ which is derived from 
the ‘Triangle that Moves the Mountain’ (Wasi 2000; Adulyanon 2012), regards social mobilisation 
of NGOs and its equivalent as an extremely pivotal element. Every successful case advocated by 
the THPF involves the active participation of civil society and NGOs (see Galbally et al. 2012; 
Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong 2015; Phusavat et al. 2011). The strategy will be further 
examined in the next chapter as a main mechanism of THPF metagovernance. 
 
6.1.2 The metagoverning THPF and the use of interactive governance 
This section explores the way the THPF, as a metagovernor, utilises modes of governance 
in an interactive manner. It is interesting to see that the independent status of an APO of the THPF 
reflects an attempt to solve health issues by less reliance on hierarchical structures and mechanisms 
while relying more on market and network structures and mechanisms. Although the THPF seems 
to favour non-hierarchical forms of governance, hierarchical mechanisms have never disappeared 
from the governance of the THPF. In fact, THPF activities can never be successful without 
hierarchical steering.  
The establishment of the THPF through the ‘THPF Act’ can be considered as a hierarchical 
solution for addressing health and related social problems. At the most fundamental level, the 
THPF itself is a result of governance at a distance. By this, it means that the relationship between 
the Thai state (that steers) and THPF (that is the object of steering) is hierarchical. However, the 
THPF as an organisation to be steered is given an amount of discretion to develop and implement 
its own policies based on the recognition of self-regulation. The THPF functions in the ‘shadow 
of hierarchy’, typically the ‘THPF Act’ endorsed by the state, which provides regulations on its 
governance and administration. The Act is a hierarchical state solution to generate and coordinate 
health promotion work and keep self-regulation headed towards the general good. Besides, 
institutionally, the state envisions the THPF as a mechanism supplementing the state hierarchical 
steering on public health governance. This makes the health governance arrangement of the state 
qualified, efficient, innovative, and accountable (see Prakongsai 2016). The very existence of the 
THPF is based totally on hierarchical governance.  
Hierarchies can also be observed in organisational bylaws and regulations which regulate 
the conduct of persons and organisations involved with the THPF. Hierarchies are also seen in the 
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implementation and enforcement of grant contracts as they are binding in law. Legal consequences 
are clearly specified and adapted if the contracts are corrupted. However, in metagovernance, 
hierarchical mechanisms can best be witnessed in terms of higher-order steering, the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’, which supervises the interactive governance in order to increase its efficiency. This 
will be further explored in the next section. 
According to Chapter 2, the practice of metagovernance can be witnessed through the 
manifestations of two key interactive governance arrangements: quasi-markets and quasi-
networks. They are key features in the performance of the THPF and its relationship with the 
NGOs. 
 
  6.1.2.1 Quasi-markets: strategic granting 
As stated in Chapter 4, the THPF is a child of the NPM. The basis of the operation 
of the THPF in relationship with its partners, comes from the idea of the principal-agent split, a 
mechanism of quasi-markets. The principal-agent split refers to the division of actors in a 
relationship into two major parties: purchasers of public services who have authority (the principal) 
and providers bound by a contract (the agent) (Ryan, Parker and Brown 2000). The THPF, as a 
grantor (the principal), holds some authority over the funded NGOs bound by a contract (the 
agent). In other words, the THPF purchases services developed or implemented by the funded 
NGOs. The THPF specifies what is needed from the NGOs in contract and creates mechanisms to 
ensure that the agreed goals, outputs or outcomes are reached. The funded NGOs are allowed to 
act as the state delegated agents, or in to be specific, THPF agents. It is believed that this 
mechanism can mitigate the inefficient monopolies of the state. In a sense, splitting principal and 
agent is seen as to shift political control (see Siverbo 2004), moving the responsibility (for health 
promotion work) out of the state agents to the quangos and non-state agents. It signifies a form of 
depoliticisation.  
Apart from this, many THPF operations and tools function in accordance with the 
principle of quasi-market aiming to reach the three E’s-efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. 
Among them, granting is the most prominent mechanism. By categorising the THPF as the 
principle and the recipients as agents, the THPF can use the granting as a tool for strategic 
purchasing by choosing service providers more flexibly and allowing them to give targeted 
prevention services more efficiently. In this sense, the THPF is ‘catalytic and leverages innovative 
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ideas with flexible funding to a wide range of multi-sectoral networks’ (Watabe et al. 2017, p. 
708) .  Grants for the THPF are an indirect, non-hierarchical tool for public action (see Salamon 
2002). 
In practice, the THPF provides grants based on projects/programmes bounded by 
contract for fixed or known periods in the delivery of service or products without legal liability for 
failure to operate. The grants are renewable depending on the performance, impact and plausibility 
of the project. They begin by the involvement of a group of potential partners. The THPF and the 
partners then together develop the projects/programmes. This means that the THPF needs to 
strategically think about what to promote and who will be the suitable partner for a certain project. 
In other words, the THPF does not simply operate with different partners, but rather strategically 
identifies gaps and potential partners. It becomes much more than a mere granter. 
If the grantees cannot reach the expected aims of the project or fail to manage the 
project, the THPF would firstly consult with the grantee to solve the issue. Negotiation is chosen 
as a default strategy to deal with the partners. The THPF will take a lead in damage assessment. If 
the grantee is found responsible, the THPF, using its authority, will terminate the project and then 
order the grantee to return the remaining money. Although there is no legal punishment for failure, 
THPF granting is a form of legal contract which is activated when two parties sign up to it. It is 
also supervised by the state-appointed board. If corruption or any illegal activities are evidenced 
related to the project, the grantees must return all grants obtained since the commencement of the 
project to the THPF plus an amount of interest. In this sense, the contract is legally-binding based 
on hierarchical steering. 
Hence, THPF granting is never solely a matter of market governance but a hybrid 
of hierarchies (regulation), markets (financial exchange), and networks (negotiation and 
partnership). To make the granting strategic and yield better outcomes, networking and partnership 
strategies (see Gabally et al. 2012) are used to shape the direction of the granting and the 
participants of the partnership. The partnership strategies replace the pure market purchaser-
provider contracts. They collectively design the activity with partners, not just 
contracting/tendering. In this sense, under the granting, the recipients are driven to design their 
activities to meet the needs of the THPF and to deal with contracting which unavoidably requires 
an amount of resources for the preparation of contracts and the supervision of work. Thus, 
networking plays an important role in making the granting strategic, while hierarchical supervision 
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plays an important part in ensuring the functionality of the granting. The granting is then rather 
considered a quasi-market mechanism. The way the granting works as a key social mechanism of 
metagovernance will be further discussed in the next chapter. 
 
6.1.2.2 Quasi-networks: networks and partnerships 
According to the Thailand Health Profile 2011-2015 prepared by the Bureau of 
Policy and Strategy of the MoPH (Prakongsai 2016), the Thai national health system is more 
advanced in governance arrangement than other systems in the country because it has used a 
combination of market, network, and hierarchical steering. Partnerships characterised by voluntary 
and horizontal relations between government agencies, bureaucrats and NGOs is witnessed. In the 
system, the THPF is prominently portrayed as dedicatedly using ‘governance by network’ 
emphasising the partnership approach. Significantly, the THPF is believed to link a variety of 
stakeholders and the funded organisations in different sectors, levels, and areas. The THPF’s 
partner network consists of public agencies at policy level, bureaucratic field agencies, community 
organisations, NGOs, and so on.  
Active stakeholder engagement, collaboration with partners to develop and deliver 
programmes, is essential to THPF organisational strategy (Galbally et al. 2012). In developing 
master plans and strategies, the THPF has started to adopt a bottom-up approach involving a 
variety of stakeholders since its early years because it has learnt that stakeholder engagement is 
key to organisational survival (Board of Governance 2005, 16 Jun, item 4.2). Participation of 
stakeholders is evident from the beginning of the project cycle developed by the THPF. Potential 
partners were welcome to discuss the project and further fine tune the project proposal. 
 
Categorising NGO partners 
There are five major types of partnership that the THPF has fostered: the THPF 
itself partnering with other organisations; between-partners through bringing different actors 
together; existing networks, by working through them to enhance networking around an issue; new 
networks by facilitating the existing actors to form a new network; and health promotion networks 
and affiliations (Carroll, Wood, Tantivess 2007). In practice, these partnerships are not mutually 
exclusive.  
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In particular with NGO partners, two major categorisations of NGOs are witnessed 
among the THPF participants. The first categorisation is well exemplified through the interview 
with Dr Korn, a THPF senior officer. He interestingly classified the NGOs using shades of leaf 
colour ranging from ‘light green’ to ‘dark brown’. The ‘light green’ are ideal, friendly NGOs 
mainly providing social services. These NGOs are working in ‘cool’ issues.11 Conflicts with the 
state rarely happen with these NGOs. On the opposite of the green are located the dark brown 
NGOs which aim to make structural changes. ‘Their work is necessary and has an impact on the 
structure of society but inviting opponents. These are the NGOs the government dislikes’ (Dr 
Korn, interview). They touch ‘hot’ issues and are often in conflict with the state. The categorisation 
helps the THPF to properly interact with the NGOs. Dr Korn continued: 
 
Each colour of NGOs has pros and cons. The THPF must properly interact with them. With 
the dark brown, we need to be careful or sometimes avoid them when the opponent is the 
government. The THPF anyway is a state agency. We asked our NGOs working in ‘hot’ 
issues not to show the THPF logo, wear THPF jackets and so on. This isn’t only to protect 
the THPF but the NGOs themselves. The government might not be able to deal any hard 
measures with the funded organisations or individuals but it can suppress the THPF, the 
funder… If the government sees the connection between us and them, and it can’t deal with 
the NGOs directly, the government comes to us. The NGOs will be worse off in the end. 
So why do they need to show any open signs of THPF support in their [hot] activities? For 
the cool works, we are pleased for them to make visible the THPF support. I want them to 
understand that the position of the THPF is ultimately the state agency with the PM as the 
chair. We [the THPF] need to work with the government for the sake of maximising 
performance (Dr Korn, interview).  
 
                                                        
11 In contemporary social development in Thailand, the term ‘cool’ here is used to refer to development and 
welfare- related work which is necessarily not against the state and government policies and is not based on 
confrontation, but negotiation.  The NGOs which usually engage with ‘ cool’  work are thus likely to cooperate with 
or/and receive funding by the state. On the contrary, the term ‘hot’ is used to refer to advocacy-related work which is 
inevitably against the state and the authorities and creating contestation. NGOs which often engage with ‘hot’ works 
tend to be sceptical of the state (see Atchawanitchakun and Vajanasara 2008).  Nowadays, NGOs are not likely to 
engage with ‘hot’ issues, if not necessary, because it can put them in a difficult situation regarding funding opportunity. 
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The second categorisation uses the metaphor of an egg. Seeing the THPF-NGO 
partnership as an egg, there are three important components: the yoke, the albumen, and the shell. 
The yoke represents the inner orbit of the partnership. Only NGOs which are close to the centre of 
THPF power are trusted enough to be in the inner orbit. They are likely to be the NGOs responsible 
for significant programmes and play a regular part in THPF key events. Some of them can even 
help the THPF to decide the direction of the office and the governance of the other partners. It is 
observed that the leaders of the NGOs participating in the meeting with the THPF executives 
regularly, both formally and informally are in this group. The albumen represents the general 
partners which received the THPF granting. These NGOs are given support as necessary. No 
special treatment is provided. The outermost part, the shell, is where the general population target 
of the THPF is located. This categorisation helps the THPF focus on strategic partners to develop 
innovative programmes/projects. 
 
Engaging with NGO partners 
The way the THPF aims at taking stock of the relevant stakeholders implies the 
combination of governance modes. For instance, the THPF has reviewed and assessed situations 
and options of the stakeholders strategically. Hierarchies are used in the identification of who are 
‘opponents’ and ‘friends’ (see Meuleman 2019). It is common for organisations like the THPF to 
have oppositional forces. From interviews, these oppositional forces are mostly politicians, the 
conservative faction in the health sector, and the business organisations negatively affected by the 
work of the THPF such as alcohol and tobacco corporations. Anticipating opponents or 
obstructions is a common routine for the THPF. Ms Gee, a THPF senior officer responsible for 
corporate communication and public relations, stressed the importance of such tasks as a part of 
the strategy of the THPF. 
 
I am dealing with the organisational image… as a part of corporate communication strategy 
(CCS) to the public as well as the staff and partners within the THPF system because I 
have found that even the insiders still misunderstood the THPF… Within the CCS, an 
active approach is taken to deal with organisational risks impacted by news and 
information, that is, to estimate both the positive and negative consequences the risks can 
have on the THPF. My team and I daily analyse the risks and then think up possible 
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responses and how to deal with them. This responses information is also delivered to the 
executives (Ms Gee, interview). 
 
However, the way the THPF has chosen its strategic partners is not constrained by 
written rules and instructions (hierarchies). There is no law which prescribes that the THPF should 
involve certain NGOs. After identifying the potential ‘friends’, networks and markets play an 
prominent part in involving the ‘friends’, or (potential) partners. In practice, the NGO partners are 
selected based on two important criteria: trust (network) and potential contribution (market). 
Referring to Chapter 2, the logic of network suggests choosing societal actors to be 
involved according to trustworthiness and reciprocity. The partners are required to be willing to 
share ideas, knowledge and information. Networks have been used to give a legitimate reason for 
the participation: stakeholder participation leads to better results and acceptance. The NGOs 
obtaining the ‘trust’ of the THPF are likely to access funding easily. Besides, trust is a matter of 
informal connection. Interviews with participants from the THFP and the NGOs concur that 
informal connection plays a significant part for the NGOs to be engaged with the THPF.  
Apart from trust, markets are used to help select those the THPF can closely go into 
contract with. They must be ‘reliable’ partners who can help maximise the efficiency and the 
effectiveness of work. NGO partners have been selected on their contribution to THFP’s 
competitive advantage, mostly based on their ability to show skills and abilities written in the 
proposal. It is important to note that trust and potential contribution can be treated as resources 
which are, in effect, exchangeable. The NGOs can use trust to gain a better position as a reliable 
partner. In a similar way, the NGOs having  a good performance history are regarded as reliable 
partners, which in turn, receive trust from the THPF. 
 
Multiple dimensions of partnership 
The THPF has been respected as a pioneer and one of the most successful state 
agencies adapting and promoting a network governance ( Phusavat et al.  2011; Laothamatas and 
Ratanaset 2014; Lorsuwannarat, Tepthong and Raksuwan 2015) . The THPF proactively and 
strategically executes every programme/project through its partners. Here, the THPF is not an 
operative agent but a catalytic one which heavily invests in nongovernment stakeholders through 
shared ownership of the public good and relies on them to perform the tasks. The NGOs are given 
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a greater role in the THPF ecosystem as agents with the THPF as the facilitator. NGO participants 
similarly admired the THPF for its connection strategy. What Ms Jeep, a senior NGO worker, said 
can best represent the admiration among the NGOs: 
 
Different organisations have already operated within their own areas of expertise. The 
THPF has come to build connections among them, make them see significant linkages that 
have not been seen before… It is like solving jigsaw puzzles, connecting each element to 
see the whole picture. This means that the working process of the THPF is one that invites 
different people, NGOs, and civil society to aim beyond their own projects, KPIs [key 
performance indicators] and activities (Ms Jeep, interview). 
 
Indeed, the THPF partnership has never been solely based on network mechanisms. 
It consists of different elements: contractual, empathetic and authoritative. It is contractual, based 
on market-driven mechanisms of principal-agent division through contractual agreement and 
innovation promotion. It is empathetic, based on network-driven mechanisms of stakeholder 
engagement and networking. It is authoritative, based on hierarchical regulations through 
organisational bylaws and command and control. 
There are multiple aspects of the partnership. The partnership can be seen as 
simultaneously formal and informal. It is formal because it is bound by official contracts which 
specify the terms of relationship, cooperation, and how benefits are arranged. It is a structured 
cooperation between the THPF and the NGOs centred around funding exchange: being the funder 
regulating the funded and the funded trying to reach the agreed objectives. This is a legal aspect 
of partnership involving a degree of risk sharing as the funded NGOs act on behalf of the THPF 
as its agent. Responsibility for the activities albeit run by the funded NGOs is shared by the two 
parties. This formal aspect highlights the partnership as asymmetrical. The THPF is the superior 
partner as it is the one with money and power to govern. Every interview participant in this study 
acknowledged that the formal aspect of the partnership created by the THPF often leads to 
dysfunction in the partnership. Complete mutual trust is difficult to achieve due to the 
asymmetrical power relations between the funder and the funded, and awkward feelings were 
reported by some of the NGO participants. Even for Ms Jeep who admired the THPF, said:  
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Often, NGOs working with the THPF were choked by the THPF through its measurement 
tools, especially strategies and indicators. These tools are continuously implemented in the 
partnership. All too often the THPF forget about the actual purpose of these tools (Ms Jeep, 
interview). 
 
Additionally, the partnership is informal because many activities run by the funded 
NGOs and the THPF are not specifically required by the contract. NGO participants agreed that it 
is this informal aspect of the partnership which allows them to enjoy their autonomy. For instance, 
they can organise and run activities in their own way; they can initiate activities and own the 
results. In cases where they sub-grant to others, they can apply the THPF’s standard to their own. 
This informal aspect also highlights the horizontal, two-way interaction. Both parties within the 
partnership hold different non-financial resources which can be exchanged. Knowledge sharing is 
a good example of an extra activity in the partnership. It is an exchange of their experience and 
intellectual resources which benefits the efficiency of work and the nature of the partnership. It 
highlights ‘trust’ and the informal connection discussed above. The NGOs provide knowledge 
from the field to the THPF, helping to build the reputation of the THPF, while the THPF supports 
the NGOs with technical and academic knowledge. This dimension of the partnership is 
appreciated by both parties. It is particularly seen as cultivating learning development in the civil 
society community. Mr Pun, a senior NGO worker, argued that: 
 
The THPF can be considered as an innovation for civil society because it has more than 
money. It also develops our work and skills… Generally THPF officers, from the directors 
to common staff,  never think of themselves as bosses. They do not hold any prestige 
toward grantees… I’ve met a variety of people when working with the THPF… What the 
THPF has more than money is friends, networks, and knowledge. This is the strength that 
I can’t see in other places. When I’ve dealt with bureaucratic departments, I could only 
follow their formats. That’s all. No friends… [On the contrary,] the THPF allows us to 
learn from others’ work, to help review others’ projects. Hence, in this way, the learning 
development in civil society has grown (Mr Pun, interview). 
 
Within the partnership, the THPF performs as a ‘network integrator’ which points 
out how all parties or entities could contribute to solving the problem. This stimulates information 
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exchange which leads to better policy solutions. It is evident in many projects that, according to 
interviews, both THPF and its partners effectively synchronised their responsibilities, plans, and 
tasks. The partners have dealt with local organisations while the THPF has coordinated with public 
agencies and private firms at the national level. Network governance is used to concretise and 
expand THPF work as well as secure success. The partnership is typically steered through its main 
strategy, the ‘tri-power strategy’ which, as a main mechanism of metagovernance, will be further 
explored in the next chapter. 
 
The interplay between modes of governance 
From interviews, it can be said that a certain mode of governance (often hierarchical) has 
been frequently used to solve conflicts while others (often networks) are used to develop more 
solutions. For example, when there was has been an organisational crisis, centralised command 
and control has been chosen as a strategy to deal with issues. Information and decisions over the 
very organisation are centralised into the executive members plus a chosen few seen to be capable 
of effective and efficient planning and problem solving. A recent crisis the THPF has faced since 
2015 when coming under investigation by government agencies, ordered by the National 
Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), has proven the use of such strategy. Mr Heat, a THPF senior 
officer responsible for policy and strategy, revealed through interview that, to deal with the 
investigation, only members of the executive level consisting of the CEO, deputy CEOs, and the 
higher levels in the Policy and Strategy Section were directly responsible for dealing with the 
crisis.  
 
I told my colleagues that I would take care of it. I started the centralisation strategy to gain 
authority over management. Every decision then was pooled into the centre… This centralised 
strategy is believed to provide coherent direction, efficiency and secure time. When things ended, 
the management resumed to the normal (Mr Heat, interview). 
 
 In contrast, stakeholder involvement is employed to generate solutions and overcome 
wicked problems. Consensual solutions, programmes and projects are developed from 
collaborative planning with partners or potential partners. Hence, it is possible to argue that 
hierarchical governance is performed at a deeper level facilitating the better practice of the 
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networks and markets. This is partly the reason why network and market governance is easier to 
observe. 
Inherent tensions between governance modes in the relationship are high. Hierarchical 
mechanisms can support as well as harm other modes of governance. For instance, the NGO 
participants commented that they often become frustrated when detailed control and regulation 
(hierarchical governance) are launched regardless of reason. Also, networks are often seen as 
problematic and messy compared with hierarchies which feature order and discipline. Interviews 
with THPF senior officers and analysis of the minutes of meetings of the THPF board pointed out 
that when the board was overwhelmed by politicians or state influencers, innovation and 
collaboration with non-state actors were not supported, or even undermined. Granting to the non-
state actors still managed to continue with the support of the THPF office but with bureaucratic 
intimidation and intervention. 
Yet, if used carefully and strategically, hierarchies can raise the effectiveness of the 
networks. Sometimes when the board was in favour of civil society initiatives, 
projects/programmes featuring collaborative networking and civil society initiatives were actively 
supported and widely implemented. Evidence also reveals an association between the board 
favouring civil society and social policy outcomes advocated by the THPF. Many social policies 
benefiting civil society such as the launch of the first ThaiPBS, as mentioned, and the first Thailand 
Social Enterprise Organisation (Sunsaneevithayakul 2013), were found to have a strong 
connection with THPF support.  They were advocated and implemented during the times when the 
THPF was governed by a board recognised for its sympathy with civil society. THPF senior 
officers who have engaged with the board meetings similarly concurred in the interviews that they 
were working ‘more easily’ with the boards that were friendly to civil society. 
The interaction of modes of governance is interdependent and relational. Although in a 
situation or a strategy in which one mode seems to be dominant, the others were running in the 
background. Hierarchical steering was backed by the trust of partners (networks) and granting 
(markets) and vice versa. Sometimes, hierarchical steering was used to deal with conflicts. At other 
times, it was utilised to stimulate the start, and mark the end, of a network process. It appears that 
a hierarchical structure for the THPF was considered to be necessary in order to force the beginning 
of network cooperation on a certain issue which was novel, or involved oppositional actors or 
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fragmented policy community. Likewise, market techniques such as public relations and social 
marketing were used to stimulate civil society involvement (networks).  
 
Combining different modes of governance 
The operation of the THPF is designed to combine different modes of governance in order 
to advocate health promotion. These modes, when implemented, are recombined if necessary. 
From interviews, it seems the THPF executives have considered it natural, or even suggestive, to 
switch or combine between modes of governance when they deemed this necessary. It is 
imperative to note that the matter of utilising and combining modes of governance should not be 
seen as a complete use, and shift between certain modes by replacing one with another at a time. 
Instead, it is more flexible and instrumental. Modes of governance are not mutually exclusive when 
functioning.  
The analysis of the THPF project/programme granting cycle reveals well the combination 
of modes of governance. Four major phases can be distinguished with different governance modes 
or combinations. Prior to contracting, there is a pre-partnership collaboration driven by network 
governance. The THPF and the NGOs collaborate together based solely on trust. No financial 
benefits are involved, and the project/programme is not granted. Then, the partnership is formally 
created and consolidated. The THPF formally grants a project/programme to the NGOs. Contracts 
are made between the two parties. Hierarchical governance takes place in order to formalise 
authority within the board and related staff. Decision-making power is a manifestation of hierarchy 
albeit delegated. Subsequently, a project/programme is implemented together with the execution 
of the formal partnership. The NGOs are the ones implementing work while the THPF is the 
enabler. To enable effectiveness and efficiency, combination modes of governance are executed. 
Market governance is seen in tendering and contractual agreement between the principal and the 
agent. Hierarchical governance is employed in regulation and supervision of the funded 
project/programme. Network governance is used to stimulate non-financial exchanges, assist in 
production of the project/programme, and expand stakeholder participation. Finally, when it is 
terminated, some hierarchical mechanisms might be necessarily involved in cases of misused funds 
or corruption. There is also a matter of succession. This partnership termination and succession 
heavily rely on network governance: networking between organisations and individuals is used as 
a way to maintain commitment, involvement and employment.  
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Shifts in governance modes also happen in daily managerial work to cope with immediate 
challenges. One good example is how the THPF has responded to resistance, namely NGOs and 
organised civil society who have disagreed with the function of the THPF.12 To deal with them, 
the THPF has employed a number of persuasion methods (network steering) and negotiated deals 
using incentives such as funding (market steering). As far as the evidence suggests, there is barely 
a use of power (hierarchical steering) by the THPF to deal with external resistance. The worst case 
that can happen is when the THPF just sanctions or expels the resisting bodies from the network. 
From the THPF perspective, it is clear that hierarchical steering is used to minimise risk 
and increase predictability while network governance is mainly used to increase the satisfaction of 
the parties involved. Market governance is used to maximise advantages. From the funded NGOs’ 
perspective, hierarchical mechanisms motivate them through fear of punishment preventing them 
from breaking the codes or rules. Network mechanisms bring the reward of belonging to a group, 
that is, the NGOs feel they are counted, and market mechanisms lead to material/financial benefits. 
 
6.2 The ‘shadow of hierarchy’: the higher-order steering 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, metagovernance necessarily takes place in the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’. Although the THPF relies more on quasi-market and quasi-network structures and 
mechanisms, as an independent APO, it cannot avoid the shadow of hierarchy. This chapter 
suggests that the shadow of hierarchy can be considered as a manifestation of quasi-hierarchies 
and a higher-order steering, which is essential for metagovernance. For the THPF, the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’ is an indirect exercise of institutionalised state power manifested in forms such as threat, 
symbolic violence, hegemony, governmentality of discipline and control, and so on. As CR 
reminds us, even though it is merely a ‘shadow’, this shadow is real. It has casual efficacy. It can 
                                                        
12 The researcher has encountered such groups during the fieldwork. These societal actors can be mainly 
divided into two sub-groups. The first one comprises the organisations and individuals who have been sceptical about 
the ways the THPF and its network functions. The cause of the disagreement mostly comes from the different ideology 
and strategy. For instance, the THPF is sometimes criticised as a conservative, elite organisation which is against 
democratic principles, and favours lobbying politics rather than social movement (Harris 2015; Ungpakorn 2009, 
2016; Phatharathananunth 2014). Some of them may obtain granting from the THPF merely for financial reasons. The 
second sub-group comprises the organisations and individuals who have experienced their proposals being turned 
downed by the THPF. These groups hold personal grudges towards the THPF. 
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be argued that the shadow of hierarchy and vertical coordination has been cast most clearly by the 
exercise of the state audit and the THPF board: two key hierarchical elements endorsed by the 
‘THPF Act’.  
  
6.2.1 Audit as a practice of verification 
Political intervention is always an overwhelming pressure influencing the governance 
model of the THPF. In particular, networking and partnership with the NGOs through a number 
of empowerment activities has often been contested by the government. Empowered civil society 
is seen as a threat to the government throughout history. According to interviews with the founding 
members of the THPF, there were cases when the THPF was pressured to grant a considerable 
proportion of government projects which were not directly related to THPF values. Yet, the most 
obvious legitimate political/state intervention is done through audit. 
 The hierarchical influence of the state audit is evident as auditing has become a ritualised 
practice of verification focusing more on the production of managerial and organisational 
legitimacy (Power 1997). The state has employed auditing to cast its shadow of government on 
the operation of the THPF thereby regulating the functioning of the THPF’s work.  
 Auditing has been frequently exploited by the government to regulate and control the THPF 
and its network since the THPF’s inception. The government has often demanded the Office of the 
Auditor-General and a special panel such as the Monitoring and Auditing Committee on Fiscal 
Expenditure, to investigate the funding of the THPF as a reason to control the fund and damaging 
the contesting social forces (Post Reporter 2015). For example, in 2015, the government accused 
the THPF of the misuse of funds and ran a series of intense investigations resulting in the budget 
freeze which had an impact on the funded NGOs across the country (Wangkiat and Mahitthirook 
2016). The funded NGOs faced severe tax investigations. Some of them were required to pay back-
taxes dating back five years, plus fines. The government targeted funds earmarked for ‘non-profit’ 
activities and claimed that such funds were ‘revenue’ on which tax must be paid (Post Reporters 
2016b). At first, it seemed that the government did not understand the connection between the 
‘non-health’ projects/programmes granted and the THPF. However, this event later turned out to 
be a political strategy to gain control over the THPF and its networks.  
As a result, auditing for large scale projects/programmes was tightened. 
Projects/programmes funded by the THPF with grants of more than five million baht a year must 
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now seek approval from the government auditing committee before the grants are transferred. 
During the interviews, every NGO participant similarly censured this governmental act and framed 
it as a state attempt to control civil society. Indeed, the projects/programmes which were allowed 
to continue after the investigation, according to the PM order, must be either (1) focusing on health 
promotion as traditionally defined such as exercise, and alcohol and tobacco consumption control, 
or (2) showing some links to the government-initiated programme, ‘Pracharat’ (state of the 
people) (Rujivanarom 2016). Projects/programmes which were not in these two categories had to 
be amended and resubmitted for approval. 
This serious state auditing and the manipulation of the governance and the funding of the 
THPF starting from 2015 led to the (ongoing) attempt to amend the ‘THPF Act’ by the 
government. Personal observation from the public hearing for the amendment of the act revealed 
that the amendment revolved around three important issues which caused widespread reaction 
from civil society: capping the THPF annual budget at four billion baht (around 120 million USD); 
moving the funding to come under the regulation of the Finance Ministry’s Management of Capital 
Circulation Act, adding an additional approval step; and replacing a number of non-state members 
on the board with state ones (see Pongutta et al. 2019; Post Reporters 2018). Unquestionably, this 
can be seen as a state attempt to regain control over, as well as weaken the THPF and its network: 
to clip the wings of civil society. 
 
6.2.2 The board of governance as a legitimate hierarchical supervision 
The hierarchical influence over the THPF board is evident in two important ways: the 
authority of the board to select, ratify or rebuff applications for the funding; and the role of the 
board in monitoring and regulating the work of the THPF office and its partners once the funding 
has been granted.  
According to section 21 of the ‘THPF Act’, the board has the powers and duties to control 
and supervise the operation of the THPF for the attainment of organisation objectives. The main 
powers include determining administration policies and approving the THPF action plan; to 
approve an annual action plan, an annual financial plan as well as an annual budget for the office; 
to prescribe rules and procedures for the appropriation of money to be expended as subsidies to a 
variety of activities; to raise funds; and to supervise the performance and administration of general 
affairs and to issue rules or regulations of the THPF. 
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The board is thus responsible for the strategic supervision of the THPF: being an arbitrator 
which establishes the rules for the funding and then deciding who obtains the funding. In other 
words, the board is a key political authority within the systems of metagovernance which both 
establishes the ground rules of governance and arbitrates over funding and governing choices and 
conflicts. It designs the conditions under which governance takes place and shapes the context 
within which partnerships are forged. In this regard, it is clear to see that THPF partnerships have 
been constructed and embedded within the prevailing hierarchies of the state. 
 
Categorising the manifested ‘shadow of hierarchy’ 
According to Whitehead (2003), three main mechanisms for governmental control in the 
shadow of hierarchy can be categorised: the production of strategic frameworks and guidance 
notes; monitoring and assessment; and the use of tactics of discipline. All of them are considered 
indirect mechanisms of governmental control. Applying it to analyse the practice of the Board, the 
actual operation of the board is summarised in the table 6.1. 
 
(1) Establishing frameworks and guidance for the operation of the THPF and its 
partnerships is a key role of the board. Among a variety of frameworks established, the funding 
guidance is considered one of the most important and strategic. Through the strategic framework 
such as the funding guidance, the board establishes a clear procedure on what and how to fund to 
the partners/applicants and ensure strategic funding. By establishing the standard funding 
procedure, the THPF can keep operations on track. Such funding guidance does not only include 
the way of funding and what to (and what not to) grant, but also the operational structure, the 
strategy, and the monitoring and evaluation of the THPF regarding funding. Another important 
strategic framework given by the board concerns the master plans which give the direction on what 
should be the strategic focus of the THPF and its granting. These plans are already explained in 
the Chapter 4. 
The frameworks are indeed essential to the governance and metagovernance of the THPF. 
They define how the THPF should relate itself with partners and stakeholders, which has already 
been explored in the previous chapter. Besides, the strategic framework is structurally biased 
prioritising certain actors and strategies over another as aforementioned. They are ‘strategic’ 
because they identify different, unequal interests to serve certain purposes. 
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Table 6.1 Mechanisms for governmental control of the THPF’s board 
Board operations Governmental techniques 
(1) Strategic frameworks and guidance -Funding guidance 
-Master plans and strategic funding 
-Financial control of the fund release 
-Operation guidance 




-Output and outcome measurement (key indicators) 
-Management system audits 
-Calling in of individual projects 
(3) Discipline -Designation of an accountable body 
-Conflict of interest (COI) protocol 
-Project appraisal approval 
-Funding based on the relevant 
-Intervention 
Source: the analysis is mostly based on the investigation of minutes of THPF board meetings between November 2003 
and November 2006. The minutes for this period were the only records the researcher was allowed to access during 
the fieldwork. 
 
(2) Under these frameworks, the THPF’s operation and partnerships are carefully 
monitored throughout their operative steps through an array of administrative procedures and 
control mechanisms held by the board. These checks were launched on a variety of temporal scales 
ranging from annual reports to more regular checks on agreed milestones, progress reports, and 
calling in of individual projects. 
The board did not just approve annual reports but also commented on the making of the 
reports, which in turn helps building the image of the THPF. Interestingly, detailed comments were 
given such as ‘avoiding bureaucratic report’ (Board of Governance 2004, 28 Jan, item 4.1) and 
‘using rural images rather that urban ones’ (Board of Governance 2004, 25 Feb, item 4.1) in order 
to create an image of the THPF as a new state agency that is not a bureaucracy and is dedicated to 
development work. In addition, the board is regularly kept updated on the progress of THPF’s 
work in order that it can plan and decide a strategic granting to certain areas. Progression reports 
regularly happen in board meetings. Sometimes, the board calls in individual projects to investigate 
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some problematic issues. A series of rigorous checks and reports is believed to help the board 
monopolise organisational intelligence which is an important element for effective 
metagovernance (Jessop 1997).  
Another important monitoring and assessment task of the board is to develop and 
implement the KPIs. In practice, the development of the KPIs is outsourced like many other tasks; 
yet the final decision on the use of the KPIs and how to use them depends on the authority of the 
board. Such KPIs are essential for the functioning of the board in terms of governance and 
monitoring systems as well as strategic development of the organisation. Throughout the history 
of the THPF, the KPIs have occasionally been revised and updated in response to the evolving 
complexity of the THPF and its partnership. The board also has the authority to set the internal 
compliance and audit which is an important mechanism to monitor and assess the function of the 
THPF. The result of the audit has been regularly reported to the board. 
 
(3) The strategic frameworks and monitoring are supported by the exercise of discipline. 
The way the THPF funding allocated to projects/programmes is based on the significant, the 
relevant, and the returns of the projects/programmes proposed, confirms a degree of discipline and 
associated conformity in the sense that the applicants must identify and align the objectives and 
priorities of the projects/programmes with the THPF’s.  
The issue of managing COI is said to be a challenging task for the board to perform. 
Studying the meeting minutes of the THPF board reveals that it had spent a significant amount of 
time trying to establish a clear protocol for the COI and things which a board member must avoid. 
Such protocol creates a discipline, namely a code of conduct, of being a board member, and has 
been applied to different levels of governance within the THPF. It appears that every board 
member strictly follows the protocol. For instance, if involved with the matter being considered in 
any sense, the member him/herself asks to leave the room unless the board agrees otherwise.   
Indeed, monitoring and assessment can also be seen as a disciplinary force to keep the 
partners on track and ensure the efficiency of the recipients. Inefficient or failing partners would 
not face punitive strategies unless illegal issues were involved. COI of the partners or a committee 
member of any level is commonly seen to receive a punitive response such as discharge. This issue 
is closely linked with political intervention. 
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The board and the government 
The shadow of hierarchy is not only assisting in the formation of the governance structure 
but also threatening and inhibiting the autonomy of the governance structure and governance 
network (Whitehead 2003, 2007). This is mostly exemplified in a case of a political intervention 
of the Board. Whether the THPF and its governance network have been running in the shadow of 
hierarchy is dependent on the extent to which the state can manipulate the direction of THPF 
governance, the Board.  
Although the government itself, led by the cabinet, appears to have given a more legitimate 
and efficacious shadow of hierarchy, the transfer of responsibility for the board from the 
government is seen as a less interventionist manner of administration due to the nature of the THPF 
as a quango, and its work. Nevertheless, as the board, in principle, is chaired by the PM, the cabinet 
resolution has impacted upon the THPF. The THPF has always been asked to respond to the 
cabinet resolutions. For sensible demands, the THPF has been ready to follow. For example, 7 out 
of 13 plans in the three-year master plans (2005-2007) were launched to directly meet the need of 
the cabinet resolution (Board of Governance 2005, 2 Mar, item 4.1). Yet, for unreasonable 
demands, the THPF has not passively obeyed. For example, in 2004, the government requested 
half of the THPF annual budget to spend on advertising a government road accident prevention 
campaign (Board of Governance 2004, 28 Jan, item 1). The request did not have a passive response 
from the THPF as it did not match well with what the THPF should really promote. Besides, the 
THPF cannot just give money; proposals need to be made for the reviewing processes. This proves 
that the attempt to manipulate the THPF fund by the government was unreasonable. Besides, there 
were occasionally proposals, especially in the early years of the THPF, from government 
departments which asked for money to buy durable goods or create an organisation; the THPF 
does not have a policy to grant such proposals. The government thus had a narrow vision on how 
the THPF funding works and what should be supported. 
Moreover, the government has framed health promotion in a different way from the THPF. 
For instance, in a Board meeting in 2005, the PM for the first time gave a speech on health 
promotion.13 His view on health promotion was based on an ‘order and security’ mindset: healthy 
                                                        
13 This was the first time the PM himself attended the meeting since the establishment of the THPF; most of 
the time the deputy PM has in fact acted as the chair of the board. 
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people are those who are safe from illness, drugs, and accidents. They generate social security and 
order. To promote health is to promote ‘safe’, docile and legal behaviour (Board of Governance 
2005, 21 Apr, item 4.2). This reflects the authoritarian view of health promotion. Nevertheless, the 
THPF interpreted health promotion in a more communitarian way believing in self-governing 
networks and healthy people as those who are able to take care of themselves and their 
communities. 
The attempt to manipulate the THPF also often came in a less interventionist way. For 
instance, the government through the MoPH once mentioned that THPF plans should have 
operated in concert with the health policies of the government. The THPF should not work 
separately. It even recommended that the THPF should work more closely with the government 
and the MoPH (Board of Governance 2004, 25 Feb, item 4.1). On the one hand, this pointed to a 
better integration in implementing the national health policy. On the other hand, it can be argued 
that the government demanded the THPF to serve the government’s agenda, jeopardising the 
autonomy of the THPF as a quango. 
Rejecting the requests and proposals from government departments sometime yielded 
negative consequences and conflicts for the THPF. Suspension and termination of certain board 
members was occasionally seen as a political tool to take revenge on the THPF. Many interview 
participants similarly pointed to the event in 2004 as a good case of political intervention when the 
government discharged the second chairman of the board from the position without informing or 
asking for the approval of the board - as a result of the conflict between the government and the 
THPF. The power of the second chairman has also been significantly reduced since then (Board 
of Governance 2004, 12 Nov, item 4.1). The conflict disrupted the functioning of the board and 
the THPF for several months. Board meetings could not regularly be held although they are 
supposed to be held monthly. There was no the meeting for five consecutive months. Many of the 
THPF projects were delayed. Likewise, recently in 2016, the THPF witnessed one of the starkest 
uses of hierarchical power to manipulate the board when the PM suspended seven THPF board 
members because of an alleged conflict of interest under a special order, Section 44 of the interim 
charter.14 Indeed, it was seen that the military government would like to reduce the number of 
board members from the civil society side as all of the suspended members were from civil society 
                                                        
14 Section 44 of the Interim Constitution of 2014 provides the PM as the leader of military government the 
final, absolute power to issue any order which shall be deemed lawful and constitutional. 
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and supporters of THPF pro-civil society programmes. This event also disrupted the operation of 
the THPF for a while. 
To mitigate or prevent the (potential) conflict, the THPF has learnt to occasionally grant 
what was proposed by government departments if it was not totally irrelevant to its mission. This 
is believed to be a negotiation strategy to keep the THPF running. Granting, in this sense, is not a 
mere economic tool but has become a deliberate political tool. Granting as a political tool has not 
been used only to deal with the state but also with the business sector. For example, the THPF has 
begun to grant a significant amount of money to sports associations in order to advocate the 
separation of alcohol sponsorship and sports events (Board of Governance 2005, 17 Nov, item 
3.2). Such granting was strategic because it aimed to advocate beyond immediate cause (sports 
events) to ultimately advocate the reduction of an unhealthy practice (sponsorship by alcohol 
companies) in health-related activities.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 The THPF represents an organisation with powerful resources and a tendency to steer, 
which makes it a qualified metagovernor in the THPF-NGO relations. What was discussed in this 
chapter directly aims to deal with the second research question: how are the funded NGOs steered 
and metagoverned by the THPF? 
This thesis argues that the THPF as a health and societal promotor enabler indeed performs 
metagovernance. The metagovernance of the THPF is strategically selective favouring civil 
society and NGOs and non-hierarchical mechanisms of governance. Specifically, granting (quasi-
market) and partnership (quasi-network) are favoured. Yet, hierarchical steering does not 
disappear from the THPF’s governance. It is interestingly manifested in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, 
through the state audit and the exercise of the board, in which the metagoverning THPF operates. 
The presence of the shadow of hierarchy reminds us that the THPF power to steer can always be 
pulled back by the centre (or the state) and then imposed more directly. In this sense, it is 
imperative to recognise the close, but complex, relationship between the state and the THPF and 
how the shadow of hierarchy operates in practice vis-à-vis interactive governance. As the THPF 
strategically utilises different modes of governance, it knows exactly when each mode, alone or in 
combination, is needed. The next chapter will further explore two key mechanisms of 
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metagovernance of the THPF: granting and partnership. The metagoverning THPF has a typical 
































Metagovernance of the THPF (II): partnership strategy and proactive granting 
 
As a metagovernor, the inherent task of the THPF is to influence social interactions in a 
way that the NGOs, as social self-organisations, and the state, including the THPF itself, are made 
complementary. The THPF, to a certain degree, represents the coordination capacity of the state 
towards the non-state actors. How the THPF acts exhibits the ability of the state to metagovern by 
the strategic construction of institutional designs which endeavours to, on the one hand, increase 
the self-regulating capacity of the NGO network while, on the other hand, retain, or even enhance, 
the coordination or governance capacity of the state. 
 According to Rakyutidharm (2014a), the successful partnership between the THPF and 
the NGOs is significantly derived from the ability of the THPF, rather than the work of the NGOs 
themselves, in engaging the NGO partners to work with and support the THPF and its partnership. 
In doing so, the THPF allows the NGOs to keep their autonomy and original missions, although 
they share a common working agenda. The THPF is political and strategically exercises its power 
as a metagovernor. This was discussed in the previous chapter. 
One major challenge of metagovernance concerns the position of the THPF towards the 
NGO network. The state capacity is heavily dependent on the development of closer state-society 
relations. If the THPF is too insulated from the social actors it will struggle to pursue its goals. On 
the other hand, if it is too close, the THPF risks ending up being captured by the NGOs who are 
seeking to develop closer relations (see Bell and Hindmoor 2009). In fact, one of the major tasks 
of THPF staff, especially the management - as indicated in their job description - is to support and 
manage the relationships among and between, the partnerships, networks, and relevant 
stakeholders. Therefore, the relationship between the THPF and the NGOs needs to be positioned, 
steered or metagoverned, so that THPF goals are effectively achieved rather than those of the 
NGOs.  
 This chapter explores the way the key mechanisms of metagovernance are conducted by 
the THPF to steer its NGO partners in practice. Two major mechanisms associated with quasi-
networks and quasi-markets are identified respectively:  the ‘tri-power strategy’ (partnership) and 
the proactive granting scheme. 
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7.1 Governing NGO partners: the ‘tri-power strategy’ 
Although THPF work is executed by the THPF office, they would not be successfully 
achieved without a wide variety of networks and partners who develop and carry out a range of 
programmes and projects.  The THPF facilitates collaboration both within government across 
departments and outside of government across sectors.  At the core of how the THPF operates is a 
certain institutional design, the so-called ‘tri- power strategy’ model (Adulyanon 2012; see figure 
7.1). The model is derived from the aforementioned idea of the ‘triangle that moves the mountain,’ 
originally initiated and echoed by Dr Prawes Wasi, a prominent thinker of health promotion and 
civil society and a respected THPF advisor. 
 











Source: adapted from Wasi (2000, p. 107) 
 
The model, claimed as the basis of many policy successes (see Wasi 2000; Thamarangsi 
2009; Galbally et al.  2012), essentially suggests that to move the immovable ‘mountain’ (a 
metaphor for complex social problems and inertia), it is imperative to reinforce the three 
interconnected angles: knowledge, social movements and political/policy involvement. The lack 
of any of the angles, especially social movement, likely leads to failure in solving difficult 
problems (Wasi 2000). Each of THPF’ s activities is developed based on this conceptualised 
strategy. The first angle highlights the need for knowledge generation through research and its 
translation into a form that can empower the public. Sufficiency of relevant knowledge helps 
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societal power to move in the right direction. This highlights knowledge management as a 
foundation for advancing the technical capacity of health promotion professionals and advocating 
changes. The second angle involves with the facilitation of social movement, and perhaps the 
organisation of civil society, to support the transformation of the knowledge generated into policy. 
The combination of the first and the second helps convey the demand for authorities at the third 
angle: the political angle. In this respect, society must take a lead in social change with support 
from the others. It is important to note that in Thailand, the strengths of professional associations 
and NGOs have greatly contributed to successful public campaigns, especially health- and social-
related issues. As a result the THPF has been particularly recognised as a pioneer for adapting and 
deploying the networked government approach (Phusavat et al. 2011). This final angle is focused 
on the authoritative aspect, namely government and state power. The movement needs to find 
suitable mechanisms to engage the political authorities and policy-makers because they ‘have 
authority over utilisation of state resources and in law promulgation, which are very often needed 
in development. Thus without political involvement the working structure is not complete. Politics 
without knowledge and social movement will not do’ (Wasi 2000, p. 107). Therefore, academic 
institutions and think tanks, social movements and organised civil society, governmental agencies 
and policy-makers are, respectively, crucial actors. This political angle implies that, to achieve a 
goal, intersectoral collaboration is advocated. Political authorities are welcomed rather than being 
shunned. This emphasises the importance of policy advocacy strategies, especially ones that lead 
to contact with authorities employed by the movement. 
For the THPF, the triangle represents three different kinds of partners with different 
personalities. The ‘tri-power strategy’ model, as the THPF’s in-house operative strategy, arguably 
extends the power of the three angles. The THPF claims the model as one of the most socially 
innovative methods for achieving policy changes (Innovation Support Unit 2016, 2017). Using the 
tri-power approach, the THPF has never acted merely as a ‘ sponsor’  but ‘a health and societal 
promotor enabler’. The role of the THPF has diversified in the partnership to include the role of 
expert stakeholder, partner, facilitator, advocate, system and capacity builder, and change agent. 
In other words, what the THPF does is to organise resources - often belonging to others - to produce 
public value within the web of multi- organisational, multi- governmental, and multi- sectoral 
relationships generated through the idea of the Triangle. In this sense, the THPF advocates the 
transfer of resources among actors across different sectors in a formulated network.  
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The ‘tri-power’ strategy is believed to particularly exhibit its strength in the most prominent 
and original working areas of the THPF: alcohol consumption control, tobacco consumption 
control, and accident prevention. 
 
(1) Alcohol consumption control 
In alcohol consumption control, the THPF funded the establishment of the Centre for 
Alcohol Studies (CAS), run by the Health System Research Institute (HSRI), in 2004 as the first 
national research institute for the reduction of consumption and alcohol-related harm. The CAS 
has successfully become the core of alcohol-related knowledge activities, the knowledge angle. 
For the social movement angle, the THPF has funded the creation and the operation of the 
StopDrink Network (SDN), a coordinating NGO body dedicated to alcohol reduction. Many 
activities of the movements have become viral over the country and generated a widespread public 
impact (see Sathapitanon et al. 2006). It is one of the most popular movements in contemporary 
Thailand. For the last angle, the political involvement, the THPF has funded the capacity-
strengthening projects for public agencies. One of them is the Tobacco and Alcohol Consumption 
Control Unit (TACCU) of the MoPH which aims to strengthen regulatory enforcement and to 
launch social campaigning programmes. The THPF also sponsored many sporting and religious 
activities organised by government agencies to ban drinking within certain areas. THPF work in 
alcohol consumption control well reflects the application of the Triangle (Thamarangsi 2009). 
The THPF performed a complementary role in coordinating, rather than replacing, existing 
structures/agencies but when there was a need to create new structures/agencies, it did not hesitate 
to do so. The creation of the CAS and the StopDrink Network exemplifies the role. Therefore, 
alcohol control is one of the most successful programmes of the THPF which was seen as the 
mastermind for anti-alcohol movements. It has shaped the social climate for alcohol through a 
series of public campaigns and indirectly influenced the process by sponsoring its partners such as 
the SDN and proactively working with the National Alcohol Consumption Control Committee 
(NACCC) (Thamarangsi 2008), where at some points it was chaired by the Vice-chair of the 





(2) Tobacco consumption control 
In tobacco consumption control, the work was started long before the establishment of the 
THPF itself. Thailand had some of the world’s strongest anti-tobacco legislation and an active 
movement even before the work of the THPF (see Chantornvong and McCargo 2001). However, 
with the support from the THPF, the community has been institutionalised through the stable 
funding and the strategic framework driven by the tri-power strategy.  
Research and knowledge has played a very important part in tobacco control in Thailand 
(see Hamann et al. 2012). In 2005, the THPF funded the creation and the operation of the Tobacco 
Control Research and Knowledge Management Centre (TRC) under the supervision of the Faculty 
of Public Health, Mahidol University. This is one of the first attempts to establish a solid link with 
universities as partners ‘in the knowledge angle’. An interview with Ms Woo, a senior THPF 
officer responsible for the creation of the TRC as well as the CAS, revealed that creating a 
connection with universities fulfilled the missing link in THPF’s work because they have a 
typically academic capacity that no other organisations have. It is also believed by the Board that 
it can help increase the success rate of the project/programme (Board of Governance 2005, 19 
May, item 4.1). 
 
The establishment of the TRC is different from that of CAS… We’ve tried to put the CAS under a 
university as well but it was extremely hard to find a suitable one. Most of the universities could 
not support the CAS as their alumni associations somehow have a relationship with the alcohol 
industry. Alcohol corporations sponsored many university events (Ms Woo, interview). 
 
In the social movement angle, the THPF is closely linked with NGOs such as ASH 
Thailand, an NGO working in the tobacco reduction area long before the THPF. ASH Thailand is 
an NGO regarded as professional and expert in the field. It has received funding from the THPF 
continuously since its inception through several programmes. ASH Thailand also hosted several 
figures that have an influence over the THPF and the policy area in general. Its senior advisor was 
a founding member and at one time the Vice-chair of the THPF board, and has been regarded as 
one of the main champions of tobacco control in the world. Apart from supporting the existing 
organisations, the THPF sponsored the formation of the Thai Health Professionals Against 
Tobacco (THPAT) and Teachers Against Tobacco Network (TATN) in 2005. These networks have 
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operated across the country and helped increase the involvement of health professionals and 
teachers in tobacco control.  
 In the angle of political involvement, the THPF has worked closely with the Bureau of 
Non-communicable Diseases of the MoPH, the key state actor in tobacco control. Regarding 
taxation, the THPF has collaborated with the Excise Department and the Customs Department as 
it has strongly advocated the rise on tobacco tax. The THPF has also cooperated with the police 
and the MoPH when the regulation is needed. The tobacco control area represents a model where 
multiple stakeholders are tightly connected (see Termsirikulchai et al. 2008). 
 
(3) Accident prevention  
As with the case of alcohol consumption control, the THPF funded the establishment of 
the Road Safety Research Centre run by the National Health Foundation (NHF). The centre has 
become one of the most strategic units to generate relevant knowledge to develop policies and 
measures in the area of accident prevention. The NHF was a temporary host for the centre; after 
operating for several years, the centre separated from the NHF and has its own foundation, the so-
called ‘Road Safety Policy Foundation’ operating as an academic-based NGO for policy advocacy. 
 Social movement is essential for the advocacy of accident prevention. The THPF have 
recognised that road accidents cannot be prevented entirely by police enforcement. The Accident 
Prevention Network (APN) was sponsored as a social mechanism to deal with local agencies and 
organisations while the THPF itself is focused more on the coordination with public and private 
organisations at the national level. 
 The accident prevention area proved to be a case where many governmental agencies are 
involved with the activities. These include the Department of Highways under the Ministry of 
Transport, the Royal Thai Police Department, Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation 
under Ministry of Interior, the MoPH, and the Department of Corrections under Ministry of Justice. 
Because of the nature of the area, regulatory power is needed. Also, analysis of THPF Board 
meeting minutes between November 2003 and November 2006 shows that many cabinet 
resolutions instructed the THPF to support measures in order to improve road safety activities in 
Thailand. This is the area where political authority is strongly involved. 
 Each angle played a different role in each stage of the policy. Together, the THPF and the 
research centre performed as a network integrator pointing out how all relevant actors could 
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contribute and solve the problem while the APN and the government agencies performed 
extensively during the implementation phase (Phusavat et al. 2011). 
 
 7.1.1 The different balance of the triangle 
In all three cases, there are many common points. Indeed, each area demonstrated a 
combination of knowledge, social movement, and political authority. Relevant actors from the 
three angles are connected through the help of the THPF and form the basis for the application of 
the tri-power. More importantly, the THPF similarly granted funds to create new relevant research 
institutes and to institutionalise the knowledge angle, be they a think tank under a government 
department, a centre under a university, or a foundation. This stresses the importance of 
knowledge-based policy and knowledge management.  
However, in each area discussed above, each angle of the tri-power strategy played a 
different and unequal role within the partnership. In other words, the power of each angle is not 
similarly actualised on a similar level in different policy areas. The triangle is, in effect balanced 
differently according to which aspect is highlighted: the knowledge aspect is the key to tobacco 
control; the social movement is the highlighted aspect in alcohol control; and the political 
authorities are dominant in the area of accident prevention. The different balance of the triangle 
can be illustrated in the figure 7.2, which is based on the interviews. 
 































Arguably, four important factors can be listed as an antecedent responsible for the 
differently balanced triangle. First, there is a difference in the nature and characteristic of the 
problem of interest of each network. For alcohol control, the issue is highly contested involving 
social and cultural dimensions. There is no established solution to the issue. This is in contrast 
with the issue of tobacco control and accident prevention where consensus was likely to be 
established. There is an agreement on the negative outcomes of smoking and accidents. Moreover, 
the accident prevention issue has never been much opposed by businesses and the Excise 
Department in contrast to the opposition experienced by the anti-tobacco and anti-alcohol NGOs. 
Second, the differences in the participation dimension of the network are also worth 
considering. In alcohol control, wide civil society engagement and social mobilisation are common 
practice. The network is open and societal-led. Mr Tan, a senior officer in an anti-alcohol NGO, 
mentioned several times during the interview that the NGOs have taken a central role in the 
network: ‘we are like a secretariat. We connect stakeholders… Normally, they [the public 
organisations] can do their work. But by inviting them to work with us, NGOs, they get a higher 
profile with the public’ (Mr Tan, interview). On the contrary, the network is rather close in tobacco 
control and accident prevention issues. The tobacco control network is technical and professional, 
occupied by a group of experts and medical doctors. The accident prevention network is 
government- and bureaucratic- oriented because it involves authorities and law enforcement 
agencies.  Government agencies took a lead in the accident prevention, and civil society initiatives 
play a limited role in these two networks.  
 Third, in terms of leadership in the network, strong leadership was found in the areas of 
tobacco control and alcohol control. The difference between them is that the leadership in alcohol 
control is rather centralised having a single direction while that in tobacco control is contested 
having multiple schools of thought. In contrast, the leadership in accident prevention network is 
weak and fragmented; a variety of stakeholders and authorities have engaged in the issue with their 
own agendas and expertise. It is difficult to see any centralised leadership in this network.  
Fourth, the direction of the partnership is heavily dependent on the abilities of NGOs to 
steer the relationship in their favour. Interviews with the NGO participants prove this point well. 
If the NGOs can manage to expand their horizon to non-financial exchange, they are able to steer 
the funding as exemplified before, through the discussion of the programme-funded NGOs. 
However, the NGOs in the major areas of the THPF are unfortunately seen as being less expert 
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when it comes to discussion of the technical solutions to the ‘health’ problems. They are often 
regarded as powerful when there is a need to mobilise movements. In these cases, medical 
professionals are seen as influential, be they respiratory physicians or pulmonologists in the case 
of anti-smoking, psychiatrists in case of anti-alcohol, or orthopaedists in the case of accident 
prevention. All actors tend to listen to the medical expertise and knowledge of the field.  
 Arguably, anti-alcohol work is less influenced by medical professionals because medical 
expertise mostly involves psychiatrists in this field. Psychiatrists are different from other medical 
doctors. The emergence of psychiatrists in Thailand is relatively new compared to others; they are 
specifically trained to see relationship in social issues. Sometimes, their opinions are considered 
less than those of a medical doctor because they do not treat psychical health. Moreover, anti-
alcohol work is the area that is most involved with society and culture. Alcohol is the closest to 
everyday and social life. It causes a variety of effects, not only in physical and traditional health 
area but also brings a wide involvement of societal actors.   
 
 7.1.2 The ‘tri-power strategy’ as strategic supervision 
 The tri-power strategy has tried to institutionalise the relationship among different partners 
across sectors. The partnership does not occur on its own. As an attempt to metagovern, the tri-
power strategy, carefully analysed, is in fact enhancing THPF organising power, and then the state 
power, over the partners. It represents a chance for the THPF and the state to develop more subtle 
forms of steering to obtain influence in the partnership, the governable terrain. 
 The tri-power strategy as a metagoverning concept, in practice allows a sphere for the 
different partners to relate collaboratively and innovatively with each other. The THPF has created 
such a sphere and become a metagovernor by creating the different partners’ latitude to function 
in particular ways and steering the partnership, whether with hands-on or hands-off means. 
 The tri-power strategy has also generated a sense of a common objective for the 
partnership, which is to drive a ‘mountain’ predominantly defined by the THPF. This does not 
only refer to what the mountain is but also how the mountain can be driven. The language of ‘we’ 
often came up during the interviews when projects were discussed. It is assumed that the 
determined goal of health promotion, created by the lead of the THPF, is the general goal of the 
partner organisations as well. Every partner has tried to speak the language of THPF health 
promotion. In this sense, the tri-power strategy is not only developing the collaboration of physical 
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organisations, but also producing collectivity, or discursive frameworks for those involved: the 
partners constructed themselves as relevant in the partnership. The contract used between the 
THPF and the funded NGOs is thus not perceived from the view of the individual interests of each 
organisation but from a deliberate common interest. Through the co-optation of the common goal, 
the partner organisations are expected to prioritise the partnership. 
 As Chapter 2 reminds us, the structural tendency of the ‘tri-power strategy’, as strategic 
supervision, is necessarily strategically selective. Indeed, the strategy is variously interpreted at 
convenient for the users. For the THPF, the strategy places a high priority on the need to strengthen 
civil society. No private or business corporations are directly emphasised in the strategy. This may 
imply an anti-capitalist world view of the strategy. Also, the strategy is criticised for a continuous 
tendency to make the THPF and its partners become co-opted by the state because it 
overemphasises the need to collaborate with the state on any policy activity to secure success. 
Moreover, interview participants similarly point out the tendency of a lobbying approach to policy 
advocacy because it is believed to give efficiency in agreeing changes or advocating their desired 
policies. Research shows that getting in contact with officials and authorities to persuade them of 
the merits of a certain policy position, using arguments and evidence, is considered one of the most 
common and effective strategies for citizen lobbying (see Adams 2007). Lobbying is also found 
as a mechanism of executing power associated with market governance (Meuleman 2019). These 
issues will be further explored in Chapter 8. 
It is interesting to specifically discuss the lobby tendency as a result of the tri-power 
strategy because this is what the THPF has implicitly advocated the funded to do. Dr Luke, a 
former member of the THPF, reflected that, 
 
Many NGO workers are thinking that they have done well at community work, solving local 
problems, and fighting for ordinary people. Anyway, that era has changed. Fighting for the people 
does not necessarily mean protest and direct action. Sometimes, a lobby of the authorities, although 
we might disagree with them, is needed. We need to acknowledge that the state power determines 
the structure of society, laws, and policies. We need to do this part as well. NGOs need to adapt 
themselves (Dr Luke, interview). 
 
If looked at carefully, the movements in the three areas discussed above, present different 
modes of advocacy work. Arguably, the anti-tobacco movement preferred to use an institutional 
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advocacy approach (lobbying) while the anti-alcohol and accident prevention movements were 
inclined to be sympathetic with a public advocacy approach (see Figure 2.2).15  
  
7.2 Governing civil society through NGOs: proactive granting 
 Peters (2010) argues that contracting and control over budgeting is ‘perhaps the most 
obvious means of metagoverning’ (p.46). The THPF uses contracting for many reasons including 
steering its partners in a way it desires. In general, the THPF has two approaches towards funding 
and granting:  proactive and passive.  Passive grants or ‘ open grants’  are a channel for anyone to 
submit a proposal for funding. This means that the THPF only reacts by reviewing and considering 
the proposal. Generally, it runs three rounds of open submissions a year and might grant an amount 
to partners who, in turn, grant and manage grants, as they are potentially closer to the community 
or the target group. Open grant budgets are normally limited to a maximum of 100,000 baht (about 
3,200 USD). 
In contrast, proactive grants, also known as ‘partnership model’ for funding are a strategy 
that directly encourages other organisations to perform the activity. This kind of granting accounts 
for the majority of the total THPF grant budget.  Hence, the THPF is in the business of working 
with partners to create projects mutually, rather than merely reacting to proposals.  There are four 
key stages in the THPF partnership model:  proposal development, technical review, project 
approval, and supervision, monitoring and evaluation (Galbally et al. 2012). 
In principle, THPF brings together a group of potential partners for the initial creative 
design phase and to develop a programme.  Subsequently, this group suggests who is best to 
implement the programme and why. This means that the THPF needs to strategically think about 
what to promote and who will be the potential partner of the project.  This implies that the THPF 
does not simply operate with different partners, but rather strategically identifies gaps and potential 
partners. Therefore, it is sensible for the THPF to consider itself more than a funder but an enabler. 
According to the 2011 THPF bylaw on regulation and method related to budget allocation 
for project and activity funding, applicants must first state what the proposed activity is and how 
it is related to THPF missions and objectives.  Then, the proposal will enter the review process 
                                                        
15 It is imperative to note that these two approaches can, in effect, be used together, either in different stages 
of a project or activity, or even at the same time. 
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which is divided into two important stages: academic review by a number of experts depending on 
the amount of required budget, and consideration and decision-making. The bylaw also states that 
grantees must submit reports of performance and finance to the THPF at least once a year. In order 
to make a contract with the THPF, applicants must be registered as a juristic person under the Civil 
and Commercial Code. 
Proactive granting mostly works through dealing with the partners who have already 
established a clear connection with the THPF. On the contrary, the passive, open granting scheme 
constitutes only around 10 percent of the total funding and is considered to be helping decentralise 
the funding towards new partners. Such granting legitimises the participatory quality of the 
funding, expanding the horizon of recipients.  
 It is suspected that the THPF has put less emphasis on the passive granting even though it 
is the mechanism for legitimising the funding itself. It has been criticised for giving too many 
proactive grants because of the potential for connection-driven and elite funding limited only to 
those who know and have experienced working with the THPF. Dr Luke, a former THPF senior 
officer and a current PAC member with experience of both proactive and open granting, 
interestingly clarified THPF funding emphasis, linking it to the organisation’s vision. 
 
If we emphasise outcomes, the proactive grant can yield more results than the open grant. Partners 
in the proactive scheme are the strategic partners such as alcohol and tobacco control movements. 
They’ve operated for some time to know how to make the work successful. Proactive schemes deal 
with ones who can work continuously and advocate policy. Anyway, the open grant can indeed 
give us a degree of legitimacy. Ordinary people can access the money and run a small project but 
it is difficult for them to make a change at a system or structural level. The THPF always says that 
its funding is like a lubricant for structural change. Open granting cannot make the THPF reach the 
goal… The question is, if structural change is the goal, is 10% of the open grant enough? (Dr Luke, 
interview). 
 
THPF grants have been used to a different degree by different organisations. Some NGOs 
have used THPF funding for their own organisations while others have used it for certain projects 
and activities. For those who have totally, or mostly, relied on THPF funding, a high degree of 
dependency is possible. This is because the fund constituted a significant amount of the 
organisation’s budget. However, under the significance of THPF’s funding, some NGOs showed 
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reflexivity. For instance, Ms Jeep, a senior NGO worker whose organisation’s budget is funded 
80-90 percent by the THPF said that:  
 
We’ve analysed and consulted with our committee members about whether it’s too risky [to heavily 
rely on THPF’s funding]. The committee directed our attention, instead, to the question of whether 
the funding serves our philosophy and missions. If it does, it’s fine to rely on the funding. We don’t 
give much importance to the money. If the THPF disappeared and we did not have money to work, 
we would need to find a new source of funding by whatever means. The work needs to carry on 
(Ms Jeep, interview). 
 
 Also, there might be another side to dependency. The NGOs are, in fact, not only relying 
on THPF funding because they do not have a choice. They also see it as an opportunity to work 
with the THPF, an institutionalised state agency, and other parts of civil society. On the other hand, 
those who have relied on THPF funding only for certain projects or activities were less dependent. 
Many of them tend to have a more diverse funding pool and are more experienced in dealing 
directly with funders, nationally and internationally. 
 However, there are financially-dependent NGOs who are able to show a certain degree of 
leadership in THPF-NGO partnership. They have not only received granting for short-term 
projects but also for their long-term programme. Running a long-term programme requires more 
organisational resources, either financial or non-financial. Programme managers need to exhibit 
an ability to think strategically and act according to the mission of the organisation and the funder. 
According to interviews with programme-funded NGO managers, to work at a programme level 
signifies working on strategy. They similarly hold an ability to think at a strategic level and see 
changes in multiple levels such as policy, service systems, and movement. 
Organisationally, the NGOs which have the complementing, supplementing, and niched 
relations with the THPF, as discussed in Chapter 5, tend to believe that they hold a certain power 
to negotiate with, and perhaps even manipulate,  THPF funding. Individually, resistance to the 
funder is common among the upper management in these NGOs. This reflects the agency of NGOs 
in relation to the funding structure. Ms Cat, whose NGO has been in the niched relationship with 
the THPF, said that: 
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I see the THPF as a social innovation which we and Thai society should use to its maximum. If we 
want to create social innovations in the country, we must help create them together. So, to work 
with the THPF…, I see myself as a bridge conveying resources [from the THPF] to other NGOs 
and civil society in local areas. My work, therefore, is to sub-grant other NGOs (Mr Cat, interview). 
  
For an organisation, being a THPF programme manager or a sub-grantor is sometimes 
criticised as being an arm of the THPF, thereby forsaking the original standpoint. They are often 
addressed as ‘elite NGOs’ helping the THPF to expand its ‘empire’. On the one hand, these NGO 
programme managers are delegated power by the THPF to control the use of funding over certain 
issues. They hold responsibility as a THPF delegate. On the other hand, it is possible to see them 
as helping the THPF metagovern other parts of civil society. As the majority of the recipients of 
the THPF are the non-state actors, these NGO managers must deal with their NGO peers. The 
NGOs are tended to become an ‘arm of the THPF’ while the THPF is inclined to become the 
‘biggest NGO’. A social hierarchy of NGOs is then created under the THPF’s funding ecosystem. 
Interview participants who are programme managers admitted that there is indeed such 
criticism. However, it can be defended. For Ms Jeep, a senior NGO worker, the matter of being an 
arm of the THPF, 
 
is dependent  on how strong a standpoint the organisation has. We must not be a little THPF. We 
must show that, in a way, we [the programme manager and the funded organisations] are in the 
same movement… Even without granting, we’re still able to be partners, creating a working 
network. We must not have a kind of funder-recipient relationship but a collaborative 
relationship… We’re using the social capital, the THPF, to generate changes (Ms Jeep, interview). 
 
Also, the way programme managers sub-grant to other organisations is considered 
problematic. For example, they are seen to excessively constrain the autonomy of the funded 
organisations, especially in financial activities. The THPF itself is seen to allow more autonomy 
to its direct fundees. Mr Tan, a senior officer of an NGO responsible for a THPF programme, tried 
to explain the reason behind this. 
 
We’ve developed the paperwork system based on the one originally created by the THPF. We’ve 
created our own systems and financial regulations under the general framework of the THPF. 
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Where the THPF makes it broad, we narrow it because we have a smaller limited budget [compare 
to the THPF]… where we need to do like the THPF does, we’ve shrunk the proportion. Yet 
everything must be under the THPF framework. For project reviews, we’ve a dedicated officer for 
such tasks (Mr Tan, interview). 
 
According to the example statement given by Mr Tan, it appears that programme managers 
are allowed to translate and implement THPF rules and regulations to suit their convenience and 
practices. They can create their own documents, forms, and assessment criteria. This proves the 
greater autonomy of the programme managers compared to other ‘mere’ fundees. 
Given this, it is possible to differentiate the funded NGOs into two levels according to how 
they are funded: programme-funded NGOs and project-funded NGOs (see Figure 7.3). The 
programme-funded NGOs usually get a large amount of grant and operate a programme in a 
strategic, long time frame (e.g. three-year). They are sometimes understood as inner-circle 
partners. Dr Pan, a THPF senior officer, mentioned that: ‘NGOs which are supposed to be inner 
THPF partners should not be many. I call them the ‘managing unit’… Their projects can be 
continued [more than a few years]’ (Dr Pan, interview).  
From the THPF side, programme-funded NGOs should be limited to the selected few. They 
can only operate under the active grant schemes as they are more strategic. From the NGO side, 
there are a limited number which are able to manage programmes because the position requires 
certain resources and skills, especially in terms of management. Many NGOs do not possess such 
levels of skills and resources. An inter-connected approach to work, for example, which looks 
beyond a single project, is needed; in practice, it is not common practice among the funded NGOs. 
Not every funded NGO, according to interviewees in this research, exhibits such vision. NGOs 
running a THPF programme are conditioned to show strategic thinking regarding integration and 
collaboration. This is different from NGOs running project-level activities, which are mainly 
focusing on their own businesses, although they are asked and stimulated to look beyond their own 
horizons. The project-funded NGOs also receive less money and operate a project within a shorter 
time frame (e.g. one-year). Many of the latter NGOs are from the open grant scheme. This does 
not necessarily mean that the active grant schemes cannot grant at project level because in fact 





















Arguably, the different levels of the funded NGO signify the difference in power of the 
funded over the fund. How they are funded reflects the potential of the funded organisation to 
negotiate with the funder. In other words, it signifies the power proximity between the funder and 
the funded. The funded organisations that are far from the centre of power (THPF grant) are less 
able to negotiate, and often excluded from the key strategic stakeholders involved in the planning 
of the project/programme. On the contrary, the funded organisations that are closer to the centre 
of power are able to negotiate with the funder and co-manipulate the fund. To put it more simply, 
the funded NGOs as programme managers hold more power, resources and have a better position 
in dealing with the THPF. It seems that, for them, the power relationship between the THPF and 
themselves is negotiable. 
It seems from the interviews that NGOs responsible for managing THPF programme(s) 
and NGOs that are only project-based funded have different, sometimes contrasting, views toward 
the THPF. Programme manager NGOs are closer to the power of the THPF and sometimes defend 
it, albeit remaining mildly critical. They are more strategic and academic, having higher priority 
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in the THPF’s partner network. In contrast, project-based funded NGOs are inclined to believe that 
they have a more recipient-funder relationship with the THPF and the programme manager NGOs. 
They hold a limited amount of power, if not no power, to negotiate with the funder. Nevertheless, 
both kinds of funded NGOs perceive that they are preoccupied by the THPF because the latter 
holds the purse strings. 
The work processes driven by the proactive granting scheme have been widely criticised 
(see Carroll, Wood, Tantivess 2007). As it is strategically selective, favouritism is commonly seen 
in the THPF granting processes as well as projects and planned development. The THPF has been 
censured for having favourites and not being open to new partners. The extent to which the 
stakeholders were invited to engage in the process of drafting plans is subjective depending on 
sections. Different sections of the THPF have different degrees and targets of stakeholder 
participation. Dr Pan, a senior officer of the THPF, gave an example: 
 
The process [of the THPF] in terms of feedback management, maybe, should be better than this. 
This is difficult to say… When I first began to work with the THPF, the process of drafting three-
year plans was designed by boards and committees. The meeting was run by the inner circle [of the 
THPF]. Recently, I’ve invited hundreds of partners. They’re happy for the participation. We got 
new, interesting views. Even so, the process did not cover the broader public. We are not there 
yet… I can’t say that the others did the same way I did. Yet, my section is rather more advanced 
than the other sections (Dr Pan, interview). 
 
 However, the stakeholder involvement conducted by the THPF is seen as insufficient. For 
example, Mr Jet, a senior member of an NGO funded by THPF’s major sections, was asked 
whether he has experienced engaging in the process of developing THPF plans. He unfortunately 
replied that: 
 
I have a little engagement with the process. I might have some, but it is too little. It is insufficient. 
Recently, [the section A] has been trying to include partners from the beginning of the process. 
Anyway, it’s still in the process. The result hasn’t been yielded yet (Mr Jet, interview). 
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Those who were selected to be included in the process of developing THPF plans were 
often those who used to be involved before. In other words, the regularly funded NGOs (funded 
before and tending to be funded in the future) were the regular members of the team. 
 
Each year, the THPF needs to develop the yearly and three-year plans. It then has the process to 
select the participants from the partner organisations. The selected ones were regulars who have 
worked for THPF and seen its development (Mr Tan, Interview). 
  
‘Favouritism’ also links with the issue of selectivity in which the THPF tends to work with 
partners who will do their bidding and follow the THPF line. The THPF is also seen by its 
nongovernment partners as too demanding with rigidity on reporting requirements, inflexibility, 
bureaucracy (Carroll, Wood, Tantivess 2007), driving the processes of the NGOisation which will 
be discussed later. Importantly, no effective standard or formal mechanism for feedback is built in 
the THPF-NGO partnership. Indeed, the THPF claims to be open for partners’ comments and 
opinions. The THPF created the PIRS as a formal mechanism for enhancing networking with 
partners; most of the feedback, in practice, was delivered through informal mechanisms, typically 
personal communication. This means that different sections of the THPF have different 
mechanisms for feedback; some sections have tended to deal better with feedback than others. For 
sections which are close to the partners, feedback is well-used. Partner organisations are 
comfortable talking and consulting with the sections. This suggests that the proximity and the 
rapport between the THPF and the funded NGOs are essential for the quality of the relationship; 
effectively dealing with the feedback shows the care of the THPF. Due to the lack of a formal 
mechanism to communicate with the funder, in 2016 the funded NGOs together formed a network, 
the so-called ‘Health Promotion Movement’ partly as a social mechanism to bridge the 
communication gap between the funded NGOs and the THPF. However, the network is also seen 
as serving to defend the interests of the funded NGOs against the unfair financial investigation 
conducted by the state. 
 
 Fragmentation of funding 
 The way in which the THPF grant-making process has been organised around departmental 
or sectional structures has influenced the context in which the THPF agents work. The decision 
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power over the actual granting is heavily reliant on the section directors. These section directors, 
in fact, have a high degree of control over their ‘own turf’, a considerable degree of autonomy. On 
a day-to-day level, they are not inclined to face an immediate challenge from a higher authority, 
that is, the CEO. Activities and policies are likely to be developed and contained within certain 
‘policy chimneys’, formed in a vertical manner under a section, which might adversely affect the 
activities being pursued by other sections. Sometimes, the directors think of the micro-level 
interests of their own sections at the expense of the macro-level goals of the whole organisation. 
This frequently causes the issue of standardisation and fragmentation of granting, signalling the 
pathology of departmentalism (see Hood 2005; McAnulla 2006; Kavanagh and Richards 2001). 
Ms Peach, a senior NGO activist who has experience working with several domestic and 
international donors, raised the issue:  
 
My experience suggested that each section of the THPF has a different standard and work protocol. 
For instance, Section A provided a clear account of how we can use an administrative expense 
while Section B gave none of that. In an organisation as significant as the THPF, it should have a 
standardised protocol so that operations would be the same. Besides, individual sections did not 
see the overall direction of work. For example, there was Section B responsible for promoting X. 
Then, Section C happened to invite me and other NGOs to work in the promotion of X. This made 
me question, ‘why didn’t they talk to each other within the organisation before talking to us?’ I also 
strongly questioned the way the THPF coordinates internally (Ms Peach, interview). 
 
Fragmentation or silo-thinking happens when horizontal coordination across departments 
is weak. It is a typical governance management failure (Meuleman 2019) which hampers cross-
border collaboration and prevents coordination. The THPF staff, typically the directors, have been 
focusing on working in their chimneys, protecting their turf and their own interests rather than 
advancing the broader organisation programmes. As a consequence, the directors are frequently 
trapped in battles over power and resources with colleagues, seeking to secure more for their own 
unit. When they tend to think vertically within the confines of their own areas, they are reluctant 
to cooperate with other sections on cross-sectional, ‘integrated’ works (Carroll, Wood and 
Tantivess 2007), which may be of importance to both. Such integration issues are widely 
recognised by both the THPF and NGO participants. 
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Fragmentation of funding significantly links with the way the NGOs can manage to access 
the funding. When the authority is with the segmented executives, standardised protocols are 
underplayed. Those NGOs with well-established connections to particular section directors, as 
interview participants complained, have a better chance in securing funding. This stresses the 
social hierarchy of NGOs. The fragmentation also defines how grants are channelled in practice. 
All too often, different sections of THPF have unintentionally granted funds to partner 
organisations which later turned out to work in the same area or be the same organisations.16 
Sometimes they have done it intentionally to increase their own output and performance. Partners 
obtaining grants from different sections at the same time have suffered from different standards 
and protocols.  
According to Mr Pun who also had experiences of receiving grants from multiple sections 
of the THPF, different treatment of different sections depends on the character of section directors: 
 
We’re lucky that Section A had Ms Jai who was academically dedicated to - and an expert on- the 
work. She understood civil society work because she was chair of an NGO. Hence, the background 
of being an academic in civil society made her dedicated to make a purposeful change… With her, 
we created an organised movement. It’s not like we’re asking for money… Working with this 
section was to work with adjustable strategies and enjoy the goals. We’re not trapped in a frame of 
funder-fundee. On the contrary, when working with Section B, the section director was from a 
bureaucratic department with a different background of expertise. She didn’t have much insight 
about civil society. She did not have a clear understanding of development work and its goal. When 
the goal was not purposive, we were left to do whatever we wanted. The work wasn’t organised as 
a movement. A purposive movement did not happen… This finally led to goal displacement. We’re 
working in a funder-fundee relationship (Mr Pun, interview). 
 
Some NGOs are reported to partly manage the problem of such differences by setting an 
internal management system with one officer dedicated to a certain project and a section at a time. 
Nonetheless, this is a matter of resources; only NGOs with sufficient resources and skills have the 
                                                        
16 Although there is no formal regulation forbidding the THPF to grant the same organisation more than one 
project at the same time, it seems that granting more than one project for the same organisation with a similar kind of 
work is considered ineffective, inefficient, and sometimes causes a conflict of interest. Thus, many directors, in 
practice, have tried to avoid doing so. 
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capacity to do this. Apart from Mr Pun, most interview participants that have experienced working 
with, or receiving grants from, two or more sections of the THPF, either at the same time or at 
different times, asserted that there are differences between sections such as the nature of their 
management, leadership, interpretation of the organisation policies and regulations, and vision 
about civil society and development work. Such differences chiefly come from the difference in 
leadership and the management style of the section directors.  
 In a positive aspect, the differences, or fragmentation, of funding proves the flexibility of 
the THPF as a quango, unlike a rigid standardised bureaucratic department. Yet, it also raises the 
issue of departmentalism and the division of the NGOs which divert the NGOs’ focus from ‘the 
big picture’ into their own silo of specialised work and in turn obstructs the emergence of a 
movement. The fragmentation becomes problematic when the THPF needs to deal with a variety 
of partners with fragmented practices. This has driven the professionalisation and 
bureaucratisation of the THPF and significantly affected its NGO partners.  
 
7.3 Conclusion 
 This chapter further discusses the mechanisms of metagovernance conducted by the THPF. 
It mainly contributes to answer the second research question regarding the way the funded NGO 
are metagoverned. The THPF’s use of quasi-networks through tri-power strategy and quasi-
markets through proactive granting, together provide a significant amount of managerial freedom 
for the NGOs. They are instruments or the main mechanisms of metagovernance which give 
effective steering while allowing the targets of the governance to retain their autonomous capacity 
to develop and operate their work based on decisions relating to a number of activities. The THPF 
is, in principle, mainly responsible for steering and monitoring contracts and partnerships.  
 This chapter reveals that there are dimensions to the metagovernance conducted by the 
THPF which can be considered the governance of NGO partners by the THPF, notably through 
the tri-power strategy. This metagovernance performs based mainly on the THPF’s own 
mechanisms. The metagovernance can also be the governance of civil society through NGOs, 
typically by granting and leveraging certain of them to act as programme managers. By doing so, 
some of them act as an intermediary body between the THPF and the rest of organised civil society. 
This metagovernance is successful, with resources shared between the THPF and the NGO 
programme manager. 
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 However, as metagovernance is caused, it is also consequential. The way the THPF 
metagoverns the NGO partners has considerable consequences for them. The NGOs are 
incorporated into the THPF frameworks and then driven to adapt to suit the frameworks. The next 
chapter examines the unintended consequences of the metagovernance of the THFP vis-à-vis its 





























NGOisation of Civil Society 
 
 The previous chapters reveal that the relationship between the THPF and the funded NGOs 
is complex, relational and inter-dependent, and the THPF obviously has a significant influence 
over the NGOs however honourable its intentions. This chapter is focused more on what is 
generated through the relationship. It is argued that, in order for NGOs to become a ‘suitable’ 
partner of the THPF, a target of metagovernance, they are driven to develop certain attributes 
which are shaped through important intertwined developments: professionalisation, 
institutionalisation, bureaucratisation, and depoliticisation. These four developments can also be 
understood as ‘technologies of governing’ utilised by the funder in its relationship of patronage 
with the funded NGOs (see Atia and Herrold 2018) and together constitute and sustain the 
NGOisation of civil society. What is discussed here reflects these developments in one way or 
other as they manifest in various ways through granting, contracting, project reviewing, 
organising, policy advocating, and so on. 
 
8.1 Professionalisation and institutionalisation of civil society 
Research suggests that NGOs are required to adapt to institutional norms and structures, 
use the language of a certain policy field, and terms of trade, to improve coordination and their 
own legitimacy while mitigating external criticism (Clemens 1997; Caniglia and Carmin 2005). 
Thus, NGOs need increased legitimacy, notably through professionalisation, to apply for, and 
successfully secure, funding (Suarez and Gugerty 2016; Lang 2013; Alexander et al. 2004). 
The evidence from the interviews with participants from the THPF and the funded NGOs 
confirms the professionalisation of the NGO sector, having the THPF as the main influencer. The 
THPF was said by the participants to have created a new standard of NGO funding system in the 
country, which is different from the time when NGOs received money from foreign donors. All 
interview participants from the THPF have realised the strengths and weaknesses of the NGOs. 
They similarly envision the NGOs as being active, working for a good cause, but which may not 
like criticism and can be unprofessional. They think it is their job to improve the professionality 
of the funded NGOs so that they can become ‘better partners’. We can take the example of Dr Pan, 
a senior officer of the THPF. Dr Pan personally created a large new project covering every 
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geographical area in the country with the intention of changing the way his partner NGOs worked 
as he found it difficult to influence them in what they were already doing. Though for this large-
scale project he had asked the NGOs to incorporate and make more use of data and research in 
order to improve working strategies, he thinks that the NGOs have not applied research into action 
very well. 
 
What I created, the big project, has changed the way NGOs work. I did try several ways before. I 
told them new concepts. Sometimes, they got them. Sometimes, they did not. Thus, I created the 
big project. I then allocated the budget. Budgeting is the THPF’s tool. I reduced the budget of their 
previous projects. If they wanted the budget, they needed to come and defend the new project (Dr 
Pan, interview). 
 
 What Dr Pan said also reflects the power of the funder and may reflect the piper hypothesis 
mentioned in chapter 1. There is an asymmetrical power relationship at play between the THPF 
and the NGOs which no one can deny. The NGOs which enter the parenting kind of relationship 
mentioned in Chapter 5 well reflect such the asymmetrical relations.  
For NGOs which enter the complementing and supplementing relationships, although it 
causes some difficulties, to be professionalised is considered beneficial in the long-term. Mr Jet, a 
senior NGO worker who has been working with the THPF for long time, said that: 
 
In a positive way… the THPF made us accountable to the accountability system. The Thai NGO 
sector so far has, frankly speaking, no such system. If there is one, it’s weak. Some might not want 
to receive grants from the THPF because they are afraid of being investigated. The point is that this 
is making the NGOs become more professionalised. NGOs must be transparent and accountable. 
Receiving THPF money to run a project or a programme allows the NGOs to be audited. This is 
beneficial for me… Apart from the audit, our [NGO] ways of working are reviewed as well. Some 
of our ways of working might be wrong. Being reviewed by the reviewers and steering committees 
helps double-check our operations. Yet, the NGOs despise such review because they believe that 
they are doing it right. I believe that NGOs should also be given critical feedback. The committees 
indeed assisted us in making our work easier. It’s a help. Although some committee members might 
misunderstand the NGOs, the NGOs should communicate with them to reach an agreement. It’s 
right, isn’t it? Thus, the THPF helps cultivate the NGOs (Mr Jet, interview). 
 
 167 
One obvious benefit from professionalisation is that the NGOs themselves can have better 
organisational structure. By being ‘professionalised’, they invite more technocratic control of the 
organisation and expertise to deal with uncertainty (see Anheier 2014). They provide practices and 
knowledge of modern developments such as project-based proposals which are structured like 
business plans in the sense that they have a clear proposed scope of work and strategic plans, 
detailed budgeting, and a model showing causal links between inputs and outputs. More 
importantly, they provide a way to monitor and measure quantified progress, proving the NGOs 
can use the resources efficiently and effectively (see Atia and Herrold 2018; Chahim and Prakash 
2014; AbouAssi 2013). 
 It is evident from stories told by NGO participants that the application processes for the 
fund demand a great deal of resources and technical knowledge. For some under-professionalised 
organisations in particular, the struggle to adapt to THPF systems and conditions, especially in 
terms of financial and accounting management, is harsh and time-consuming creating tension 
within the organisations.  
It is often assumed that having experience of foreign funding would give NGOs the skills 
to deal with THPF reporting and accounting systems. Yet, this may not always be the case for 
some interviewees. In fact, this is depends on what kind of agencies NGOs used to work with. Ms 
Jeep, whose NGO is highly professionalised and has a rich experience with foreign donors 
requiring the implementation of systems, said that:  
 
Many foreign donors provided [unconditional] grants. When they did, they did not require any 
systems [of accounting and reporting]. If required, the systems were not strict… NGOs nowadays 
are then thinking [of such systems] as involving difficulty… to work with the THPF the first thing 
to do [for NGOs] is to adapt oneself, that is, to set a clear, accountable system which is acceptable 
for the common standard. I think this matter is good because it sets standards (Ms Jeep, interview). 
 
 For NGO participants who have experience like Ms Jeep, they are said to be fine with the 
THPF system. However, they still need to adapt to it rather subtly. Ms Jeep continued: 
 
I see that if we do not remain on our guard [against the THPF’s system] in the first place, everything 
should be fine. If we keep thinking that they [THPF] will aim to investigate us, order us to do 
things, and don’t try to understand them, it [the system] can work… If we want to understand, we 
 168 
must look at the rationality. Ask for it. Investigate it… Understanding the rationality, we won’t be 
annoyed by the details, which are sometimes silly (Ms Jeep, interview). 
 
For the THPF, conditioning the NGOs to build their financial management capacity can be 
understood as ‘a way of providing and maintaining an infrastructure. It can be the scaffolding upon 
which to build the rest of the organisation. If it is strong, the organisation can flourish; if not, the 
organisation may struggle or even collapse’ (Cammack 2014, p. 5). In other words, having strong 
financial management is a way to become more effective and professionally organised because the 
NGOs can better control their own affairs and then develop improved activities. Interestingly, the 
funded NGOs, to a certain degree, agree with this point. NGO participants acknowledged that 
bureaucratic rules and regulations concerning the project management creating constraints and 
difficulties for the NGOs can ultimately be seen as contributing to a better system. Mr Pun, a senior 
NGO worker who runs a funded THPF programme, said that: 
 
Were the difficulties [rules and regulations] constructive? They were. They encouraged us to have 
good governance, prudence, and better clarity in whatever we do especially in finance, accounting 
and management. [They stressed that] plans when created should be followed, not otherwise. If 
plans are to be changed, there is a process. The work became systematised which is good for civil 
society… Working with the THPF made us stronger in return (Mr Pun, interview). 
 
Mr Pun also mentioned that when the organisation was receiving a programme-level grant, 
most of the resources were used for management tasks as the organisation needs to sub-grant the 
others; little was dedicated to develop the work content. In this regard, the managerialist drive has 
stimulated the organisation to professionalise itself, becoming ‘inward-oriented’ featuring the 
‘organisation-first’ approach which prioritises success in terms of organisational management 
(Harwood and Creighton 2009), which in turn ties the NGOs to focus on expanding their projects 
and the funding. 
 
8.2 Grant-making and ‘contracting regime’ 
Professionalised knowledge and managerialism as inherent conditions to secure the 
funding can be criticised as impelling the NGOs to fragment and compartmentalise the world into 
‘issues’ and ‘projects’ (Choudry and Kapoor 2013a), which, ultimately, makes them ‘projectised, 
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log-framed and compliant’ (CIVICUS 2015) under the newly-emerged ‘contract/granting culture’ 
created by the THPF. A kind of ‘depoliticisation’ of issues, to be discussed later, thus happens in 
which NGO work tends to become merely a technical matter (see Ferguson 1994; Li 2007). 
THPF granting, as discussed in the previous chapters, is contract-based. The THPF yearly 
provides more than 1,000 million baht (about US$ 28 million) to promote numerous NGO projects. 
The increasing support and grants from the THPF to the NGOs ultimately causes the creation of a 
‘contract regime’ (Smith and Lipsky 1993) in the NGO’s ecosystem, which refers to the 
partnership configuration that on the one side has government being a funder and on the other side 
has the NGOs being recipients. The THPF and the NGOs are thus involved in a mutually dependent 
yet not equal relationship. According to Smith (2010) such contracting profoundly changes the 
internal management and the political behaviour of the NGOs. It does this particularly by 
transforming the organisations to a more professionalised, corporate style of management, notably 
by featuring a professional staff composition. 
The THPF claims itself to be more than a ‘sponsor’ which facilitates and supports 
partnership. For THPF, although the proactive granting stresses the collective activity with 
partners, unlike normal contracting/tendering, the relationship steered by the granting contract 
between the THPF and the NGOs is still asymmetric. As the controller of funding decisions, the 
THPF normally sets the terms of the relationship and its funding decisions are indeed selective 
depending on THPF yearly plans and frameworks. Criticism for not allowing all interested parties 
to compete for the right to develop and implement a project is regularly seen. Moreover, 
organisations excluded from the partners’ pool, especially those who do not receive the grants, 
often censured the THPF for being a ‘club’ whose inner circle, those who know the THPF board 
and staff, has advantages in securing funding (Galbally et al. 2012). The ‘funding’ bias coming 
from the personal relationship between the NGO workers or referees and the THPF is mentioned 
by many NGO participants and in other research (see Rakyutidharm 2014a, 2014b). Nonetheless, 
the THPF claims that a wide range of new partners appears every year and the proportion of new 
potential partners has continually increased (see THPF 2014, 2015, 2016). 
NGOs with more resources and technical knowledge are at an advantage in the application 
process. Being familiar with technical matters for proposing the project and with people working 
in the THPF, to a certain degree brings the promise of a funding contract. This is the same situation 
as happens in a market competitive tendering process in which large consulting companies are 
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frequently excellent at winning competitive tenders because they have a favourably sophisticated 
tender writing infrastructure in place. The NGOs pursuing THPF funding find they need to adapt 
themselves and practice the writing of project proposals to suit THPF agendas (Rakyutidharm 
2014a). Instead of working with the beneficiaries, the NGOs interviewed are compelled to focus 
more on technical matters and be familiar with the THPF system of language and regulation. This 
is particularly important given the partners’ capacity of project evaluation. In effect, those who are 
part of the initial project design team must have knowledge and experience of appropriate 
evaluation methods for the proposed project so that the proactive partnership model can produce 
maximum outcomes. Grantees are asked to specify their evaluation approaches and methods from 
the outset in order to adjust and improve the project as well as to learn lessons and assess the 
possibility of scaling up the project (Galbally et al. 2012). 
The THPF, intentionally or not, helps to create ‘socialising rituals’ of NGO work. 
Aksartova (2009) reasons that such rituals are unique to civil society assistance which socialises 
recipients into the donor-recipient relationship and the donor world view which are venues where 
the recipients grasp rules of appropriate professional conduct and learn to become familiar with 
the donor vocabulary. The NGOs are likely to be pushed by the nature of the work contracted with 
THPF to replace local workers with professionalised experts. 
Moreover, when the NGO work becomes more professionalised and technical, people 
without ‘matching’ expertise will be slightly excluded and fade away from the working circle of 
the organisation, leaving professional staff to do the organisational routine jobs and distancing 
themselves from volunteers and the public. The development of the contract regime puts the NGOs 
in danger of embracing too wholeheartedly the language of the business world. Interviews with 
NGO staff revealed that they have all become busy devising their mission statements and plans, 
and concentrating more on their outcomes and throughput, as reported elsewhere by Bates and 
Pitkeathley (1996). Unsurprisingly, the NGOs that receive grants from the THPF become focused 
on assessment and strategic planning. They have become what Roy (2014) calls the ‘indicator 
species’. When they think and work, impact and measurement of the activities come first. 
Nonetheless, the NGOs tend to experience the contract regime differently, as both a benefit and a 
threat compromising their autonomy. This is dependent on the relationship the NGOs have with 
the THPF (see Chapter 5).  
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8.3 ‘Success myth’ and indicators-led development 
Engaging less with social movement, NGOs become focused more on organisational 
and/or material reproduction as they are required to indicate that their granted money is well-spent 
on activities in which their impact can be assessed. For NGOs, this increases the chance to get 
future funding. In this sense, NGOs appear to become obsessive with manufacturing measurable 
‘results’, making their work seem successful in order to attract and keep the THPF funding. Having 
a good performance history is thus a key to the funding. Projects proposed by the NGOs have to 
clearly state how they plan to expand and develop the results from what they are doing (or what 
they have done). The THPF expects the impacts of projects to contribute more and more if they 
are to continue their funding. The logic of success has become the NGOs’ determining factor which 
makes it hard for them to admit failure.17 
To successfully achieve, established indicators are seen to prove the quality and the 
effectiveness of the funded organisations. Without failure reported, it helps build trust and a 
stronger connection with the THPF. When such trust and connection are well-established, 
however, formal processes of granting and evaluation may be less focused upon. Concerns were 
raised among participants that connections can, and perhaps already do, guarantee the quality and 
effectiveness of the funded organisations. This can obviously jeopardise the efficiency of the 
formal process and increase a reliance on a patronage system based on connection. 
Furthermore, NGO participants claimed to be subject to severe pressures through THPF 
evaluations and measurements which are seen as trying to force THPF logic, frameworks, and 
goals into the funded organisations, shaping them towards their desired direction. Some indicators, 
such as sustainability and policy change set by the THPF to evaluate the granted 
project/programme, are seen as being too difficult, or even impractical, to reach. Sustainability can 
mean that NGOs should think of: a way to sustain the project without THPF funding, a way to 
expand the impact of the project with a lesser amount of money, a way to establish a network 
within the governmental sector, and how to make a policy change which can be treated as an 
                                                        
17 In fact, failure does not have legal consequences, but it ruins the possibility of getting a new grant and the 
capacity to compete with other NGOs who have reported successful performance. To gain more funding, a success 
story is needed to legitimise the proposal. Failure denotes a negative outcome. For the THPF, failure is not rewarded. 
For the NGOs, especially those in surviving mode, failure is not accepted. Grants given by thy THPF are structured 
as performance-based. The NGOs will only get paid when they meet certain performance targets. 
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introduction of new legislation. According to NGO participants, the sustainability-as-a-destination 
unintentionally leads to a working model where the NGOs are driven to work within a narrower 
scope, more expertise, greater contribution to the institutional level, and lesser budgeting. 
Some interviewed NGOs clearly stated that they have fought back for more reasonable 
indicators. They see the issue as being fought at the conceptual and managerial level. At the 
conceptual level, they questioned the plausibility of, and the logic behind, the funding for policy 
change. What Ms Jeep, a senior NGO activist, said is illuminating: 
 
We’re only a small NGO, overlooked by the state. How is it possible for us to change a policy 
which some ministries are still unable to change? Is this underpaid work? You [the THPF] gave me 
a few million Baht while the public budget for public agencies is a thousand billion Baht, and they 
still cannot change a policy (Ms Jeep, interview). 
 
 At the managerial level, the NGOs questioned the THPF’s management of resources. As 
the THPF has a secured budget every year through the dedicated tax, it was expected to grant the 
funded NGOs - at least the programme-level NGOs - evenly. Reducing funds while at the same 
time asking for a greater contribution, was considered unreasonable by NGOs. This is clearly 
reflected in Mr Tan’s speech: 
 
 With the reduced budget [for us], it’s apparent that the THPF will use the money for some other 
purposes… The issue is that the THPF’s budget has never been less. At least, it keeps the same 
amount every year. Then, the THPF cut our budget but the money was still there… So, we see this 
as a managerial problem that the office must deal with (Mr Tan, interview). 
 
Arguably, the pressure to secure success is tended to be more severe for the less 
professionalised NGOs. Yet, for the highly professionalised NGOs which normally enter the 
complementing or supplementing relations with the THPF, they see this as an opportunity to 
communicate and negotiate with the THPF. Ms Jeep, whose NGO is highly professionalised, said 
that: 
 
This is a good chance to educate them. We must continue what we are doing and tell them that their 
indicators are not working and not suitable for our work… We know what we are doing. We gave 
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a clear statement about it… If we think and act like this, they [the THPF] will learn… They will 
know that what they have isn’t suitable for social development work… It is their job to create tools 
that suit social development work (Ms Jeep, interview). 
 
 The above statement is not the only response of the same kind from the interviewees. 
Others similarly suggest that to reach a goal, there must be a good strategic planning, clear project 
design and an evidence-based approach. Arguably, only having passion is no longer enough in the 
contemporary NGO complex. 
On the other hand, difficulties in achieving KPIs and reporting, as stated by many funded 
NGOs in the interviews, might come from the lack of skills of the funded organisations. NGOs 
with more resources and strong identity seem to manage the issue effectively. This stresses the fact 
that most NGOs lack skills in areas of funding and modern management, and this is problematic 
for them. It also emphasises the reason why professionalisation focusing on institutionalised 
knowledge and skills is encouraged by the THPF and even by the NGOs themselves in the 
relationship as aforementioned.  
To be fair, it is normal for a grantor like the THPF to want to ensure that money would be 
spent effectively and efficiently. The funding ultimately becomes about exhibiting impacts. 
However, the THPF itself falls victim to the culture of success. As the THPF is not always on good 
terms with the government, it is often pushed to corroborate success stories which in turn serve to 
legitimise the existence of the THPF. This situation also happens to the NGO partners as they are 
compelled to succeed for their funding to continue. 
 
8.4 Project review mind-set and ‘project-based’ mentality 
Issues have been raised by interview participants regarding the THPF’s mind-set on project 
reviewing. It seems that the THPF has its own project menus and has heavily employed academics 
as project reviewers, instead of development practitioners in relevant areas. This is why detailed 
indicators are built with a lack of insight in the field; this has often annoyed the NGOs who are 
pushed to operate following the indicators based on an academic standard. The problem is that 
some work cannot be measured academically within a short time frame. To survive, the NGOs are 
thus urged to focus solely on measurable short-term (e.g. one-year) projects to meet the indicators. 
As a result, long-term movements or changes, many of which are seen as ‘hot’ issues, are left 
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untouched. The NGO participants similarly suspect that when there is a lack of practitioners, the 
focus of projects is inclined to be academic at the expense of tangible and local, area-based 
development work. 
Two contrasting ideas were often raised among participants regarding the reviewing mind-
set: result-driven and process-driven. In the Thai NGO community, these ideas are normally 
discussed in the context of project review and evaluation. Result-driven refers to a way of thinking 
that is focused on results, notably outputs and outcomes; only the result is the measure of success. 
On the contrary, process-driven is believed to be broader. Success is not solely related to the result 
but also how the result is achieved. For example, one can look at whether the institutions and 
procedures of the activities are structured and operated in a way consistent with the implementation 
of a defined, justifiable goal of social organisations (Murrel 1990). Interviews with the funded 
NGOs indicated that the NGOs originally favour the process-based thinking as they aim at social 
reforms which are hard to measure.  
Several NGO interviewees also mentioned that THPF’s project reviewers have frequently 
not understood what they were proposing or trying to do. This is because most of the reviewers 
employed by the THPF come from academia and are criticised as living in an ivory tower, distant 
from operational fields and actual practices. They are seen as lacking insight and experience of the 
nature and characteristics of the work. A usual communication channel between the reviewers and 
the organisations proposing the project is merely through the paperwork, namely, the proposal. 
Shared understanding is thus difficult to create. 
Interestingly, the NGOs can deny the reviewer’s suggestions. According to the experience 
of Mr Pun, a senior NGO worker, there is a way to deal with it. 
 
Working with the THPF is rather flexible. What I’ve learnt is that they [the THPF’s staff] do not 
watch us in every step of what we do during the project. How do they know what we have done? 
Reporting to the THPF was formally done through document work and it wasn’t frequent. Reports 
to and from the PAC do not go into much detail. Hence, we can refuse reviewers’ suggestions. We 
can talk to the section directors… who are more influential than the PAC because they’re the ones 
who operate with us (Mr Pun, interview). 
 
In order to deal with the reviewer issue, some NGO programme managers have initiated 
the decentralisation of budget by distributing decision-making on money to local community 
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organisations which allows for the review process at community level by senior practitioners in 
the field. This shows the agency of the funded NGOs and that they can build on what THPF has, 
to develop their ‘better’ way of funding.  
 As a result, the THPF’s reviewing mind-set has created what many interviewees called a 
‘project-based’ mentality, that is, a mode of work in which NGOs are impelled to concentrate on 
meeting the indicators under a safe, short-term project. It is not exaggerating to say that project-
based mentality has become second nature to the NGOs. It is possible to say that such project-
based mentality comes from two major sources. The first is the organisational nature of the THPF. 
Although the THPF is more flexible than departmental public bodies, it retains the status of a 
public agency which requires a certain kind of bureaucratic regulation. The second source is the 
direction of the THPF management officials. The officials are the bridge between the institutional 
regulations and everyday practices. They are responsible for the translation of the systems and 
regulations. If they are rather orthodox bureaucrats, it is highly likely that the project-based 
mentality is well-formed. On the other hand, if they are more progressive, they are likely to find a 
way for the funded NGOs to work more easily and continuously. 
Project-based planning and management was regarded by many NGO managers as an 
obstacle for funded programme management. As the nature of the funded programme requires a 
large amount of money and a long-term timeframe, project-based thinking which is focused on 
short-term assessment and a clear inception and destination for the project, does not seem suitable. 
As Mr Tan, a senior officer of an NGO responsible for a THPF programme on alcohol consumption 
control, said: 
 
we’re granted less… we’re questioned [by the government and the board] on how long we will ask 
for THPF money. They asked the question with a project-based mentality and wanted the clear 
starting and finishing points. Yet, we think with process-based mentality. Work should also 
empower both the people and their thinking. The mentalities [between us and them] are different… 
By thinking in terms of project-based, concentrating on indicators, the sustainability [of the 
activities and works] is reduced (Mr Tan, interview). 
 
 What Mr Tan said corresponded with many other NGO participants. For them, the 
sustainability or the continuity of projects and work is essential as it can create expertise. Such 
expertise, in turn, can help them effectively meet the needs of the THPF. Yet, with a project-based 
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mentality as the obstacle, the funded NGOs are not likely to deliver the expected results and meet 
the indicators. This is a dilemma for THPF granting. 
 However, the matter of continuity of projects is also dependent on the proximity of the 
funded towards the funder and the agenda of the funder itself. In cases where the funded 
organisation or people have a good reputation, a clear record of being a well-behaved recipient, 
and having a close relationship with the THPF - either with the THPF-as-an-organisation - or 
senior officers, they are likely succeed in continuing the project. They might use different 
organisational bases to get in contract with the THPF while retaining the same personnel for the 
project/programme. Additionally, if the project/programme was initiated in any way by the THPF, 
it is highly possible that the project/programme will continue being funded, albeit through different 
sections of the THPF.    
Mr Pun, a senior NGO worker who has a rich history with both the THPF and the NGO 
sector, gave an interesting account of his experiences of continuingly receiving grants from the 
THPF. He has managed a large project, funded by the THPF, aiming to strengthen civil society 
organisations in different areas of the country. How he has done this relied on inputs from both 
sides: the THPF and himself.  
 
Indeed, this project has continuously received  funding  from a certain resolution of the 1st Thai 
Reform Assembly in 2011 when I was working with the THPF… The solution suggested that we 
should find a way to make use of a lottery fund to support other public social development funds. 
I think this topic was really interesting. The THPF’s CEO at that time also gave special attention 
to the issue and support for the implementation. The CEO said that we should make this issue 
successful because it will result in more funds for civil society, apart from the THPF. When I left 
the THPF, I continued working on the issue under Foundation A for the first few years. Then the 
project was granted under Foundation B. Currently, the project is in the third phase granted under 
the management of Foundation C. The funded organisation [which managed the project] has 
changed from one to another. Yet the staff have not changed since the beginning (Mr Pun, 
interview).  
 
 Moreover, the mentality has a profound influence on NGO beneficiaries. Beneficiaries, the 
target group of the NGOs, are becoming defined by the timeframe of the project (see Jad 2007). 
Targets are selected and then units of development are prioritised and defined for particular NGOs. 
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The projects are thus carried out by professionals hired by the organisations to do the ‘job’ rather 
than driven by voluntarism. NGO work has become more technical, requiring a degree of 
conformity. 
 
8.5 Colonisation of ‘health’ and isomorphic pressure 
There is a critique regarding the inherent imperialist and colonialist feature of 
professionalised NGO-led processes of social actions (Rajagopal 2003; Williams 2010). This is 
because the professionalisation of knowledge employed by NGOs is largely drawn from Western 
sources and assumptions (Smith 1999; Choudry and Kapoor 2013a). In developing countries like 
Thailand, a Western model of NGO-ing has been forged during the time of structural adjustment 
and development aid either in the name of democratisation or development starting from the 1970s. 
This model is maintained even though direct links with the West have ceased. Such knowledge is 
not only inherently applied in NGOs themselves by also in other related organisations such as the 
THPF. 
In the case of the THPF, the WHO Ottawa health promotion approach is the bible in the 
field. NGOs receiving funding from the THPF must align themselves with the approach. Key 
words of the approach such as ‘well-being’, ‘partnership’, ‘policy advocacy’, ‘community action’, 
are often repeated and concretised by the interviewee participants. 
One good example is the language of ‘health/well-being’ championed by the WHO, the 
THPF, and the funded NGOs. Mr Pun, a senior NGO worker who has a strong connection with the 
THPF, was highly critical of the way the THPF has tried to influence its partners: 
 
In my feeling, the THPF has been trying to significantly spread its values and culture. Let’s take 
the concept of ‘sook ka pawa’ [health/well-being] for instance. Currently, civil society 
organisations in Thailand are mostly working on ‘sook ka pawa’ issues. Besides, the way we work 
as ‘pakee’ [partnership/partner], the term has become influential because of the THPF. It was 
spread to the public… To be fair, it wasn’t from any particular people in the THPF…, it also came 
from us [the NGOs] when we talked to each other. We use a similar language… The term ‘sook ka 
pawa’ is the keyword. There is a directive from the THPF saying that we need to use this term in 
order to make a proposal possible. This makes us go further into the issue of health… [However] 
the influence of ‘health’ [over the funded organisations] is only on a surface level. It hasn’t changed 
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the behaviour of the workers. It is just a façade that we became ‘healthy’ under the shadow of the 
THPF (Mr Pun, interview). 
 
This pressure generated by THPF in affecting granting, the contracting regime, and 
professionalisation is consistent with the analysis of DiMaggio and Powell (1991) on ‘institutional 
isomorphism’ which suggests that organisations in a certain field (THPF network and health 
promotion, in this case) are subject to powerful isomorphic dispositions which then drive the 
organisations to become more similar. In other words, the organisations have the tendency to 
become more homogeneous in relation to one another. In this sense, isomorphic changes happen 
as organisations interact more with one another, depend on others for their resources, 
professionalise their field, and rely on the relationship and funding source. In effect, the NGOs 
hold less power and are impelled to be like the THPF. This also drives the NGOs to develop 
bureaucratic structures like the THPF’s. This bureaucratisation aspect will be discussed later. 
The funded NGOs adopt similar internal practices in order to compete effectively for the 
contracts (in the future). The THPF and the NGOs, in tandem, develop norms, practices and other 
shared professional standards guiding their conduct. It is possible to assume that some NGOs, 
particularly those with a strong commitment to their original values and strong identity, are able 
to resist the isomorphic pressures, especially if the THPF fund is a relatively small part of their 
overall revenue. Yet, as aforementioned, the THPF has become the prominent and influential 
funder of civil society or even the sole source of income for many NGOs in reality. This makes it 
difficult, or even impossible, for the NGOs to avoid or resist the pressure. 
 
8.6 Bureaucratisation 
As a key apparatus of governing, bureaucratisation involves a plethora of reporting and 
surveillance techniques that donors employ to regularly oversee their recipients. It is not a 
hierarchical apparatus confined to only government affairs; rather, bureaucracy is a form of 
administration found in any organisation pursuing a wide variety of goals on a continuous basis 
(see Hibou 2015; Beetham 1996) including the NGOs. It is recognised that the recipients need to 
give frequent, regular, and detailed reporting on aspects of organisation and activity the funders 
require (Herrold 2016; Wiktorowicz 2000; Bebbington 1997). Such overseeing is criticised as 
extensive, intrusive, tedious and procedural, demanding considerable staff time and, perhaps, 
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organisational change in terms of structure and operations in order to comply (Atia and Herrold 
2018).  
Bureaucratisation through the THPF reflects a paradox of the ‘Iron Law of Liberalism’, 
that is, the more the state promotes non-state forces, the greater the total amount of regulations, 
paperwork, and bureaucracy (Graeber 2015). The NGO interviewees often gave accounts of how 
they have been pressured by bureaucratic requirements, typically through ‘a lot of paperwork’ and 
‘intense report writing’ which they found difficult or ‘impossible to meet’, causing them to obsess 
to comply with bureaucracy. It appears that there is an over-valuing of procedural accountability 
inflicted by the donor. Ms Day, a senior NGO worker who has been close to the THPF since its 
inception, expressed that, although the THPF grant is relatively the largest amount of grant her 
organisation has ever had, she was uncomfortable with the overwhelming amount of paperwork: 
 
Our organisation needed to heavily adapt to the THPF. I’ve spent at least 5 years on learning and 
developing in-house systems to suit the THPF. Many new functions were created to work under 
THPF conditions. This sometimes made some of us uncomfortable. We might not have a great skill 
in writing proposals. Other donors we’ve worked with haven’t had as many systems as the THPF 
has… It was a burden, I think (Ms Day, interview). 
 
This corresponded with what Choudry and Kapoor (2013a, p. 17) argue: ‘funding criteria 
and reporting guidelines place a heavy burden of expectation on organisations’.  Some NGOs may 
not be ready to do management work or fit into the criteria, guidelines and goals set by funders. In 
practice, the NGOs need to report their progress, along with the financial report, several times as 
outlined in the contract agreement. The amount of information needed to report on increases over 
the duration of the project. The first report might need not to be as extensive as the final one. 
Generally, the NGOs are asked to report on activities, their outcomes and participants as well as 
carry out a self-evaluation of the activities. The tasks of monitoring and assessment consist of 
many varied indicators and criteria. The NGOs must fill pages of assessment forms which require 
knowledge and experience, to a certain degree, to effectively complete them. For the final report, 
they are also required to specify and analyse their target groups and areas, strategies, publicity, 
publications, participation with other organisations, and so on. These self-assessments are both 
quantitative and qualitative, and require advanced technical knowledge and expertise. The final 
report must be written in a standard book format with a cover, acknowledgments, an executive 
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summary, table of contents, preface, body texts, summary, bibliographies, appendixes and other 
visual materials (if any). 
The funded NGOs are asked to record every detail of financial expenditure/income and 
submit accounts with audit reports approved by a professional auditor. This creates difficulties for 
the less professionalised and institutionalised NGOs in particular. Professionalised or large NGOs 
are likely to have an in-house audit section or similar which performs the finance-related tasks; 
small NGOs have less developed finance department, if any, and need to hire external accountants 
to perform the task. Moreover, the NGOs are obliged to act according to numerous laws and 
regulations which are written in legal language and need to be interpreted into common language. 
NGOs workers are compelled to learn and familiarise themselves with prescribed rules. One 
important rule for the grantees is that they must not have been involved in any commercial and 
advertising activities related to tobacco and alcohol for the year leading to receiving funding from 
the THPF and must not take any support from tobacco and alcohol industries during the funding 
period. The THPF even has regulations that the grantee must use the THPF logo and state its 
mission message on any products, or in any activity, so that the public will know that the activities 
are funded by the THPF. With minuscule but numerous funding requirements, NGOs funded by 
the THPF are likely to spend a great deal of time dealing with writing project reports and other 
documentation, which are perceived as ‘extra’ to the working mission. 
Even so, some funded NGOs mentioned some positive aspects of the bureaucratisation. 
For example, as noted above, the THPF introduced a system where the funded organisations need 
to hire an approved external auditor and stricter financial regulations. This system is reported 
through interviews as novel in the social sector. According to Mr Tan, a senior NGO worker: 
 
 THPF financial regulation, especially the part that requires an external auditor, is new to us 
[NGOs]. This matter might be normal for business organisations but for NGOs it is not. Auditing 
social development projects creates difficulties [for NGOs]. It takes time to adapt [to the system]. 
The regulations are also stricter than ones of bureaucracy… For example, we need to submit the 
original receipts for things or services [bought for running the project] (Mr Tan, interview). 
 
 Moreover, reporting as a part of bureaucratisation allows the funder to exert influence on 
a funded project/programme and the funder (Bornstein 2003; Ebrahim 2005). Ms Peach, a senior 
NGO activist, gave an interesting account of how her organisational initiatives have become a 
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lesson learnt by the THPF. She started by complaining about the bureaucratic procedures and 
performance measurement approach of the THPF heavily focusing on the measurable 
outputs/outcomes which made her feel uncomfortable and then thought of a new way to create an 
output/outcome. This new way ended up being the model the THPF adopted to run its activities 
ever since. 
 
We’re asked to justify our output and outcome quantitatively. [At first,] we tried to create a number 
of trained young people which was a quantity-type work measured within a 2-3 year-timeframe. 
Later, we tried to do more in a qualitative way, through storytelling and empowerment. We asked 
the young people to create stories of people… and built the process of coaching. The young people 
didn’t only stay within our organisation but engaged with the others… We ourselves created the 
monitoring and empowerment system to support the young people in the areas we’ve trained them. 
Then, our organisation proposed to the THPF to run activities like this. The THPF at first didn’t 
have much of a system to develop young people [in local areas] and, indeed, the way to measure 
the product quantitatively itself. It originally tended to focus more on the Youth Council [the youth 
organisation officially initiated and endorsed by the state] (Ms Peach, interview). 
 
In fact, the THPF is not the only body responsible for bureaucratisation. The state is also 
heavily involved in a more direct way. While the THPF directly, albeit perhaps unintentionally, 
requires the funded NGOs to bureaucratise, the government always deliberately forces the 
bureaucratisation of NGOs through formal and informal supervision and interference in their 
community work. For the government, cutting the source of money is a way to appropriate the 
NGO sector. Apart from the effort to manipulate the THPF’s fund for its own interest, the 
government has also tried to bureaucratise the funding so that the NGOs will find it more difficult, 
or even impossible, to access. For example, since 2014 with the new government following a coup 
led by Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, there has been more oversight from the government and it is 
suspected to keep increasing. In 2016, every organisational bylaw and guideline was revised by 
the influence of the government intervention to bureaucratise the THPF. At the moment, the 
original THPF Act is in the process of amendment, which has been widely opposed by the NGOs 
and health activists. The government has tried to make considerable changes to the autonomy of 
the financial procedure and the governance of the THPF, making it similar to a state department 
under direct state control.  
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In an indirect way, although the THPF is a non-departmental agency, it is still a public 
organisation accountable for the statutory body functioning within the framework of the state 
bounded to bureaucratic culture. To be fair, the THPF was not born with it, yet as it has evolved, 
it has become more subject to bureaucratisation. For instance, a clear division between sections 
within the office and the procedures of the board meetings came about in late 2006 after the THPF 
had been established for 5 years (Board of Governance 2006, 19 Oct, item 4.3). Many bureaucratic 
protocols even came after that. Interviews with THPF senior staff support this point, that is, the 
THPF has barely wanted to be bureaucratic and, indeed, tried to avoid bureaucratisation as much 
as possible.  
The THPF board is also significantly influenced by bureaucracy and state power as the 
proportion and direction of the members favours the public sector. Chairing by the PM with the 
help of the MoPH implies that the state and bureaucracy still ultimately hold the decision-making 
power over the organisation. In addition, the Evaluation Board’s work reflects the logic of the 
performance-based capitalist market emphasising expertise, competition, accountability and 
performance. Focusing on outcomes and social impacts, THPF performance is monitored and 
evaluated at three levels: planning and programming, the master plan, and at organisational level. 
Consequently, this creates ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ of the organisation by monitoring and evaluating the 
organisation’s performance which will become new criteria for future operations. Although its 
autonomous status would free it from the rigid and complex structures of a bureaucratic system, 
bureaucracy-as-professional-administration still functions well in the THPF. It appears that these 
protocols and working standards are being imposed on the grantees that have a lower position and 
direct interaction with the THPF. The funded NGOs are inclined to be more hierarchical given the 
isomorphic pressures put on them by the THPF. 
 
8.7 Becoming stronger, becoming organised 
There is a general belief among civil society actors that the more organised they are, the 
more they can become ‘stronger’. The development pattern of the NGOs from a loosely organised 
entity to a more organised one is not entirely new. Research suggests that NGOs are likely to 
constantly evolve through a series of ‘generations’: from ad hoc units interested in meeting the 
immediate needs of vulnerable people in their initial days, to more formal organisations in their 
later days reaching the final stage of working in a network focused on certain issues and wider 
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structural concerns (Korten 1990). To become an organisation is to be institutionalised to some 
extent (Salamon and Anheier 1992), that is incorporating signs of institutional reality such as rules 
of procedures, regular meetings, and membership which differentiate NGOs from ad hoc or 
temporal gatherings (Anheier 2014). 
Mr Jet, a senior NGO worker running a THPF programme, explained the assumption 
underlying such belief: 
 
With the active grant scheme of the THPF, sufficient budget was distributed to innovate in local 
communities. We NGOs could run activities outside the box. For instance, I’m working on reducing 
alcohol consumption with communities. I’ve seen communities developing innovations such as 
helping people to stop drinking by focusing on something else instead. The ones who became 
successful through the programme were happy when they saw their planting results and so on. I 
think this is the benefit the THPF gave us. The THPF makes civil society developed and strong. 
Besides, [with the THPF’s support] we can pass on our ideologies to civil society through our extant 
works. Although we did not have the THPF then but we had the ideology aiming to make people 
stronger and become self-reliant. Now we’ve the THPF as a tool to relay our ideologies. Together 
we advocated for people to form their organisations and became stronger. To reach a long-term 
goal, people must become stronger and they able to have their own voice. This is what the THPF 
has generated (Mr Jet, interview). 
  
The organisation of civil society represents the pressure for institutionalisation exerted by 
the THPF. The THPF perceived that the NGOs often have difficulties with paperwork and 
finance/accounting systems. They need to be institutionalised so that the collaboration would be 
easier. Comments from Mr Heat, a THPF senior officer dealing with policy and strategy, clearly 
describe the situation. 
 
Given they are NGOs, they have less prioritised management and financial systems. When they 
don’t put an emphasis on them, they can’t become organised, institutionalised. With such 
arrangements lacking, the NGOs I’ve dealt with have often had to change their finance and 
accounting staff. The turnover rate is high, I guess. Both big and small NGOs are the same. They 
can’t effectively manage their finance and accounts… The small NGOs can still sometimes manage 
their money better because they’ve got smaller, simple budgets (Mr Heat, interview). 
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 The above comment is directly made towards the funded NGOs, regardless of their size. 
From the THPF’s perspective, the NGOs’ standard of management, especially in finance and 
accounting - which is the major part the THPF deals with - is rather weak and needs 
systematisation.  
 One common way to achieve such systematisation as a part of institutionalisation is to 
formally register the NGOs with the state. The registration requires the NGOs to possess certain 
forms of organisation, skills and resources, which can be considered the minimum standards for 
engaging with the funding. Mr Glass, a senior NGO worker whose organisation has a long 
connection with both foreign and domestic donors, firmly concurred with the need to 
institutionalise NGOs in order to attract the funding:  
 
[Back then,] our group was just a loosely organised party. But, one important condition of many 
donors was they would only recognise a group with legal person status. We then needed to establish 
our group to be an [organised] NGO, registered with the state so that we could get the legal 
acknowledgement. Such status has made it easier to deal with donors, be they bureaucracy or 
foreign agencies. We registered to gain credibility (Mr Glass, interview). 
 
Generally, the THPF requires anyone who pursues the grants to be, to some extent, 
organised or incorporated as the contract-based funding is a legal activity. In Thailand, only 
registered NGOs are regarded as official NGOs qualified to conduct legal transactions with other 
organisations (Shigetomi 2002; Cheecharoen and Udornpim 1999). However, the pull to register 
with the state risks driving the NGOs to obsess about money and materials as the registration 
requires a certain amount of endowment fund to prove the organisations’ stability. 
Becoming more organised is also believed to increase the NGOs’ chance of getting 
funding. In an application for granting, the THPF suggests that the project proposal must be carried 
out by a credible and reliable group of people relevant to the area of the proposed project. These 
applicants have to be endorsed by a credible individual who has no involvement or interest in any 
payment from the applicants. In reality, no one would like to be accountable for informal groups 
without institutional backing. Institutionalisation increases the stability and credibility of the group 
and makes the credible individual feel, to some extent that the institution is safe to endorse. 
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Moreover, some NGO members did not think that they were passively confined by 
institutionalisation pressure. Mr Pun, a senior NGO worker, gave an interesting account relating 
to this notion: 
 
Change in organisations is normal. Being organised is fine… [However,] as the organisation tends 
to grow larger, this causes a lot of difficulties in terms of management as it requires a certain amount 
of money and resources to be managed. Civil society should function with small, but active and 
flexible organisations. In fact, civil society organisations should be created easily and terminated 
easily as well. If they achieve their missions, they can disappear. Yet, individuals’ capabilities 
[within the organisations] might develop over time. Someone might be involved in the task of 
management task and gain capability. Then, he/she might start a new project or work with a new 
organisation. The capabilities belong to individuals and they can’t be taken away; what can be taken 
is just the role the individuals held. This is the flexibility I’m talking about which allows individuals 
to develop themselves without the limitation of the organisational boundary. I think this can 
contribute more to civil society (Mr Pun, interview). 
 
It is possible to say that Mr Pun argues for de-institutionalisation of civil society focusing 
more on civil individual actions. It stresses that working skills and knowledge which are integral 
to the NGO actions actually belong to individuals. It resonates the notion of ‘non-governmental 
individuals’ (NGIs) (Wasinpiyamongkhon 2013), possibly understood as a counter mechanism to 
institutionalisation. The NGIs refer to an NGO-based social activist/worker: ones who see 
themselves mostly belonging to the NGO sector but believed to be capable of acting without their 
institutional constraint. It involves the individualistic attribute of individuals’ working style which 
partially relates to their NGO workplaces. NGIs may not necessarily work for NGOs; yet many 
NGOs are established to facilitate individuals’ personal work. This potentially explains why Mr 
Pun advocates the NGO model which in general is momentary and not well-established in the 
sense that it is not strictly institutionalised. The NGO model was created to support individuals 
rather than institutions. 
 
8.8 Partnering with the state and the institutional advocacy  
NGOs are professionalised and institutionalised so that they are better stabilised and 
recognised. In the contracting setting, the more professional they are,  the higher the chance that 
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they are selected to participate in institutional settings of government (Take 1999). The state has 
tended to get involved with social actors that are effectively organised and resourceful because 
such institutionalised actors can help the state to achieve its goals (Bell and Hindmoor 2009). For 
the NGOs, this is about resources and inner-organisational building to secure their survival (Kriesi 
1996; Campbell 2005) by developing consistent norms, functions, and routines, having a charter, 
and establishing managerial bodies that are not solely relied on certain individuals. Yet, in the 
NGOisation context, these processes mean more than contributing to the intention of a system’s 
stability and professionality (see Lang 2013). It also means an increase in institutional work for 
the NGOs. Their institutionalisation serves to bolster the NGOs to better socialise with 
government. As the processes allow the NGOs to work in harmony with the government, they can 
foster an elite group of activists at the expense of horizontal their (Jacobsson and Saxonberg 
2013b). It is suspected that the expansion of the NGOs by fostering top-down, centralised, 
bureaucratic, corporate NGOs rather than through grassroots, bottom-up processes potentially 
harms the building of a functioning civil society (Henderson 2002; cf. Fagan 2005). 
Furthermore, in the study of the development of the Community Organisation Council in 
Thailand, Praditsilp (2018) found that there has been an increasing necessity for civil society 
groups to become institutionalised and formalised, when working with the state system. The 
Community Organisation Council Act was promulgated in 2008 to meet the need of social 
movements and community organisations which required an institutional basis to advocate certain 
policies and issues. Interestingly, the institutionalisation of these civil society groups was heavily 
advocated by quangos including the THPF which appears to take the lead in championing civil 
society organisations to work with the state. 
The THPF, through its tri-power strategy, shows itself to be in favour of institutional 
advocacy, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Institutional advocacy, typically through lobby 
officials and authorities, has been heavily influenced by a successful model of policy advocacy on 
tobacco control. Other areas of THPF work have often looked upon the tobacco control plan in the 
hope of learning its secret in achieving changes. The nature of lobbying by the THPF and its NGOs 
is well represented in what Dr Top said:  
 
Lobbying is an unpleasant work. To advocate policies is to get in contact with the political or policy 
authorities, talk to them with a good manner. We can’t go and order them to stop doing anything 
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we don’t like… In politics, negotiation is important. They always ask us ‘why should I believe 
you?’ We need to convince them with evidence and rhetoric. I’m trying to create an expertise in 
advocacy [lobby] but it’s so hard (Dr Top, interview). 
 
Dr Top is a distinguished medical doctor who is one of the founding members of the THPF 
and a senior health worker for tobacco control. His numerous achievements through his 
organisation are respected by the THPF and its NGO community for being an influential working 
model. He is regarded by other interview participants as a champion in this field because he often 
lobbies the authorities to get his propositions formalised. 
 Also, the lobbyist mentality is arguably embedded deep in the design of the governance 
structure of the THPF. To have the PM as the chair of the Board is a deliberate design allowing 
the THPF to directly push its policies to the government through the PM. Getting into contact with 
the authorities is regarded as one of the best strategies employed by the THPF at all levels. 
 Another reason why lobbying is seen as a good strategy, is because it avoids tensions and 
conflicts with the government. Dr Top continued: 
 
The THPF has emphasised the lobbying strategy [through getting into contact and having informal 
conversations with the authorities] because the state and the government are authoritative. If we 
often run external advocacy [including public protest and mass mobilisation], the government is 
surely not happy. We will only increase our chance to get attacked (Dr Top, interview). 
 
 However, the lobbying tendency the THPF created is seen to be problematic. The funded 
NGOs are driven to make changes as a result of the projects/programmes granted. The fact is that 
it is very difficult for NGOs without any authority or powerful resources, to make a change at the 
national or systemic level. The change should not only be described as a policy change potentially 
achieved by contacting with the authorities. In fact, policy/system changes should not only be 
reached through the expert and the authority. Thinking of lobbying as the default mode of advocacy 
discourages the potential of civil society and a bottom-up approach to change, reflecting elite, top-
down approach instead. Dr Rat, a senior thinker in the health sector who has a close relationship 
with the creation of the Triangle, firmly criticised the lobby politics of the THPF. 
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It seems like the THPF has its goal when it grants, that is, to ask the grantees to create impacts, to 
make a policy change.… Lobbying became the common mode they used. I think this comes from 
the misinterpretation of the THPF on the very idea of the Triangle. The ultimate goal of the 
Triangle… is mutual learning. Making policy change without learning isn’t right. Lobbying is not 
the goal… The Triangle does not suggest the lobbying of authorities… Those working with the 
THPF often assume that in order to make a policy change, they need to use lobbying. There are no 
alternatives. [In fact, they should use more] social communication and learning… Just granting 
three groups of actors [government departments, academics, and NGOs] isn’t enough. Change 
won’t automatically happen… The THPF needs to establish a learning mechanism to manage the 
continuity and the dynamic of the partnership and the collaboration between them. Granting may 
not be necessary… Policy changes don’t happen only by the authorities in the system. They don’t 
come exclusively from policy makers and bureaucracy. The THPF shouldn’t let people think in 
such a top-down view [that the policy always come from above]. To set the goal for the partners to 
make a system change isn’t wrong, but it is wrong to infer that lobbying the authorities to reach the 
desired policy outcome is a must (Dr Rat, interview). 
 
 Actually, the assumption that the ultimate goal of the THPF and its NGOs is to bring about 
change is controversial. The THPF and its partners have always been criticised, for example, for 
increasing earmarked-tax revenue and yet their inability to significantly decrease the rate of 
alcohol and tobacco consumption, obesity, and related unhealthy lifestyles, which are believed to 
be the THPF and its NGO partners’ main mission (see ThaiPublica 2015). It seems that, from a 
critical perspective, changes do not happen. However, this view is based on a misunderstanding 
that the THPF is the one creating changes. Indeed, the THPF is not a doer, but a facilitator or an 
enabler. Its operational tools are granting and technical support. Mr Pun, a former senior office of 
the THPF, interestingly said that: 
 
[To directly make a change] isn’t a mission for civil society and the THPF, but it’s a state 
bureaucracy responsible for certain issues. The THPF aims at the bureaucracy to effectively let 
others succeed in their work by giving support, such as technical know-how. Only civil society 
[funded by the THPF] creates innovation and such know-how. It doesn’t make a change by itself… 
Bureaucracy must be the focal actor of certain issues. With this belief, it’s reasonable for the THPF 
to grant a two- or three-year project. When the know-how has been learned [through the project], 
it’s passed on to relevant public organisations which are the main doers (Mr Pun, interview). 
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 The statement given above by Mr Pun reflects the THPF’s approach to NGOs as lead agents 
from civil society corresponding to literature on development studies: NGOs are expected to 
experiment and give successful models of working which others such as public and business 
organisations could then apply or even replicate (Wallace, Bornstein and Chapman 2006). In this 
regard, the THPF and its civil society partner are supporters, in particular, of the state bureaucracy 
to effectively perform its job. The THPF officers always refer to their work as adding a ‘lubricant’ 
to a machine, provided the machine is the organisation responsible for making the change. The job 
is to ‘enable’ changes, not ‘make’ them. Additionally, change requires a multi-sectoral approach. 
This is why the THPF believes that non-state actors are needed to reach the goal and that the tri-
power strategy is essential. 
 However, what Mr Pun said also implies the significant role of the THPF as an intermediary 
agency between the political authorities and the NGOs. To pass the results or the prototypes of the 
projects made by the NGOs to the state, the THPF must act as a bridge and connect the authorities 
within public organisations. Partnerships between the state and the NGOs are also encouraged 
under such a vision.  
The institutional advocacy approach stimulates NGOs to get involved with the government 
and sometimes gain insider status. Having civil society actors gain insider status in governmental 
agencies - becoming government insiders while retain sharing the NGOs’ goals and values - is a 
good example of a product of the institutional advocacy approach (Lang 2013; Banazak 2010; 
Skrentny 2003). The NGOs can access the inner orbit of governmental decision making and 
advocate what they want (see Gouws 1996; Chappell 2002). The health system movement seems 
to excel in this strategy through the operation of the RDM led by health influencers such as Dr 
Prawes Wasi, a distinguished advisor of the THPF. The RDM is believed to have had significant 
influence on the THPF since its inception and the general public health institutions (see 
Wibulpolprasert 2003; Vongtangswad 2017; Sapyen 2013). Many RDM members have played a 
part in THPF governance and management system at different times through being the CEO, a 
Board member, an advisor, an expert, and so on. They have also involved many NGOs as 
committee members. These people originally held government positions in the MoPH and had 
introduced new approaches to social movement in the country. They created NGOs to function 
outside the state power while making use of their governmental resources due to their positions, 
to support the NGOs’ causes (Sapyen 2013). As a result, many policies they advocated were 
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successfully implemented. They were working for both the NGOs and the government at the same 
time, providing the institutional setting in government decisions on the NGOs. They have helped 
many NGOs to connect with political elites (see Vongtangswad 2017). For the THPF, this model 
tends to bring success in policy advocacy. The THPF has then encouraged the NGOs to participate 
in any kind of government setting: be it as a participant, a committee member, or a partner. 
Traditionally, policy advocacy of the NGOs mainly aimed at creating or changing laws. 
With the support of the THPF, policy advocacy has become a practice where the NGOs need to 
integrate themselves into the state structure, helping the state to better achieve its agenda. 
Sometimes, this runs the risk of making the NGOs merely extras for the state projects. 
 
8.9 Depoliticised NGOs 
The processes mentioned so far have brought a certain version of civil society to Thailand, 
a co-opted, elite civil society in a ‘depoliticised’ partnership. First of all, the NGOs are compelled 
to focus on their ‘core business’ or the ‘task at hand’, being busy with day-to-day, paper-based 
jobs with a total interest in their own ‘projects’. Their work has become more focused on managing 
systems for issue/problem-driven advocacy while discarding their ideological commitments and 
the broader socio-politico environments as they are not relevant to the funding cycle and their 
organisational reproduction/survival. It has shaped an advocacy repertoire for the NGOs and 
established a depoliticised and well-trained professionalised class of civil society (see Lang 2013; 
Choudry and Kapoor 2013a).  
The approach to health promotion advocated by the THPF, particularly in recent years, is 
seen to make work become more technical. There is little debate about non-economic and political 
factors regarding health promotion projects. In other words, the broader landscape of health 
promotion and related social development is often overlooked or oversimplified. The THPF thus 
has never directly discussed political ideologies and issues related to the projects. It rather 
addresses their technical aspects. Many interview participants argued that the complexity of issues 
and work have been reduced to ‘words’ appearing as the indicators in strategic planning. The 
NGOs are barely asked about the normative dimensions of the issue and work but only the methods 
to achieve the indicators. According to Ms Jeep, a senior NGO worker: 
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In the later years of the THPF, it was pressured to respond more to the health problems… The 
THPF has tried to design activities and strategies to address these problems… Work issues are 
narrower, for me. We [the THPF and the funded NGOs] must, too much, work to solve issue-based 
problems… The THPF’s approach to health thus cannot be made widespread… With this mind-
set, we’re focusing too much on solving problems. Other dimensions, such as prevention and 
foundation of health promotion, have started to disappear. Premature shortcuts to the problems are 
always immediately asked for (Ms Jeep, interview). 
 
Worst, the NGOs have stopped asking about or had less interest in the bigger questions, 
such as how they should respond to the nature of the political regime in which they are embedded, 
or engaging with questions relating to the kind of authorities that suppress the development of the 
civil society. Rakyutidharm (2014a, p. 523) found that some NGO activists under THPF funding 
‘pay less attention to the politics of the construction of [the] THPF and its political projects and 
act as if the structure and work of [the] THPF emerge naturally without politics’. To survive, the 
NGOs are compelled to negotiate and cooperate with the state authorities if the state can help them 
reach their ‘own’ goals. They risk forsaking their constituencies by negotiating or collaborating 
with corrupt authorities, just in order to reach their goals. The understanding and definition of 
social problems is reduced to their own technical problems, revolving only around how to achieve, 
by using any techniques or means, to reach their own goals.  
The THPF also somehow censors the NGOs on ‘risky’ activities. Evidence from interviews 
suggests that the THPF is quite concerned about its connection with the ‘hot’ work as it can damage 
the THPF’s image and position with the government. Ms Peach, a senior NGO activist, mentioned 
activities her organisation did which were sensitive to political conflict and which the THPF was 
extremely concerned about. Her NGO does not directly work on health areas such as alcohol or 
tobacco control but on human rights and human development. 
 
The THPF is extremely sensitive and defensive on issues such as rights, environments, etc. which 
represent the contemporary peoples movement. The THPF is rather happy to work with alcohol 
and tobacco reduction… I’ve faced an unexplained freeze of a project involving human rights 
literacy which challenged the government. The THPF was afraid that the project might cause harm. 
Although the project resumed later, I think this was not right. The THPF should indeed execute 
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‘health’ beyond physical dimensions, to cover social and environmental determinants as it always 
claims. Civil society cannot limit itself to only alcohol and tobacco control (Ms Peach, interview). 
 
In fact, for Ms Peach’s NGO, the funding from the THPF has been used specifically for 
certain activities, not all of those in the organisation.  Hence, there have been activities supported 
by the THPF and others the THPF did not. However, for the public, there is always a 
misunderstanding that everything the organisations funded must represent the THPF. The funded 
organisations do not necessarily represent the THPF in all as aspects and vice versa. Ms Peach’s 
NGO strategically chooses to run the ‘safe’ activities (or ‘cool’ work) with the THPF’s presence 
while operating ‘sensitive’ activities (or ‘hot’ work) such as protest against the state without it. 
Furthermore, she carefully chooses to avoid certain terms or alter them to suit the THPF’s comfort 
zone, if she still wants to do ‘hot’ work, which indeed makes her and her colleagues uncomfortable. 
These are to mitigate and prevent the tensions between the state, the THPF, and the NGO itself. 
Ms Peach knows what kinds of projects should be proposed for THPF funding and what should 
not be, and the THPF does, unofficially, send a kind of signal to warn the NGO of the ‘sensitive’ 
topics. 
 
The THPF sent some signals when we ran some [sensitive] activities in which the THPF’s presence 
was obvious. They think it can create some difficulties for them… They said this would make the 
THPF uncomfortable to work with my NGO. It wanted us to be more considerate [to the THPF’s 
presence in this kind of issue]… The THPF has been put on a defensive stance too much. They 
worried too much about what will happen to them (Ms Peach, interview). 
  
 However, not every NGO is passively depoliticised. Mr Jet, a senior NGO worker, 
critically scrutinises the THPF and pointed out during the interview that although the THPF is 
afraid of the state, which is why it has depoliticised itself to be safe, he is ready and willing to 
challenge the state if  he feels the state is doing wrong, especially to the people.  
 
The THPF may seem obvious in its mission, that is, to promote health and well-being, but it isn’t 
brave enough to show its position and thought against what it is dealing with… In times of crisis, 
the THPF doesn’t play its cards. I don’t think this is ok. The THPF should face and confront [the 
government]. Indeed, the THPF has a shield, its partners and people. They are ready to protect the 
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THPF. So, why be scared?… I think the THPF is too scared of power that is greater than its own: 
the power of unjust, undemocratic government. Anyway, the partners are ready to confront such 
power. Even though we may have to act against the PM’s order, we are not scared. The PM is 
fallible, isn’t he? Criticism is needed (Mr Jet, interview). 
 
The case of the THPF serves to exemplify the limitation of the state’s ability to ‘purchase’ 
the NGOs to contribute to public policy. The NGOs which need to work against the state can still 
oppose government projects or contribute to policy in a way they would like to, although they are 
told to collaborate with the state or ‘make a difference’ within state institutional setting instead of 
being outside state coalition. This is made possible due to the double nature of the THPF: being a 
public organisation constrained by rules but also a foundation allowing the recipients to perform 
their own missions. However, the NGOs under THPF support run a risk of becoming the anti-
political machine of development (see Ferguson 1990; Wood 2016), which is driven by neoliberal 
ideas of self-interested individualism and market efficiency discouraging interest and engagement 
in politics and communities.  
 
8.10 Conclusion 
 This chapter suggests that the relationship between the THPF and the funded NGOs and 
how the NGOs are metagoverned have consequences toward the development of the NGO sector 
and civil society in general. In this regard, this chapter aims to respond to the third research 
question: what does the relationship produce? In doing so, the chapter looks at the way the funded 
NGOs are driven to be NGOised. 
 The developments of the characteristics of NGOs under the THPF funding discussed in 
this chapter emerge regardless of the THPF’s intention to foster them. The NGOs are made to 
adapt themselves to become appropriate targets of metagovernance, or suitable partners, in the 
relationship. As a result, they tend to become more professionalised, institutionalised, 
bureaucratised, and depoliticised, which together strengthens the NGOisation of civil society. In 
fact, these changes are neither inherently good nor bad. However, they bring a certain version of 
civil society which is preoccupied with organisational reproduction, institutional advocacy and the 






This chapter discusses the major findings in order to draw some conclusions in the light of 
existing frameworks and current debates. By engaging with retroductive strategy, this thesis 
particularly aims to make an explanation on what can account for the NGOisation of civil society 
discussed in the previous chapter. In other words, it is interested in why the NGOisation of civil 
society has unfolded.  
Through this, three main research questions were formulated to guide the analysis of the 
research: 
1) What is the nature and characteristic of the relationship between the THPF and the 
funded NGOs?; 
2) How are the funded NGOs steered and metagoverned by the THPF?; 
3) What does the relationship produce? (or in what way are the funded NGOs driven to 
be NGOised?) 
The overall answer is that NGOisation of civil society happens through the 
metagovernance of the state donor. The NGOisation discussed in this thesis emerged out of the 
metagovernance by the THPF of its NGO partners and in turn, intentionally or not, driven them to 
become more professionalised, institutionalised, bureaucratised, and depoliticised.  
 
9.1 THPF-NGO relations, metagovernance and NGOisation 
Metagovernance helps connect broader, abstract ideas of changing state-society relations 
with what is occurring within practice. NGOisation reflects the relationship between the funder 
and its funded NGOs as well as the consequence of the relationship. The development of the 
THPF-NGO relation has resulted in a certain version of state-society relation in Thailand which is 
different from that of a liberal society, a prominent character of most Western societies.  
The analysis of the THPF-NGO relation reflects the relational view of state-society, where 
the state does not only penetrate society but works closely with social actors. This is because the 
state can better reach its goals provided that the interests of the state and society are advanced 
collaboratively, not competitively. The THPF has enabled the state to increase its capacity and 
reach over the NGO sector, proving that the Thai state has attempted to rearrange governance 
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arrangements by adopting a metagovernance stance. The THPF itself can be considered as a new 
working model for a better state-society relation as it is involved with the designation and the 
implementation of cross-sectoral partnership in promoting health and social purposes. Specifically, 
it suggests the ‘state-in-society’ approach, the relational model to understand state-civil society 
interactions. In such relationship, civil society is implicated in all sorts of political and social 
change, including change in state governance (Weiss 2008). 
In specific, in response to the three research questions respectively, this chapter argues that 
the relationship between the THPF and the NGOs is interdependent, asymmetrical, and 
consequential. 
 
9.1.1 The interdependent relation: state-society relations in relational perspective 
The dependency on funding does not mean that the funded NGOs are totally passive to the 
THPF. In fact, the THPF needs to rely on the NGO partners to implement the projects/programmes. 
Without the partners, the THPF is only a source of money. Interaction between the THPF and the 
NGOs is thus not confined to financial relations. The THPF-NGO relationship is not a common 
patron-client relationship seen in some literature in the field. This thesis agrees with Rakyutidharm 
(2014a) that the collaboration between the THPF and NGOs is found driven not only by the 
reciprocity but also by the shared development ideology, that is, to promote a public health policy. 
It would be misleading to look at the THPF-NGO in terms of patronage relationship. The 
relationship between them is rather interdependent. 
The thesis found that the NGOs are welcome to become a part of the THPF’s project. As 
an agent of the THPF, the outputs and outcomes of the NGOs can be considered as those of the 
THPF too. The NGOs have become a mechanism, a network mechanism, of the THPF while the 
THPF establishes and exercises its power over/through the NGOs. In other words, the THPF 
expands it values through societal initiatives and the societal actors enlarge their contribution 
through the THPF. 
The THPF-NGO experience reflects the relational idea of state-society relations. The 
THPF enhances its power and capacity by developing close, interdependent relationships with 
NGOs and using networks to govern. The THPF represents a ‘ consultative authoritarianist’  state 
agency which simultaneously promotes the progress of NGO and instruments of governance. 
Mechanisms of metagovernance such as partnership and granting become favoured strategies for 
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the THPF to indirectly coordinate and steer NGOs. The THPF has attempted to bring NGOs into 
the governable terrain by enabling them in a way which supports THPF values. Civil society under 
the metagoverning THPF is a form of ‘semi-civil society’ which is neither fully autonomous from 
the THPF nor completely dependent on it. This highlights the reciprocal, interdependent nature of 
the THPF vis a vis the NGOs. 
 
9.1.2 The asymmetrical relation: the metagoverning THPF and the funded NGOs 
 The THPF, as a health and societal promotor enabler, always claims that it treats its NGO 
partners as equal. Yet, the fact that the THPF is an independent APO holding a considerable 
amount of money necessarily points to its powerful resources and the capacity to metagovern. 
Indeed, the extent to which the THPF steers it partners is conditioned by how it is perceived to 
perform. This thesis suggests that the THPF should be treated as a health and societal promotor 
enabler. This role gives the THPF a distinct capacity to steer using combined modes of governance. 
The thesis argues that the THPF is performing metagovernance. The THPF strategically 
metagoverns its NGO partners through interactive governance, namely quasi-markets and quasi-
networks. The interactive governance is actualised in the form of proactive granting and the ‘tri-
power strategy’. 
 The THPF strategically grants an extensive number of non-state actors through its 
proactive approach. The grants are becoming more than just giving money; they are also tools to 
expand the THPF’s reach into areas where hitherto it had no presence and influence. The 
relationship between the funder and the funded has, at least in financial terms, never been 
symmetrical. As discussed in the thesis, the NGO sector in Thailand has received less and less 
funding from international and foreign bodies since the mid of the 1990s. Since then, APOs have 
come to be the new patrons for civil society. As a result, the NGOisation driven by the THPF has 
reshaped the landscape of Thai civil society since the 2000s. Thai NGOs, which managed to 
survive by strengthening their independent managerial strategies before the 2000s have slowly 
become dependent on public funding. The THPF has become one of the most significant sources 
of funding for civil society in Thailand and the NGOs have become dependent on it. It is hard for 
the NGOs to deny the value of the THPF. 
 In addition, the funded NGOs, along with other relevant partners, are strategically 
positioned within the partnership. Through the ‘tri-power strategy’, the THPF initially designs and 
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steers the interaction of each participant, coordinating them to reach a common goal. As a 
metagovernor, it defines ‘facts’ beforehand, that is, defines how the problem should be conceived 
and how it should be addressed in the partnership. Such facts become the common goal. This goal 
holds the authorities to facilitate or constrain the partnership using both hands-on and hands-off 
approaches. Sometimes, it merely strategically supervises the partnership by providing resources 
and connecting a number of agencies in the partnership. At the other times, it participates in the 
partnership, playing a more interventionist role. The THPF is both structuring and structured by 
the partnership. This strategy is considered performing at a higher-level of governance to shape 
how the partnership should operate, steering the strategies, actions and activities. 
 These key mechanisms of metagovernance are conducted in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’. 
Authorities and laws have taken place in the relationship. This continues giving the THPF the 
authority to metagovern its partners in order to secure future partnership. The ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’ also makes the THPF’s ability to combine different modes of steering possible. Through 
the ‘THPF Act’, the THPF is granted autonomy to govern itself through its independent board. 
Different governance mechanisms are designed to operate interactively, which result in the 
interactive governance discussed in the thesis. 
 As an independent APO, the THPF has a complicated connection with the state. The THPF 
and its partners do not function as a straightforward arm of the state governing society and health. 
In fact, the THPF itself always has an uneasy relationship with the government because it is 
operating at arm’s length distancing itself from the central state. Sometimes, it is even seen as the 
NGO incubator by the government, which has led to a series of government investigations and 
interventions. 
For the NGOs, working with the THPF allows them to enjoy a much greater autonomy 
than when they are funded by other governmental agencies. They are not subject to direct state 
control. However, it is possible to see that they remain within the purview of hierarchical control, 
the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, in the name of ‘governance’. 
In addition, the NGOs themselves are operating beyond the ‘shadow state’ thesis 
mentioned in Chapter 1. The case of the THPF-NGO relations suggests that it is not totally correct 
to perceive the funded NGOs only as a fully-fledged ‘para-state’ apparatus carrying out welfare 
functions previously shouldered by the public sector. It is evident that the funded NGOs are 
persuaded to perform the state functions within the THPF’s broad health promotion values; yet, 
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they are also allowed, or even encouraged, to pursue their own values and missions. The THPF is 
friendly to civil society in a sense that it is the only public fund in the country whose recipients 
have the autonomy to carry out their original missions. However, this does not mean that they can 
do whatever they want. The scope of the activities must match one of the values of the THPF, 
which as mentioned before, are extremely broad covering most of the social policy areas, not only 
the health ones. 
 Therefore, having the relationship with the metagoverning THPF can be seen as both co-
opting and enabling. For enabling, the THPF encourages an intense engagement and autonomy of 
civil society. It facilitates the space for NGOs to negotiate with the authorities which the NGOs 
alone cannot have. Even so, there is no doubt that the funding entails a series of constraints within 
which the NGOs must operate. It is extremely challenging for the NGOs to strike a balance 
between exclusionary tendencies and state co-optation. To position themselves between these two 
forces is subjective and influenced by the character of the NGOs themselves and the funder. The 
thesis found that different NGOs have different relations with the THPF. Highly professionalised 
NGOs which tend to have organisational signature, and poorly professionalised NGOs with no 
signature, do not enter the same kind of relations with the THPF. In particular, the NGOs founded 
since the THPF and work in the area of health are subject to a close, parenting kind of relationship 
with the THPF. On the contrary, the NGOs which were founded and actively operated before the 
THPF tend to go into a complementing (for health NGOs) or supplementing (for non-health 
NGOs) type of relation with it.  Tension is highly expected in the NGOs which are in the niched 
relations with the THPF because within this relationship, the THPF and NGOs compete to frame 
the issue of interest. The winner can establish the leadership role within the partnership. NGOs are 
allowed a certain space to exert their agency in the relationship. 
It should be noted that this work does not suggest that the possible co-optation of NGOs 
by the THPF (and the state) should blind us to their continuing significance. This thesis agrees that 
the NGOs are important forces for social and political change in Thailand, thereby becoming, as 
argued by Phongpaichit and Baker (2000, p. 251), ‘the conscience of the society… which will act 
as forces for changes towards a better future’. The question is not simply about how the NGOs 
come to align with the THPF (and state mechanisms) and how NGOs are transformed through 
THPF funding, but also how to reframe the understanding of these realignments to better 
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understand the complex social realities animating the contemporary Thai civil society and state-
society relations.  
 
9.1.3 The consequential relation: NGOisation of civil society 
 Unlike many analyses of NGOisation which look at pressures from international 
organisation or/and foreign donors or governments towards the NGO sector in a particular country, 
NGOisation argued in this thesis is more domestic and indigenous. It is driven by the THPF, an 
independent Thai APO. The effects of NGOisation generated through the metagovernance of the 
THPF are varied across different types of NGOs and the relationship they have with the THPF. 
However, the detailed empirical investigation of such an effect on different NGOs is not the main 
enquiry of the thesis. Further study is required. Instead, the main enquiry of the thesis has been 
about the push for NGOs to become suitable and reliable partners of the THPF (and indirectly the 
state). It has explored conditions for the emergence of NGOisation. Moreover, NGOisation as 
explored in this thesis only captures ‘one side’ of a reality where the THPF and its funded NGOs 
are the protagonists. Recognising large variations in civil society, NGOs, and politics in Thailand, 
this work has not tried to examine the whole of Thailand’s civil society, but just the THPF-NGO 
partnership. 
As discussed in Chapter 8, NGOs under the metagoverning THPF are driven to develop 
certain characteristics which will suit the THPF’s system better. However, three prominent 
features can be considered as emergent effects of NGOisation. 
 
 Institutionalised advocacy: NGOisation strengthens the application of institutional 
advocacy. The social movement-based advocacy heavily favoured by the Thai NGOs since the 
1980s has been made less significant through the promotion of institutional advocacy focusing on 
collaborative interaction with the state. The institutional advocacy is rather compromised, 
nurturing ‘elite’ civil society that has a capacity to connect with the authority and know the rules 
of the game behaving well in an increasing state-civil society partnership. In the Thai context, such 
institutional advocacy or lobbying also implies a tendency for NGOs to be opportunistic, being 
prepared to work with any government, even an authoritarian one, if the government can help them 
reach their goals. For the funded NGOs, with the opportunities that proximity to power brings - 
such as access to resources and insider information - comes the loss of critical distance. The 
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problem of proximity to power is not just a professional dilemma inherent to NGOs. It is also an 
aspect of the neoliberal transformation of Thai society. NGOised organisations tend to become 
elitist, upscale, and uncommitted to the social movements. 
 
 Elite civil society: as aforementioned, NGOisation creates a division between NGOs 
resulting in standard and ‘elite’ NGOs. Most NGO participants are NGO programme managers 
who sub-contract other civil society organisations. They are agents of the THPF. They act as an 
arm of the metagovering THPF using their devolved authority. These NGOs themselves 
unavoidably become a significant engine of NGOisation. They become part of the ‘system of 
managing the system’. These NGOs engage less with the public. They have contributed to their 
demobilisation and been seen as a legitimate proxy for the government and donors rather than a 
proxy for the public. In this respect, NGOs working with ideologies shared by the THPF or/and 
under the funding of THPF can be, to a certain degree, understood through the notion of ‘elite civil 
society’, mentioned in Chapter 2. They become an elite proxy between people and state agencies. 
They rather represent the interests of the THPF in the policy process and development work in 
order to ensure the continuation of funding and their very own survival. This arguably makes 
advocacy activity without public participation.  
In Thailand, the situation in which leaders of the funded NGOs speak the same language 
and share similar ideas with the funders is noted in other research (Shigetomi 2006; Rakyutidharm 
2011) as well as in this thesis. Specifically, Shigetomi (2006) even states that the leaders of APO 
donors and NGOs are sometimes the same people. This corresponds with the case of the THPF 
where experts and PAC members are often part of the funded NGOs’ advisory boards. 
Besides, NGOisation supporting institutional advocacy (such as gaining state office, 
becoming an insider to change the state and policy) potentially leads to civil society drifting from 
its original path to become a more ‘political’ society. In fact, the realm between civil society and 
political society has been blurred due to the intense interaction of state and non-state actors. This 
is because, although civil society organisations are regularly intended to influence public policies, 
they do not seek the acquisition and exercise of state power or form themselves on a partisan basis 
to advance their interests and officially compete for state office (Alagappa 2004b). For political 
society, it is an area where actors ‘compete for the legitimate right to exercise control over public 
power and the state apparatus’ (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 16). The aim of the political society is 
 201 
the ‘acquisition and exercise of state power’ (Alagappa 2004b, p. 37). The NGOs are developed 
to do more than influence the policy; they also try to manipulate state power and policy itself. The 
matter of NGOisation is thus not limited to cooperatively working with the state but somehow 
managing to grasp and make use of it. 
 
Upward accountability: Rakyutidharm (2014a) found that the collaborative development 
between the THPF and NGOs is not guaranteed to yield benefits to their intended beneficiaries. 
Specifically, this thesis found that NGOisation can lead the NGOs to prioritise the funder over 
their social bases. NGOs are focused on producing and completing their projects/programmes as 
a way to survive. Organisational reproduction is prioritised. This may be part of the process of 
adopting corporate organisational models which seek legitimacy from the funder. This research 
found that the NGO participants rarely mentioned their social beneficiaries during the interviews. 
Instead, they often showed consideration for their funder, who would assist their careers and 
support stability for their situation. The NGOs in this thesis are found to be focused more on the 
demands the funder. Upward accountability occupies the NGOs as they shift their accountability 
away from their beneficiaries and upward to the THPF. 
The THPF functions closely with civil society, thereby significantly affecting the trajectory 
of the third sector. The THPF has indeed played a crucial role in shaping NGO strategies. 
Specifically, THPF funding requirements cause significant imposition of institutional blueprint of 
civil society moulded by the THPF. NGOs which receive money from THPF are required to follow 
THPF administrative systems and project advice. They are expected to act and think in the way 
the THPF has designed. A heterogeneity and variety of civil society is replaced by the limited 
pattern of NGOs. 
In conclusion, the THPF-NGO relations reflect a version of state-society relations in 
Thailand where the state has changed from a traditional government to a metagovernor exercising 
its power through civil society and a combination of governance mechanisms beyond mere 
hierarchies. This paves the way to look at a relational dimension of the state-society relations. 
 
9.2 CR and the research on metagovernance and NGOisation 
CR was used to navigate the research for this thesis. It particularly helped the research in 
two important ways. First, it helped develop the conceptual understanding of reality, structure and 
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agency, emergence, and relationship. This is important for developing the theoretical frameworks: 
NGOisation and metagovernance. The complementary approach used for connecting the theories 
is in fact supported by the philosophy of CR. As social realities are stratified, there is a need to 
combine multiple perspectives to explain different aspects of the same phenomenon.  
Besides, the CR concept of reality reflects the idea of emergence, which is crucial to the 
concept of NGOisation. NGOisation can be understood as both a theoretical model and an 
empirical description of the Thai NGO landscape. It highlights the change in NGOs and their 
relationship with donors. The NGOisation is conceived as a process (and a result) of the NGO 
transformation under the influences of the funder to become a suitable partner in the funder’s 
business. NGOisation consists of several, interrelated developments: professionalisation, 
institutionalisation, bureaucratisation, and depoliticisation. When these developments are 
triggered under certain conditions, NGOisation is likely to be manifested and its effects tend to 
play out. These developments of NGOisation are not mutually exclusive and simultaneously 
manifested as cause and effect. The effects of NGOisation cannot be reduced to its components. It 
has emergent power which its components do not have.  
The layered ontology and emergence helped shape the analytic of metagovernance. It 
highlighted the orders of governance. Metagovernance is higher-order governance with emergent 
power, and the metagovernance of the THPF is a strategically calculated action whose power is 
far above the power of a certain governance mechanism alone. Mere hierarchical governance 
cannot make the THPF govern and steer the NGO partners in the way it does. Also, CR 
understanding of the dialectic of structure-agency and relations is typical. It encouraged the 
research to look at the interactive governance, the reciprocal, interdependent interaction between 
the THPF and the NGOs, the internal relations of the THPF-NGO partnership, and the structural 
tendency of the metagoverning THPF. There are a multiplicity of interrelating mechanisms and 
structures in the relations.  
 Second, CR helped develop methodology in a distinct way. As discussed in Chapter 3, CR 
encourages the used of retroduction which is well-suited to enquiry guided by a ‘why’ question. It 
made the research ‘exploratory’ in the sense that the research looks beyond people’s understanding 
and regularities of phenomena located in the experienced domain. It instead seeks casual 
mechanisms at the real domain which are responsible for the event observed. The research then 
focused on producing an explanatory account of what is responsible for NGOisation and how 
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metagovernance functions. The account is theory-driven but grounded in empirical data. Hence, 
CR is an interesting and constructive philosophical idea. This thesis believes that CR can provide 
a serious theoretical and methodological consequence shaping the research in a novel way. 
 
9.3 Contributions 
It can be considered that this thesis makes some principal contributions to knowledge in 
the following points: 
• Essentially, navigated with CR, the research of this thesis does not only aim at describing 
things, their relationships, and their construction of meanings but also at explaining why 
things are the way they are and why it occurs through an investigation of underlying 
mechanisms. This shows the capacity of this thesis as a social research which tries to give 
an alternative to positivism and interpretivism. The research also implicitly engages with 
evaluating things under study such as normative dimensions of the relationship, 
NGOisation, and metagovernance; 
• Methodologically, by applying CR, this thesis shows how CR research can be conducted 
using retroductive analysis. This helps advance the applicability of CR as a serious 
methodology for empirical social research. Also, the thesis elaborates the way in which CR 
can be used to advance other theories and concepts. CR is no longer left being only a 
philosophical concept but becoming a social theory and a social methodology; 
• Theoretically, this thesis directly aims to advance knowledge on metagovernance and 
NGOisation as analytical, conceptual frameworks. Both of the concept have been either 
over-theorised or poorly-theorised with deficient empirical application. This thesis thus 
elaborates a model which can be used to study metagovernance and NGOisation elsewhere; 
• To study the THPF-NGO relations reflects an attempt to look at the broader state-society 
relations and the changing state in contemporary governance in Thailand. The state is no 
longer exercising its power through state mechanisms. It expands the power with and 
through non-state, societal mechanisms, thereby developing a relational, interdependent 
relationship with the social actors. Indeed, what are discovered here can be used to look at 
and explain state-society relations in other developing countries where the state is 
authoritative but, at the same time, trying to developing supporting, enabling instruments 
for civil society development; 
 204 
• Substantively, as aforementioned, the THPF is widely recognised but largely unexamined, 
let alone its relationship with civil society. Also, the landscape of civil society funding 
since the 2000s, where the THPF and other APOs have emerged to be predominant in the 
field, has been left unexplained academically. This thesis directly aims to contribute to the 
development of understanding on the THPF as an interesting institution with both a state 
and foundation functions and its interaction and impacts on societal partnership it has 
created as well as the contemporary civil society funding development. 
 
9.4 Limitations of the research 
 All studies have limitations. Four major limitations should be mentioned. First, as this 
research is navigated by CR, it seems that the approach to apply CR of this study is highly subject 
to the researcher’s own interpretation and intellectual creativity. As mentioned, there is no 
common guide of CR research and CR is deficiently applied in empirical research. Different people 
use and apply CR in their own ways. It is possible that other CR scholars might find this research 
as diverting from their CR interpretation. However, it is better to treat this issue as a matter of 
intellectual experiment or discovery because this is believed to be the way to advance the 
knowledge of CR in actual empirical research. 
 Second, given the word limits, it is challenging to explain the developing theories and 
methodologies employed and the arguments made with sufficient and appropriate supporting 
evidence. Some parts require more space to elaborate better. 
 Third, a lack of academic research on infrastructure or foundation knowledge of the NGO 
sector and civil society in Thailand in general, especially quantitative studies like in many Western 
societies have, gave some limits on the analysis. If Thailand has an updated knowledge and 
statistical data on the sector, it would be better to see the overall character of the sector and its 
funding landscape. 
 Fourth, given the data access, it is obvious that this research found some limitations on 
getting in contact with some potential participants especially board member-level of the THPF.  
Although the research chose to complement to lack of such data with document analysis, the 
document the researcher has obtained was also subject to a degree of censorship and rejection. For 
example, not all minutes of meeting as requested is available for the researcher to access. The 
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given minutes were subject to some minor censorship. This indeed limited the analysis of the 
research. 
 
9.5 Directions for further research 
 It is reasonable to suggest some possible further research which could be conducted to 
expand and strengthen our understandings and explanations over the issue. They are as follows: 
• As this thesis argues that different NGOs have different kinds of relationship with the 
THPF, it would be interesting to look further into how NGOisation has affected each NGO 
in everyday practices. It is suspected that they as they go into different types of relationship, 
they should experience dissimilar actualisation of NGOisation; 
• Details on hands-on and hands-off mechanisms of metagovernance of the THPF as well as 
state agencies which fund organised civil society are worth of research. It is believed that 
everyday practices of metagovernance involves a web of more complex interacting power 
and mechanisms. These can give rise to the study of micro-techniques, their coordinations 
and tensions, of metagovernance; 
• Studying of mentality and operation of the board would be interesting as it can reflect the 
political strategy of the THPF over broader health and society as well as civil society in 
general. This would also give rise to an investigation in political relationship the THPF has 
with the government and political interventions which had been taken place over since the 
inception of the THPF; 
• Research on metagovernance of the Thai state on a macro-level analysis is suggested. This 
can help to historically and analytically comprehend the very nature and manner the Thai 
state in relation to society. The state is indeed changing itself into a more relational one 
where its links with society is indispensable. It is considered useful to seriously look into 
metagovernance which has taken place in other areas of Thailand. 
 
9.6 Recommendation for the THPF and NGOs 
It is recommended that the THPF needs to take the initiative in re-shaping the relationship 
and re-define the ecosystem of civil society. The THPF should highlight the interdependency 
aspects of the relations it has with the NGO partners. This thesis suggests that, unlike what is 
commonly assumed under the ‘piper hypothesis’, the funded NGOs in practice have considerable 
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decision-making space and organisational autonomy granted by the THPF. Yet, the autonomy of 
the NGOs, at the same time, is strongly circumscribed by their considerable financial dependence 
on the funder, contractual performance agreements, accountability requirements, and importantly 
working in the ‘shadow of hierarchy,’ that is, the governmental rules and expectations albeit 
indirectly. In this regard, giving NGOs more autonomy does not indicate a weakening influence 
of governmental power or the state agency of interest but new ways of governing and steering. 
This demonstrates the complex relationships the NGOs have, in that although they are dependent 
financially, they are interdependent in other resources. 
With the capacity to metagovern, the THPF should analyse the identity of NGOs, perhaps 
together with the NGOs themselves, and help them keep their identity as appropriate through the 
funding. The THPF should not narrowly define its self-perspective by only giving money and then 
asking the funded organisations to follow its values. It should find a way to bring together different 
identities and enable them to reach the common goal, that is, to address the social determinants of 
health and create a healthy society. NGOisation is not inherently bad as realising its potential can 
benefit the sector too. 
 For the NGOs, they would like to keep their passion to work and their identity. It is 
reasonable for them to think of a way to apply the funding to their work regardless of means. 
Collaboration between the NGOs and the THPF does not mean the NGOs need to be passive. In 
fact, collaboration is an important way to gain access to the resources including THPF support and 
knowledge, which in turn provides the NGOs with the chance to pursue their goals in the national 
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Interview Guideline (for THPF staff) 
 
Part A: General Information 
-How did you become involving or working with THPF? 
-What is your current responsibility in the organisation, and how do you do the work? 
-What do you think of the status and the role of the THPF in society? 
 
Part B: Working Experiences 
 
B1: Working Experiences within the Organisation 
-What do you think of the role of the Board of Governance towards the management of the office? 
-Have you encountered any difficulties by working with the Board and other sections of the office? 
If you have, what are they? And how did you overcome them? 
-How do different sections of the office operate and collaborate? 
-What will you do if there is a conflict between the office and the Board, or within the office, either 
between sections or different level of staff? 
-What is the key for efficiency in management of the THPF? 
 
B2: Relationship with Partner Organisations 
-In your view, what is a non-governmental organisation (NGO)? 
-Do you think that the THPF is an innovative funding for NGOs? 
-Does your organisation or your section have a special strategy or a policy to deal with NGOs and 
other social organisations? If it does, what is that and how does it work? 
-How do you choose the partner organisations? Does THPF have any criteria for the recruitment 
of the partner organisation? 
-What kind of project/programme do you see that suits NGOs best? 
-How do you interact with the partner organisations? 
-Have you encountered any difficulties by working with NGOs? If you have, what are they? And 
how have you deal with them? 
-What aspect of NGOs you have been dealing with that you want them to improve or develop?  
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And do you think that the THPF can help with this improvement? 
-What do you think about an opinion that the funding of THPF can lead the funded organisations 
to be more project-based in term of working approach?  
 
Part C: Influences of the THPF towards the Funded Organisations 















To what extent do you think that civil 
society and NGO sector in Thailand is 
depended on THPF funding? 
     
To what extent do you think that the THPF 
has changed the funded organisations 
during and after the funding period 
(especially regarding the size and the type 
of work of the funded organisations)? 
     
To what extent do you think that the THPF 
has an influence or an impact towards the 
policy and management of the funded 
organisations? 
     
To what extent do you think that the funded 
organisations have their managerial 
autonomies under the funding of the 
THPF? 
     
 
Part D: Reflexive Comments 
-What do you think about a criticism that the THPF is ‘a hub or a network of Dr Prawes Wasi and 
his followers’ or ‘elite civil society’ in Thailand? 
-What do you think about the idea of decentralising the THPF such as having a regional office of 
THPF? 
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-Have you satisfied with the performance and the management of THPF so far?  
-What aspect of the THPF that you would like to improve for a better working approach with 
partner organisations? 
-In your view, what is the strength of the THPF in comparison with any other social funders in 
Thailand? 
-Do you think that Thailand should have more THPF-like organisations? Why do you think like 
this? 
-Have you ever considered the THPF as a part of Thai civil society? If you have, what is the THPF 
























Interview Guideline (for NGOs) 
 
Part A: General Information 
-What is the job of your organisation? 
-What is your current responsibility in the organisation, and how do you do the work? 
-How did you or your organisation become involving or working with THPF? 
-Have you ever work for, or have a position, whatever kind, in the THPF apart from the grantee? 
-How many programmes does your organisation receive granting from the THPF? And what are 
they? 
-Have you or your organisation obtained funding from other organisations apart from the THPF? 
If you have, what were they? 
-How many percent does the funding of the THPF constitutes your annual organisation budget?  
(please give an estimated number) 
 
Part B: Working Experiences with the THPF 
-In your view, does your work suit the working approach of the THPF? 
-What is the status of the THPF in your perspective? Is it a state agency? 
-Do you think that the THPF is an innovative funding for NGOs? 
-Does your organisation follow every single suggestion from the THPF? If it does not, what would 
happen? 
-What do think about the THPF’s project review process done by appointed reviewers? 
-Who do you think that hold a power in approving and managing projects/programmes of THPF? 
Why do you think like this? 
-Have you satisfied with the performance and the management of THPF?  
-Have you encounter any difficulties when working with the THPF? If you have, what are they? 
And how have you deal with them?  
-What aspect of the THPF do you think should be improved for a better collaborative working 
with your organisation and other NGOs? 
-Do you think that the funding of THPF can lead your organisation and other funded organisations 
to be more project-based in term of working approach? If you do, what kind of change do you 
think it has on your organisation and civil society in Thailand?  
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Part C: Influences of the THPF towards the Funded Organisations 















To what extent do you think that civil 
society and NGO sector in Thailand is 
depended on THPF funding? 
     
To what extent do you think that your 
organisation or/and other organised civil 
society has been changed during and after 
the funding period (especially regarding 
the size and the type of work of the funded 
organisations)? 
     
To what extent do you think that your 
organisation or/and other organised civil 
society has been influenced by the change 
in policies and operations of THPF? 
     
To what extent do you think that your 
organisation or/and other organised civil 
society has the managerial autonomies 
under the funding of the THPF? 
     
 
Part D: Reflexive Comments 
-What do you think about a criticism that the THPF is ‘a hub or a network of Dr Prawes Wasi and 
his followers’ or ‘elite civil society’ in Thailand? 
-If you have obtained funding from other organisations, do you see any differences between the 
THPF and other funders? If you do, what are the differences?  
-Do you think that Thailand should have alternative funding like the THPF? and why? 
-Have you ever considered the THPF as a part of Thai civil society? If you have, what is the THPF 
as a part of civil society? 
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Interview Guideline (For Experts) 
 
-What is your opinion regarding the NGO sector and civil society after 1997? 
-What is your opinion regarding the funding situation of NGOs vis-a-vis the THPF? 
-What do you think about the rationale and the social function of the THPF? 
-In your view, what is the role and influence of the ‘rural doctor’ movement or Dr Prawes Wasi 
and his followers towards the THPF and Thai civil society? 
-To what extent do you think about the influence of THPF towards NGOs in Thailand? How have 
NGOs adapted themselves under the funding system created by the THPF? 
-Do you think that the funding of THPF can lead NGOs to be more project-based in term of 
working approach? If you do, what kind of change do you think it has on NGOs and civil society 
in Thailand?  
-What do you think the THPF should improve for a better working approach with NGOs? 
-Do you think that Thailand should have more THPF-like organisations? Why do you think like 
this? 





























(at the date of the 
interview) 
Background Place and Date 
of the 
Interview 
1 Ms.Woo THPF, a section director 
responsible for social and 
health risk control 
 
The interviewee has joined the THPF since the first few years of the 
organisation and has worked in a major granting section since then. 
Then, the interviewee was promoted to be a director of another 
section. 
THPF’s office, 
8 Aug 16 
2 Dr.Rice Ministry of Public Health, a 
senior advisor of the 
Department 
of Mental Health 
The interviewee is a psychiatrist and an expert on children and media. 
The interviewee was a board member (mass communication expert) 
of the THPF and has also sat on a board of many civil society 
organisations and public organisations. 
Ministry of 
Public Health, 
10 Apr 17 
3 Dr.Korn THPF, a senior officer 
 
The interviewee was an academic in the Department of Dental 
Surgery in a university and had experienced working with the THPF 
as a partner when the organisation was in its early years. Then, the 
interviewee was invited to take a position of a section director of a 
major granting section. Recently, the interviewee was promoted to be 
an executive of the THPF. 
THPF’s office, 
16 May 17 
4 Dr.Sor Quality Learning Foundatio
n (QLF), a senior office 
The interviewee is a medical doctor and an expert on health 
promotion. Before being invited to take an executive role of the 
THPF in its the early years, the interviewee was a researcher in a 
health-related research organisation which allowed the interviewee to 
QLF’s office, 
25 May 17 
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involve in the very process of the creation of the THPF. The 
interviewee was regarded as a founding member of the THPF. 
5 Dr.Sing Independent social 
entrepreneur 
The interviewee has dental surgery and activist background.  The 
interviewee joined the THPF since its early years and was also an 
executive of the THPF and the Thai Public Broadcasting Service 
(ThaiPBS), respectively. People around the interviewee regards him 
as an entrepreneur introducing innovations to the organisation.  
A coffee shop in 
Bangkok, 
30 Mar 17 
6 Ms.Fai Retired The interviewee was one of the first people who involved in the 
management of the THPF. The interviewee was an executive member 
and particularly responsible for internal management of the THPF. 
A coffee shop in 
Bangkok,  
17 Apr 17 
7 Dr.Kob THPF, a section director 
responsible for health risk 
control 
The interviewee has a dental surgery background and experienced 
with the THPF as a partner prior to joining the THPF as a section 
director of an active granting scheme. 
THPF’s office,  
13 Jun 17 
8 Ms.Sora THPF, a section director 
responsible for child, youth, 
and family promotion 
Prior to joining the THPF, the interviewee was a senior civil servant 
in the Ministry of Education.  
THPF’s office, 
16 May 17 
9 Dr.Poom THPF, a section director 
responsible for healthy 
lifestyle promotion 
The interviewee is a medical doctor and had experienced with the 
THPF as a partner. Then he was first approached to be a section 
director taken care of evaluation system of the THPF and 
subsequently promoted to the current position.   
THPF’s office, 
3 May 17 
10 Ms.Cold THPF, an acting section 
director responsible for open 
grant 
The interviewee was working as a researcher in a public health 
service agency and then applied for a job in the THPF since its early 
years. The interviewee has been working in the section she is in since 
the beginning as a staff and then promoted to a management level. 
THPF’s office, 
9 May 17 
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11 Dr.Pan THPF, a senior officer Prior to joining the THPF, the interviewee was a psychiatrist and the 
director of a research institute specialised in alcohol control funded 
by the THPF. The interviewee was then invited to be a section 
director responsible for major risk factors control of the THPF. After 
several years of work, the interviewee was promoted to help taking 
care of management of the organisation. 
THPF’s office, 
11 Jul 17 
12 Dr.Jai Thai Public Broadcasting 
Service (ThaiPBS), an 
executive 
The interviewee was a university professor interested in feminism, 
journalism, and mass communication. The interviewee was then 
invited to work in the THPF as a section director responsible for 
social communication and campaign. The interviewee was regarded 
as a person to bring critical elements to the organisation. 
THPF’s office, 
16 Jun 17 
13 Ms.Kent THPF, a section director 
responsible for a learning 
centre 
The interviewee has been working with the THPF since its early 
years. Prior to the current position, the interviewee has experienced of 
directing several issues of the THPF before, such as health system 
development, partnership and international relation, and social 
enterprise.  
THPF’s office, 
4 May 17 
14 Ms.Card THPF, a board member The interviewee is an activist and has worked in the NGO sector for 
decades. Apart from being a board member of the THPF, the 
interviewee is also an expert in alternative education and directing a 
public juvenile detention centre. 
THPF’s office, 
24 Apr 17 
15 Dr.Dark THPF, a senior, executive 
officer 
The interviewee was an engineer and a senior researcher interested in 
social impacts of technologies in a public organisation. Then the 
interviewee applied for a job in the THPF and was accepted in 2013. 
The interviewee started working with the THPF in a unit dedicated to 
THPF’s office, 
5 May 17 
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innovation development and monitoring and evaluation. Prior to the 
current position, the interviewee was promoted as a section director 
responsible for vulnerable and specialised populations. 
16 Mr.Heat THPF, a section director 
responsible for policy and 
strategy 
Prior to joining the THPF, the interviewee had experienced with 
organisations both in the public and the business sectors. He then 
applied for a position in the THPF and was accepted. Apart from 
taking care of policy and strategy of the organisation, the interviewee 
is also directing financial and accounting unit of the THPF.  
THPF’s office, 
18 May 17 
17 Ms.Gee THPF, a section director 
responsible for corporate 
communication and public 
relations 
The interviewee was a journalist and then invited to join the THPF as 
a public relations officer in the first decade of the organisation. Since 
then, the interviewee has been working in the same section. 
THPF’s office, 
16 Jun 17 
18 Dr.Three THPF, a section director 
responsible for partnership 
and international relations 
The interviewee was a senior researcher in a science and technology 
development institute. The interviewee then applied for a job in the 
THPF and was accepted. The beginning years of the interviewee in 
the THPF were dedicated to innovation support. 
THPF’s office, 
2 Aug 17 
19 Dr.Top Action on Smoking and 
Health Foundation (ASH),  a 
senior officer; the 




The interviewee is a medical doctor and a well-known health 
professional. Also, the interviewee has dedicated his life to tobacco 
control and NGO work. The interviewee was regarded as a founding 
member of the THPF and used to be a board member of the 
organisation. With such background, he was promoted as a successful 
health promotor by international society. 
ASH’s office, 
11 May 17 
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20 Ms.May Family Network 
Foundation,  a senior officer 
The interviewee is a professional social worker interested in family 
and children development. The interviewee’s organisation can be 
consider a regular recipient of the THPF’s funding, obtaining grants 




17 Aug 16 
21 Ms.Cat Child and Youth Media 
Institute,  a senior officer 
The interviewee has worked in an NGO specialised in children 
development for decades. Then, the interviewee has expanded her 
interest to other social determinants of children development such as 
media and education.  




23 Aug 16 
22 Mr.Two Thailand Walking and 
Cycling Institute,   a senior 
officer 
The interviewee has a rich experience working with international 
organisations and Northern NGOs. Also, the interviewee authored 
several articles on NGO funding in Thailand. 
Interviewee’s 
house, 
27 Mar 17 
23 Mr.Corn Stop Gambling Foundation,  
a senior officer 
Prior to working in the current position, the interviewee has worked 





2 Dec 16 
24 Mr.Tan Stop Drink Network Office,  
a senior officer 
Prior to working in the current position, the interviewee has an 
experience working in big NGOs, specialised in local and social 
development, funded by foreign donors. The NGOs’ main job was to 
fund other organised civil society. So the interviewee has a rich 
experience in civil society funding ecosystem.  The interviewee also 
often coordinated with religious organisations. The interviewee is 
regarded as working in a major area of the THPF since its inception 
Stop Drink 
Network Office, 
6 Apr 17 
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and has continuously managed one of the biggest project granted by 
the THPF. 
25 Mr.Pun Civil Society Empowerment 
Institute, a senior member 
The interviewee has several experiences in both the THPF and the 
NGO sector. The interviewee was a manager of an NGO working for 
promoting family relationship and children development. His interest 
also covered the creation of public media for children and family. The 
interviewee was then asked to be a THPF’s section director 
responsible for health promotion for vulnerable populations. 
Currently, the interviewee is organising campaigns, funded by the 
THPF, to advocate the strengthening of civil society organisations in 
the country. 
A hotel in 
Bangkok, 
19 Dec 16 
26 Dr.Luke Tobacco Control Research 
and Knowledge 
Management Centre (TRC) 
(supported by THPF), a 
senior officer 
As an academic in public health, the interviewee has, apart from 
teaching in a university, engaged with several policy advocacy for 
health promotion, especially tobacco control. The interviewee is 
considered one of the first people engaged in the operation and the 
management of the THPF. Also, the interviewee has an experience as 
being a plan executive committee of THPF’s plans such as healthy 
community strengthening plan and health promotion innovation and 
open grant. 
TRC’s office, 
1 May 17 
27 Mr.Glass Friend of Women 
Foundation, a senior officer 
Since joining the NGO community, the interviewee has been working 
for women and labour rights. The interviewee has experienced with 
foreign and domestic donors. Currently, the interviewee is responsible 






5 Apr 17 
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28 Mr.Jet Women and Men 
Progressive Movement 
Foundation, a senior officer 
The interviewee is regarded as one of the senior, progressive NGO 
activist in this generation. The interviewee has been working for 
women rights and anti-violence campaigns since he has joined the 
NGO sector. The organisation that he is running is founded by him 
and his team after he left another women NGO. He has a rich 
experience in people movements. The interviewee has involved with 
the THPF since its early years running campaigns on alcohol control 






5 Apr 17 
29 Ms.Day Action on Smoking and 
Health Foundation (ASH), a 
senior officer 
The interviewee has been working for the NGO for a long time. She 
is better understood as an NGO professional rather than an NGO 
activist as she is normally taking care of management works rather 
than going out to the fields. The organisation that she is working for 
is closely related to the THPF as it actively involved in the creation of 
the THPF and has been a major partner of the THPF since then. 
ASH’s office, 
10 Apr 17 
30 Mr.Keynes Makhampom Foundation, a 
senior officer 
The interviewee is an educator and facilitator. He can be considered a 
pioneer in advocating and experimenting alternative learning to the 
wide public. 
A coffee shop in 
Bangkok, 
10 Apr 17 
31 Ms.Read Reading Culture Promotion 
Programme, a senior officer  
The interviewee has worked with NGOs for children and media for 
children, particularly cartoon. Then, she was approached to deal with 
the promotion of reading culture in Thailand. Now, the programme 
she is working for has been funded by the THPF.  
1 May 17 
32 Ms.Sky Holt Sahathai Foundation, a 
senior officer 
The interviewee joined the NGO community for decades working to 
strengthen family unit of families in crisis in order to prevent child 





engaged with the funding of the THPF since its first decade. The 
interviewee’s organisation has a close link with foreign donors 
providing the interviewee analytical comments on the operation of the 
THPF.  
18 Apr 17 
33 Ms.Pa Folk Doctor Foundation, a 
senior officer 
As an academic, the interviewee has taught public health system and 
policy in universities for decades. The interviewee has also joined the 
NGO she is working for since its inception. Her organisation is 
specialised in health literacy and  has involved with the creation of 




18 Apr 17 
34 Mr.Wan Towards Ecological 
Recovery and Regional 
Alliance (TERRA), a senior 
officer 
The interviewee is regarded as one of the senior in the NGO 
community. He has an insight and a rich experience in NGOs. The 
interviewee was also the President of the NGO Coordinating 
Committee on Development (NGO-COD), a national NGO body to 
advocate development policy in the country. Currently, the 
interviewee is interested in environment and ecology. 
Tum Ma Pan’s 
office, 
19 Apr 17 
35 Ms.Peach Thai Volunteer Service 
Foundation (TVS), a senior 
officer 
The interviewee has worked in the NGO community for decades and 
been an expert on volunteer development. Although the interviewee’s 
organisation is old, the collaboration between the organisation and the 
THPF is relatively new. One funded programme the organisation has 
run became controversial as it involved political dimension. 
TVS’s office, 
26 Apr 17 
36 Mr.Gandalf Thai Holistic Health 
Foundation, a senior officer 
The interviewee is considered a senior in the NGO sector. The 
interviewee has also actively involved with several other NGOs such 
as the Foundation for Consumers. He holds several positions in 
committees, either public or NGO. The interviewee was a Plan 
Ministry of 
Health, 
20 Jun 17 
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Executive Committee of Health Promotion Innovation and Open 
Grant Section. 
37 Ms.Sun Path2Health Foundation, 
senior officer 
The interviewee has a lot of experience with foreign donors and 
international organisations. She can be considered a professional 
NGO worker who dedicated to management development of the 
organisation. Her organisation has started obtaining the THPF’s grant 




23 Jun 17 
38 Mr.Club Information Centre for 
Gambling Control  Policy, a 
senior officer  
The interviewee has experience working for the THPF before joining 
NGOs. Currently, he is interested in advocating gambling control 
policy work, which funded by the THPF and managed under the 
National Health Foundation (NHF). 
NHF’s office, 
4 Jul 17 
39 Mr.Pen BioThai (Biodiversity 
Sustainable Agriculture 
Food Sovereignty Action 
Thailand), a senior officer 
The interviewee is considered a senior in the NGO community and 
has engaged with the THPF for a decade. At first, the interviewee was 
approached to develop a proposal in health and food security, the 
issues on which his organisation is still working. 
BioThai’s 
office, 
6 Jul 17 
40 Ms.Jeep Women's Health Advocacy 
Foundation, a senior officer 
The interviewee is a pioneer who has been working in the NGO 
community to promote and educate sexual health for women. The 
interviewee has a strong background working with international 
development organisations and foreign donors. The interviewee has 
engaged with the THPF since its earl y years and managed  a program 
dedicated for sexual health promotion since then. 
THPF’s office, 
21 Jul 17 
41 Dr.Wat National Reform Council, a 
member 
 
The interviewee has his background in academic, Pharmaceutical 
Sciences. The interviewee was also a director of a programme 
dedicated to health consumer protection funded by the THPF. The 
National Health 
Commission 
Office, 18 Jul 17 
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interviewee holds several positions either in the state and non-state 
bodies. 
 
42 Dr.Rat National Health Foundation 
(NHF), a senior officer 
The interviewee is a distinguished, progressive medical doctor in the 
health sector. He is a part of the Rural Doctors’ Society and several 
related NGOs advocating for the public health reforms. He was also 
the first generation of the officer at the Health System Research 
Institute (HSRI), a think tank providing evidences behind many 
health initiatives, including the creation of the THPF. He reached his 
peak in public career when we was a Deputy Minister of the Ministry 
of Public Health.  
NHF’s office, 
24 Jul 17 
43 Mr.Water Foundation for Child 
Development, a senior 
officer 
The interviewee was working for the NGO for a long time. His NGO 
is one of the oldest NGOs in the country dedicated to child 





4 Aug 17 
44 Mr.Merlin Root Together, a senior 
officer 
The interviewee has experienced in running THPF’s programmes 
dedicated to vulnerable population such as disabilities empowerment. 
Currently, the interviewee is responsible for a capacity-building 
programme for leadership for change and social-health justice funded 
by the THPF. 
THPF’s office, 
21 Aug 17 
45 Dr.Nat Centre for Peace and 
Conflict Studies, 
Chulalongkorn University, a 
senior officer 
The interviewee is a respected person in the NGO and  social science  
community. As a sociologist, the interviewee was teaching and 
researching in a university until his retirement. His main interests are 
Chulalongkorn 
University, 
6 Dec 16 
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civil society, sustainable development, and the state.  He also 
dedicated himself to civil society works.  
46 Dr.Green Faculty of Agricultural 
Economics, Kasetsart 
University,  a faculty 
member 
The  interviewee is an economist teaching in a university. He is 
regarded as a public intellect dedicated himself to civil society to 
develop alternative learning models. His main interests are rural 
development, agricultural industrial, and resource management. He 
has many encounters with the THPF. 
Kasetsart 
University, 
28 Mar 17 
47 Dr.Bus Puey Ungphakorn School of 
Development Studies, 
Thammasat University, a 
faculty member 
Prior to work as an academic, the interviewee worked for the THPF in 
its early years, particularly in evaluation works. The interviewee’s 
main interests are development studies, social policy, and social 
enterprise. The interviewee is also regarded as a public intellect 
dedicated to civil society. 
Thammasat 
University, 
4 Apr 17 
48 Dr.Snake Faculty of Political Science, 
Chulalongkorn University,  
a faculty member 
The interviewee is a political scientist interested in civil society, 
social movement, and political development. She has several 
experienced with the THPF as a fundee and a hired researcher.  
Chulalongkorn 
University, 
4 Apr 17 
49 Dr.Cherry Faculty of Political Science, 
Chulalongkorn University,  
a faculty member 
The interviewee is a political scientist interested in people politics, 




21 Apr 17 
50 Dr.Plum Faculty of Humanities and 
Social Sciences, Thonburi 
Rajabhat University,  a 
faculty member 
The interviewee is a political scientist interested in public 
governance, civil society, and health reform movement. His PhD 
thesis investigated the role of the Rural Doctors’ Society, a movement 
behind the creation of the THPF. 
A coffee shop in 
Bangkok, 
21 Jun 17 
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Appendix C 





































The categorisation of interview participants 
(IP) is set up in order for the researcher to 
properly address the source of the 
interviewees. However, it does not reflect the 
positions or the activities the participants 
actually involve or have involved. For 
instance, one is working with a funded NGO 
while previously worked for the THPF or is a 
board committee of a section/programme in 
the THPF. This shows the blurring boundary 
between different sectors in society, namely 
between the THPF and NGOs. 
 
According to the figure, this research is 
heavily relied on the researcher’s personal 
network in terms of participant recruitment. 
Most of the participants have never been 
interviewed about the issue of this research 
before. They found it interesting and worth to 
study. Access to these key stakeholders is thus 
play a substantial part for establishing 
originality and interesting findings of the 
research. 
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